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I. INTRODUCTION
The virtual absence of substantive review is one of the
most striking features of the arbitration process. Barring unu-
sual circumstances, parties and arbitrators have only one
chance to "get it right." But in international commercial and
investment arbitration-fields that tend to involve disputes
with significant economic stakes and complex legal and factual
issues-the dogma of finality has come under attack, as practi-
tioners and academics have advocated for the introduction of
appeals mechanisms.
Proponents of appeals processes in the two arbitration
fields do not, however, seek to achieve a wholesale replication
of multi-tier adjudication as it exists in national legal systems.
In court systems, as many have observed, appellate review ful-
fills two principal functions: error correction and lawmaking.'
While these functions are intertwined in operation, the pur-
1. See, e.g., PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 2 (1976)
(identifying "review for correctness" and "institutional review" as the dual
functions of appellate review); Christopher R. Drahozal, Judicial Incentives
and the Appeals Process, 51 SMU L. REV. 469, 469-70 (1998) ("The first func-
tion of an appeals process is to correct errors by the initial decision-
maker ... The second function attributed to the appeals process is lawmak-
ing."); David Frisch, Contractual Choice of Law and the Prudential Foundations of
Appellate Review, 56 VAND. L. REv. 57, 74 (2003) ("[T]he distinction between
error correction and law development ... has been the keystone upon which
our whole system of appellate courts has been built."); Chad M. Oldfather,
Error Correction, 85 IND. L.J. 49, 49 (2010) ("Most depictions of appellate
courts suggest that they serve two core functions: the creation and refine-
ment of law and the correction of error."); Chad M. Oldfather, Universal De
Novo Review, 77 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 308, 316 (2009) ("Appellate courts serve
two primary institutional functions-the correction of error in the initial
proceedings, and the development of the law."). Notably, authors consist-
ently call the first function "error correction," but use a variety of terms for
the second function. Terminology is not without significance, and in this
case word choice may reflect differing views on the proper place of courts
vis-a-vis legislatures. In this Article, unless I address a more specific aspect of
the second function, I use the term "lawmaking" in a broad and descriptive
sense to refer to the role of courts in shaping substantive law. This includes
such diverse activities as the creation of judge-made law, the interpretation
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poses they serve are distinct. Error correction protects liti-
gants against erroneous decisions and safeguards the integrity
of adjudication. Lawmaking refers to the role of appellate
courts in the development and harmonization of norms.
The case for appellate review in each of the two interna-
tional arbitration fields, on the other hand, targets only one
function: error correction in commercial arbitration, and law-
making in investment arbitration. The primary argument for
appeals processes in international commercial arbitration is
that parties to high-stakes disputes should have recourse to an-
other adjudicator when awards appear to contain mistakes. In
addition, it is expected that the availability of substantive re-
view will attract new parties who currently deem arbitration
too risky. The envisioned appeals process typically takes the
form of review of awards by a tribunal appointed specifically
for this purpose. 2 In investment arbitration, on the other
of written and unwritten sources of law, the application of law to facts, and
the confirmation of the continuing validity of earlier case law.
2. See William H. Knull, III & Noah D. Rubins, Betting the Farm on Interna-
tional Arbitration: Is It Time to Offer an Appeal Option?, 11 AM. REv. INT'L ARB.
531 (2000), for an elaborate and compelling argument for offering an ave-
nue for error correction by a second arbitral tribunal within the interna-
tional commercial arbitration framework. A few years earlier, two interna-
tional law luminaries had proposed the creation of an international arbitra-
tion court, which would hear appeals from commercial arbitration awards.
These proposals, however, did not envision substantive review as advocated
by Knull and Rubins. Id. at 541-42. Rather, they suggested that an arbitra-
tion court review awards under the narrow grounds of the New York Conven-
tion, see infra Part III.A, effectively serving as a substitute for domestic courts
in enforcement decisions. See Howard Holtzmann, A Task for the 21st Century:
Creating a New International Court for Resolving Disputes on the Enforceability of
Arbitral Awards, in THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRA-
TION: THE LCIA CENTENARY CONFERENCE 109, 112 (Martin Hunter et al. eds.,
1995) (proposing a "new court [that] would have exclusive jurisdiction over
questions of whether recognition and enforcement of an international arbi-
tration award may be refused for any of the reasons set forth in Article V of
the New York Convention"); Stephan M. Schwebel, The Creation and Opera-
tion of an International Court of Arbitral Awards, in THE INTERNATIONALISATION
OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THE LCIA CENTENARY CONFERENCE, supra, at
115, 115-16 (supporting Holtzmann's proposed International Court of Arbi-
tral Awards, "whose jurisdiction would be limited to deciding upon chal-
lenges to the validity of international commercial arbitral awards."). See also
ELIHU LAUTERPACHT, ASPECTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF INTERNATIONAL JUS-
TICE 112 (1991), for the suggestion that the value of international arbitration
"may be enhanced if it is linked to a system of appeal."
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hand, proposals call for the creation of a permanent appeals
facility that articulates coherent interpretations of substantive
terms in investment treaties. The primary impetus for sug-
gested reforms is a perceived interest of the investment com-
munity at large in centralized lawmaking.
3
The difference flows, in part, from the distinct nature of
the disputes in each field. The paradigmatic commercial arbi-
tration case involves contract claims arising out of business
transactions between private parties. 4 Investment disputes, on
the other hand, always involve claims against state party re-
spondents concerning their interference with investments
made by foreign investors (often, but not always, in state-spon-
sored projects) .5 The private-public distinction also holds true
for the sources that govern the disputes. In most commercial
3. See, e.g., Doak Bishop, The Case for an Appellate Panel and Its Scope of
Review, in 1 INVESTMENT TREATY LAw: CURRENT ISSUES 15, 17 (Federico Or-
tino et al. eds., 2006) (hereinafter CURRENT ISSUES] (arguing that review by a
standing appellate body would contribute to the sustainability of investment
treaty arbitration as it would increase consistency and legitimize the pro-
cess); James Crawford, Is There a Need for an Appellate System?, in CURRENT
ISSUES, supra, at 13, 13 (arguing that an appellate body is needed to address
inconsistencies that have arisen as a result of the greatly increased volume of
investment arbitrations); David A. Gantz, An Appellate Mechanism for Review of
Arbitral Decisions in Investor-State Disputes: Prospects and Challenges, 39 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 39, 74 (2006) ("A well-structured and staffed appellate mech-
anism could improve the jurisprudence in investment-related arbitration by
increasing consistency and annulling the occasional wrong decision."); see
also Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration:
Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM
L. REv. 1521 (2005) (proposing the establishment of an independent, per-
manent appellate body with the authority to review awards rendered under a
variety of investment treaties in order to restore legitimacy, transparency,
determinacy, and coherence to investment treaty arbitration).
4. A leading treatise defines "international commercial arbitration" as
"a means by which international business disputes can be definitely resolved,
pursuant to the parties' agreement, by independent, non-governmental de-
cision-makers, selected by or for the parties, applying neutral judicial proce-
dures that provide the parties an opportunity to be heard," but proceeds to
note that "there are almost as many other definitions ... as there are com-
mentators on the subject." GARY B. BORN, I INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AR-
BITRATION 64-65 (2009) (internal citations omitted).
5. The transactions that may give rise to claims under investment trea-
ties are often referred to as foreign direct investment. One treatise explains:
"Foreign direct investment (FDI) typically consists of medium- and long-
term infusions of cash, equipment, expertise, or other assets in another
country, into either ongoing enterprises or new companies created for the
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arbitration cases, arbitrators interpret private contracts. In so
doing, they almost always apply the laws of a particular jurisdic-
tion (for example, New York State). Of course, the resulting
awards do not contribute to the development of the substan-
tive laws that govern the dispute. In investment arbitration, on
the other hand, the sources of both substantive investor rights
and the consent to arbitrate are treaties between sovereigns.
Investment arbitrators are the primary interpreters of open-
ended terms in those treaties. Consequently, their awards con-
tribute to the development of public international law. In
light of these characteristics, it makes sense that advocates for
appeals processes in commercial arbitration emphasize error
correction, which primarily protects litigating parties. 6 It is
also not surprising that lawmaking, which benefits the legal
system as a whole, takes center stage in proposals for appellate
review in investment arbitration.
7
This Article addresses an issue that has received surpris-
ingly little attention: Can the proposed appeals processes
achieve the error correction and lawmaking goals in the re-
spective arbitration fields? To answer this question, I examine
whether the conditions under which each function is realized
in court systems are present, or can be replicated, in the rele-
vant arbitration contexts. The examination yields different
conclusions for each field. For commercial arbitration, I pro-
pose that arbitration institutions offer an optional two-level
process that could achieve error correction in a broad sense,
aimed at improving the quality of adjudication in the first in-
stance and providing meaningful review for error at the sec-
ond level. These error correction benefits can only ensue,
however, if parties and institutions that opt for appeal are will-
ing to experiment with changes to features that have become
common in the arbitration process, including the practice of
direct nomination of arbitrators by the parties. As to invest-
purpose of carrying on some business." CHRISTOPHER F. DuGAN ET AL., INVES-
TOR-STATE ARBITRATION 1 (2008).
6. Oldfather, Universal De Novo Review, supra note 1, at 317
("[F]ulfillment of [the error correction] function is typically conceived of as
involving a focus on ensuring justice between the immediate parties on ap-
peal.").
7. Id. ("The law declaration function .. .involves the articulation and
refinement of legal standards through the process of case-by-case adjudica-
tion.").
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ment arbitration, I conclude that an attempt to achieve the
intended lawmaking goals through the creation of an appeals
facility runs into significant problems. In a relatively young
field that involves competing interests of a public nature, a cer-
tain degree of unsettledness is not only inevitable, but it also
provides room for experimentation. Any increased stability
that would result from the creation of a permanent appeals
facility would come at the expense of the ability to adapt.
Moreover, it is doubtful that an appeals facility would achieve
the goal of harmonization of investment law. Most investment
treaties are bilateral, they currently number approximately
three thousand, and their terms are not identical. In addition,
unless and until all sovereigns amend their investment treaties
to provide for a non-waivable right to appeal, only a sub-set of
arbitration awards would be reviewable.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II examines the dif-
ferent roles of arbitrators in commercial and investment arbi-
tration through the lens of the dispute resolution and public
values models of adjudication. Part III analyzes the possibility
of error correction in commercial arbitration. Part IV ex-
plores whether an appellate mechanism can effectively address
incoherence in investment arbitration.
II. Two ARBITRATION MODELS
This Part provides a brief introduction to international
commercial and investment arbitration. Although both fields
involve the arbitration of international disputes, they differ in
significant respects.8 Commercial arbitration is best under-
stood as pure "dispute resolution," while investment arbitra-
tion incorporates elements of a "public values" model of adju-
8. Although the arbitration processes have developed differently due to
the distinct nature of the disputes, there is some overlap between the two
fields. Some commercial disputes have significant public interest aspects,
and the resolution of a commercial dispute may turn on the consequences
of mandatory laws or involve evaluation of an executive or administrative
decision. See Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or
Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REv. 668, 671 (1986) ("[H]idden in many seemingly
private disputes are often difficult issues of public law."); cf. Gabrielle Kauf-
mann-Kohler, In Search of Transparency and Consistency: ICSID Reform Proposal,
2 TRANSNAT'L Disp. MGMT., no. 5, 2005 at 1 n.2 (pointing out that commer-
cial arbitrations often have a public interest element).
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dication.9 These differences, in turn, are critical for under-
standing the envisioned role of appeals processes.
The term "dispute resolution model" refers to the ac-
count of adjudication in Lon Fuller's seminal essay, The Forms
and Limits of Adjudication, which was written in the late 1950s
but officially published posthumously in 1978.10 The essay
identifies as "the distinguishing characteristic of adjudication"
that "it confers on the affected party a peculiar form of partici-
pation in the decision, that of presenting proofs and reasoned
arguments for a decision in his favor."'" Melvin Eisenberg has
termed this claim the "participation thesis."12 The dispute res-
olution component of Fuller's adjudication model provides a
useful framework for understanding the nature of most types
of arbitration, including international commercial arbitra-
tion.13
International commercial cases involve claims arising out
of business transactions between two or more parties from dif-
ferent jurisdictions. One leading treatise defines international
9. See Chad M. Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism: Models of Adjudica-
tion and the Duty to Decide, 94 GEO. L.J. 121 (2005), for an insightful analysis
of the debate in the American legal scholarship about the two adjudication
models, and how they relate to each other.
10. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV.
353 (1978). Fuller himself did not use the term "dispute resolution model"
but it has become a widely used shorthand reference to his account of adju-
dication. See, e.g., Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447,
453-54 (2009) ("Lon Fuller is most closely associated with the traditionally
adversarial 'dispute resolution' model of adjudication, in which private dis-
putes are resolved by a neutral and passive decisionmaker."); Susan P.
Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEo. L.J. 1355, 1382 &
n.139 (noting that Fuller is generally cited as the "exemplar of the dispute
resolution model").
11. Fuller, supra note 10, at 364.
12. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Participation, Responsiveness, and the Consulta-
tive Process: An Essay for Lon Fuller, 92 HARV. L. REV. 410, 411 (1978).
13. Indeed, Fuller expressly included arbitration in his definition of ad-
judiction. See Fuller, supra note 10, at 354 (noting that "the term adjudica-
tion . . . includes adjudicative bodies which owe their powers to the consent
of the litigants expressed in an agreement of submission, as in labor rela-
tions and in international law"). Fuller was also sensitive to the practices of
judges and arbitrators, often using the term "arbiter" when referring to as-
pects of adjudication that are the same for both but always pointing out dif-
ferences when relevant. See, e.g., id. at 364, 382, 385-93, 397, 401, 407, 409
(references to arbiter); id. at 387-88 (explaining why reasoned opinions are
not common in certain "arbitration" fields).
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commercial arbitration as "a means by which international
business disputes can be definitely resolved, pursuant to the
parties' agreement, by independent, non-governmental deci-
sion-makers, selected by or for the parties, applying neutral ju-
dicial procedures that provide the parties an opportunity to be
heard."1 4 Commercial arbitration offers a purer example of
the dispute resolution model than almost any court process.
This is in large part because arbitrators in international com-
mercial disputes do not contribute to the development of sub-
stantive law. In the vast majority of cases, commercial arbitra-
tors apply the laws of specific jurisdictions, often pursuant to a
contractual choice of law provision. 15 Thus, an arbitrator
called upon to resolve a dispute about a contract governed by
14. BORN, supra note 4, at 64-65.
15. For example, the ICC reported that "[i]n the cases filed with the ICC
in 2010, the great majority of parties had exercised their freedom to choose
the law applicable to the merits by including provisions to that effect in their
contracts." 2010 Annual Statistical Report, ICC INT'L CT. ARB. BULL., Spring
2011, at 14. The ICC also noted that the parties had opted for national law,
as opposed to supra-national law such as the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, in 99 percent of the cases (the
report is not clear, however, on whether this is a percentage of all cases filed
or of the cases in which the law was specified). Id.; see also Christopher R.
Drahozal, Private Ordering and International Commercial Arbitration, 113 PENN.
ST. L. REv. 1031, 1039 n.36 (2009) (presenting a table showing that the per-
centage of cases in which parties opted for national law was consistently
around eighty percent in ICC cases filed between 2003-2007, and conclud-
ing that "international arbitration largely is a procedural substitute for na-
tional courts; international arbitrators generally apply national law, not some
autonomous body of private commercial law."). In an empirical study,
Drahozal found that only 13.6% of the English-language ICC awards pub-
lished from 1983 through 2002 contained any reference to supranational
law, but noted that this number is probably over-inclusive because "[o]nly
those awards in which arbitrators have felt least constrained to apply na-
tional law have been published." Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Out of
National Law: An Empirical Look at the New Law Merchant, 80 NOTRE DAME L.
RE-,. 523, 542 (2005) (citing W. LAURENCE CRAIG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARI rRATION, at 639 n.39 (3d ed. 2000)). Parties
almost never authorize arbitrators to act as amiable compositeurs, which would
empower them to render an award without being bound by strict application
of the law. See W. Laurence Craig, The Arbitrator's Mission and the Application
of Law in International Commercial Arbitration, 21 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 243, 267
(2010). The 2010 statistical report of the ICC identifies only one contract in
which the parties had so agreed. 2010 Annual Statistical Report, supra, at 14.
That commercial arbitrators do not create precedent is also supported by
the relative paucity of citation to earlier awards in commercial cases, corn-
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French law will try to apply this law to the best of his ability,
taking account of statutes, decisions from the French courts,
expert opinions, and any other relevant materials submitted by
the parties.
The contractual underpinnings of commercial arbitration
extend to the arbitration process itself. Parties are free to con-
tract for ad hoc arbitration or for arbitration administered by
an institution. Although institutions offer arbitration rules,
the principle of party autonomy allows parties to deviate from
most provisions. In this regard, Thomas Stipanowich has ob-
served that "the central and primary value of arbitration is not
speed, or economy, or privacy, or neutral expertise, but rather
the ability of users to make key process choices to suit their
particular needs."' 6 As private adjudicators, commercial arbi-
trators owe duties principally to the parties who contracted for
arbitration, rather than to a broader legal community. 17 The
two norms identified by Eisenberg as critical to the dispute res-
olution function of an adjudicator-attention and "strong re-
sponsive[ness] to the parties' proofs and arguments"-are as
apt in the commercial arbitration context today as they were
more than thirty years ago.
I8
Fuller's essay has been criticized, perhaps unjustly,' 9 for
giving insufficient consideration to the public aspects of litiga-
pared to sports and investment arbitration. Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Ar-
bitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity, or Excuse?, 23 ARB. INT'L 357, 362-69 (2007).
16. ThomasJ. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The "New Litigation," 2010 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1, 51 (2010).
17. See William W. Park, Arbitrators and Accuracy, I J. INT'L DisP. SETTLE-
MENT 25, 43 (2010) (contrasting responsibilities of arbitrators and judges).
18. Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 411-12. Eisenberg identifies a third
norm, namely explanation. He notes, however, that this norm is not critical
to dispute settlement or meaningful participation (although it may facilitate
these goals), whereas it is a necessary condition for the rulemaking function
of adjudication. Id.
19. Robert Bone has convincingly argued that the characterization of
Fuller's theory as "dispute resolution" unfairly reduces it to something that
has no impact beyond the immediate parties to a dispute. Robert G. Bone,
Lon Fuller's Theory of Adjudication and the False Dichotomy Between Dispute Resolu-
tion and Public Law Models of Litigation, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1273, 1282 (1995)
("Fuller viewed adjudication as a profoundly public institution with a vitally
important social function. It was through the process of adjudication that
reason was applied to the task of developing frameworks to order the ongo-
ing process of human interaction, including the articulation of public
norms.").
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tion. One of the most serious challenges to Fuller's account is
Owen Fiss's critique that adjudication's principal purpose is
not to resolve disputes, but to articulate public values. The
argument is that Fuller's description of the limits of adjudica-
tion (the types of disputes appropriate for resolution in the
courts) fails to capture the public role of courts. 20 For Fiss, the
rule-setting aspect distinguishes court adjudication from arbi-
tration: "[T] he function of the judge-a statement of social
purpose and a definition of role-is not to resolve disputes,
but to give the proper meaning to our public values.... The
function of the arbitrator is to resolve a dispute."
21
Just as the "dispute resolution" model is useful for under-
standing the aims of commercial arbitration, Fiss's "public val-
ues" model sheds light on how investment arbitration has de-
veloped. Investment disputes, which invariably pit investor
claimants against state respondents, have a public character.
They involve challenges to state action, and a significant por-
tion of investment disputes concern natural resources. 22 In in-
vestment cases, the basis for the claims and for submission of
disputes to arbitration is not a private contract, but rather a
treaty between sovereigns. In investment treaties, sovereigns
commit to protecting investments made by each other's na-
tionals by granting certain substantive rights (for example, to
provide adequate compensation in case of expropriation or to
provide "full protection and security" to investments).23 The
commitments are reciprocal, but in the context of a specific
investment, the terms "host country" and "investor country"
20. Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Farms ofJustice, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1, 35-37
(1979).
21. Id. at 30-31; see also Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L. J.
1073, 1086 (1984) (arguing that the job of judges "is not to maximize the
ends of private parties, nor simply to secure the peace, but to explicate and
give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitu-
tion and statutes: to interpret those values and to bring reality into accord
with them.").
22. See Karl P. Sauvant, The Rise of International Investment, Investment Agree-
ments and Investment Disputes, in APPEALS MECHANISM IN INVESTMENT DISPUTES
3, 13-14 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2008) [hereinafter APPEALS MECHANISM] (as of
the end of 2006, approximately forty-two percent of investment treaty arbi-
trations involved the services sector, including infrastructure, with the re-
maining arbitrations divided equally between manufacturing and natural re-
sources).
23. Franck, supra note 3, at 1531-32.
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are used to refer to, respectively, the country in which the in-
vestment is made and the country of which the investor is a
national. Although bilateral investment treaties are patterned
on models, their provisions are not identical. 24 By interpret-
ing and applying these terms, investment arbitrators contrib-
ute to the development of the meaning of these substantive
terms.
In contrast with commercial arbitration, investment arbi-
tration has transformed into a hybrid process in which dispute
resolution and the articulation of public values go hand in
hand. Investment arbitrators are aware of earlier awards and,
presumably, mindful of the fact that their own awards will con-
tribute to the development of investment law. Their role in
shaping substantive legal norms, unique in the arbitration uni-
verse, has been aided by the relative transparency of the field.
The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes (ICSID), the only arbitration institution that exclusively
administers investment disputes, maintains a website that pro-
vides basic information about all pending and concluded
cases. Although not all investment awards are published, a sig-
nificant number are publicly available and easily accessible.
25
24. For example, one study of at least five hundred treaties found a vari-
ety of approaches to the "fair and equitable treatment" standard, which is
absent from some BITs, provided without further qualification in others, but
in many BITs is qualified by reference to one of several, potentially not en-
tirely overlapping, standards (by making it subject to "principles of interna-
tional law," "international customary law," the "international minimum stan-
dard of the treatment of aliens," or by combining it with national treatment
and most-favored-nation treatment). AnnaJoubin-Bret, The Growing Diversity
and Inconsistency in the IIA System, in APPEALS MECHANISM, supra note 22, at
137, 137-38. An insightful analysis of the relationship between variation in
provisions in investment treaties and seemingly inconsistent results in arbi-
tration awards is provided in PatrickJuillard, Variation in the Substantive Provi-
sions and Interpretation of International Investment Agreements, in APPEALS MECH-
ANISM, supra note 22, at 81. Cf Barton Legum, Options to Establish an Appellate
Mechanism for Investment Disputes, in APPEALS MECHANISM, supra note 22, at
231, 234-35 (noting that even treaty provisions that are facially similar may
need to be interpreted differently based on the apparent intent of the nego-
tiating states).
25. Although ICSID does not publish awards without the parties' permis-
sion, it may include excerpts of the legal reasoning of tribunals in its publica-
tions. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes Conven-
tion, Regulation, and Rules, art. 48, 15, Apr. 2006, ICSID 15 [hereinafter
ICSID Convention]; International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, r.48.4, Apr. 2006, IC-
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Tribunals increasingly allow submission of amicus briefs by
non-parties, and at least one tribunal has opened a hearing to
the public.2 6 Yet commentators have noted an inherent ten-
sion between the public nature of the interests at stake in in-
ternational investment disputes and the private character of
arbitration, the forum of choice for resolution of such dis-
putes. 2
7
In investment arbitration, as in national and supra-na-
tional court systems, dispute resolution and the articulation of
public values are really two aspects of adjudication. 28 Al-
though these aspects usually coexist peacefully, they some-
times clash. For example, dispute resolution and the articula-
SID 15 [hereinafter ICSID Arbitration Rules]. In practice, many awards are
posted on ICSID's website. See http://icsid.worldbank.org; but see Susan D.
Franck, The Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights Under Investment Treaties:
Do Investment Treaties Have a Bright Future, 12 U.C. DAVISJ. INT'L L. & POL'Y
47, 88-89 (2005) (pointing out that the circumstance that a significant num-
ber of investment arbitration awards are not publicly available creates ine-
quality when parties do not have the same access to unpublished awards); see
also Gus VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW
160-64 (2007) (noting the relative transparency of investment arbitration
but arguing for compulsory publication of relevant documents and in-
creased openness of process).
26. See, e.g., Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Emerging Civilization of Investment
Arbitration, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1269, 1286-94 (discussing developments
toward increased transparency in investment arbitration).
27. See William B. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in
a Public Law Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE
J. INT'L L. 283, 285 (2010) ("[1I]t is time to recognize that contemporary
investor-state arbitrations are not merely another form of private law com-
mercial arbitration, with one party now being a state, but that they are more
fittingly understood as a form of dispute settlement that, like many domestic
judicial proceedings, also operates in a public law context."); see also Nigel
Blackaby, Public Interest and Investment Treaty Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: IMPORTANT CONTEMPORARY QUESTIONS 355, 355
(Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2003); Franck, supra note 25, at 69 ("Invest-
ment treaty arbitration is ... a system that grafts a traditionally private dis-
pute resolution system onto an international treaty between Sovereigns.").
28. Henry Monaghan made this point in discussing the dispute resolu-
tion and law declaration aspects of adjudication by the United States Su-
preme Court. Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control,
and Related Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REv. 665, 672-73 (2012) ("The Court's
jurisprudence does not formally separate these models. Quite to the con-
trary, it merges them .... But current commentators, although they recog-
nize that the models are only heuristic devices that bleed into one another,
tend to emphasize the tensions between the two models.").
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tion of public values may give rise to conflicting demands
when the parties misperceive the nature of their dispute, or
fail to address relevant legal issues. In such a situation, as Mel-
vin Eisenberg has pointed out, the strong responsiveness norm
of the dispute resolution model is at odds with what he calls
the "rulemaking function" associated with the public values
model. 29 An adjudicator could try to reconcile the two mod-
els, for instance, by directing the parties to address additional
questions. While judges in a constitutional system have strong
arguments for bringing up pertinent issues on their own initia-
tive,30 a departure from party control over the scope of a dis-
pute is harder to justify in private adjudication. This is true
even for arbitrations that implicate significant public interests.
This tension between the "strong responsiveness" norm
and the "rulemaking function" is on display in investment arbi-
tration. True to arbitration principles, investment arbitrators
seem at pains to be responsive to the parties' submissions.
Awards typically provide extensive summaries of the argu-
ments made by both sides for each issue, followed by the tribu-
nal's decision and a discussion of the reasons for coming out
in favor of one side over the other. Yet in one of the recent
Argentina cases discussed in more detail later in this Article,
31
an annulment committee criticized a tribunal for its failure to
address, sua sponte, issues that the parties had not raised. In
ruling to annul the award on the basis of manifest excess of
powers, the committee stated: "A Tribunal is... certainly not
required to address arguments that have not been put by par-
ties.... Having said that, the Tribunal is required to apply the
applicable law, and is required to state sufficient reasons for its
decision. ' 32 In other words, in investment arbitration, it is not
29. Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 412-14; see also Oldfather, supra note 9,
at 142 ("Strong responsiveness ... stands in tension with the lawmaking
function.").
30. See, e.g., Frost, supra note 10, at 516-17 (defending issue creation by
courts as a condition for the fulfillment of the tasks of courts in giving mean-
ing to disputed legal issues); see also Sarah M. Cravens, Involved AppellateJudg-
ing, 88 MARQ. L. REv. 251, 251-53 (2004) (arguing that appellate judges
should be "involved" in guiding a case to the most appropriate outcome, and
that they ought to be more transparent in clarifying when they consider the-
ories not presented by the parties).
31. See infra Part IV.B.1.
32. See Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/O1/3,
Award (May 22, 2007) [hereinafter Enron Award]; Enron Corp. v. Argentine
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sufficient to respond to the arguments made by the parties (at
least according to the members of this particular annulment
committee). Rather, investment arbitrators have an indepen-
dent obligation to ascertain what the law requires.
The distinction between the dispute resolution and public
values models also becomes relevant in determining what the
goals of appellate review ought to be. In a pure dispute resolu-
tion model, such as commercial arbitration, one would expect
a strong focus on the error correction function of appellate
review. As we will see, appellate review improves the quality of
dispute resolution, not only by correcting errors but also
through the disciplining effect of potential reversal on the first
instance adjudicators.3 3 The lawmaking function of appellate
review does not come into play in a pure dispute resolution
model, which is concerned primarily with settling particular
disputes, not with the external effects of decisions.
In a sophisticated "public values" model, the lawmaking
and error correction functions of appeal both serve to articu-
late communal norms. This is most obviously true for lawmak-
ing, which is simply the manifestation of the articulation of
public values at the appellate level. Yet error correction also
serves public purposes. In fact, it is somewhat artificial to dis-
entangle the two functions of appellate review, since much of
the refinement of law occurs under the guise of error correc-
tion.34 Proposals for the introduction of an appeals mecha-
nism in investment arbitration, however, have focused strongly
on the lawmaking aspects of appellate review. Advocates for
appellate review in investment arbitration are principally con-
cerned with the development of shared understandings. Error
correction, at least when applied to legal determinations, is
premised on the presumption that the law is relatively settled.
In investment arbitration, it is precisely the lack of consensus
on fundamental norms that is viewed as problematic. What is
argued for is not so much a fresh second look by another
panel, but rather the creation of an authoritative entity that
establishes the baseline that can then be used to distinguish
erroneous decisions from correct ones. For this reason, pro-
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Annulment Decision (July 30, 2010)
[hereinafter Enron Annulment Decision], at 368-78.
33. See infra Part III.C.3.
34. Oldfather, Error Correction, supra note 1, at 64.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U Journal of International Law and Politics
[Vol. 44:1109
APPEALS IN ARBITRATION
posals for appellate review in investment arbitration consist-
ently call for the creation of an appeals facility, as opposed to
the appointment of a second tribunal. Error correction, at
least at this time, is at most a subsidiary consideration.
35
III. INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
AND ERROR CORRECTION
The case for making appellate review more widely availa-
ble in international commercial arbitration is aimed entirely at
the correction of mistakes. Yet the literature has not seriously
examined whether it is possible to realize this value in the arbi-
tration context. This Part first provides an overview of the lim-
ited substantive review of international commercial arbitration
awards that is currently available. It then unpacks how error
correction works in court systems and identifies to what extent
its central aspects are present, or at least can be replicated, in
international commercial arbitration. This analysis culminates
in the outline of an optional two-tier process.
A. The Current Landscape
It has become a bedrock principle of international com-
mercial arbitration that courts do not second-guess the sub-
stantive correctness of arbitral awards. The United States Con-
vention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbi-
tral Awards deserves much of the credit for this state of affairs.
Known as the New York Convention, this treaty was signed in
1958 and today has been ratified by 140 nations.3 6 The New
35. A few authors, however, have discussed the potential role of error
correction and accuracy in the argument for the creation of an appeals facil-
ity in investment arbitration. See Christian J. Tams, An Appealing Option? The
Debate About an ICSID Appellate Structure, in 57 BEITRAGE ZUM TRANSNATION-
ALEN WiRTSCHAFTSRECHT 5, 26-28 (2006) (discussing "accuracy" as a value
served by appellate review, but concluding that this rationale does not justify
adding an appellate level because there are no indications that parties ques-
tion the legitimacy of the current process); Thomas W. Walsh, Substantive
Review of ICS1D Awards: Is the Desire for Accuracy Sufficient to Compromise Final-
ity?, 24 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 444, 459 (2006) (observing that the desire for
accuracy, which directly benefits the parties to the dispute at hand, is a
greater incentive for adoption of an appeals procedure than consistency and
predictability, which benefit the larger investment community).
36. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, Jun. 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New
York Convention]; List of Contracting States, http://www.newyorkconven-
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York Convention distinguishes between the venue of the arbi-
tration, which is typically selected in part for its absence of sig-
nificant ties to any parties, and the jurisdictions in which en-
forcement may be sought, in which the losing party has assets.
In the latterjurisdictions, the Convention restricts court review
by providing an exhaustive list of grounds for refusal of recog-
nition and enforcement of arbitration awards, which does not
include error of law or fact.37 The Convention imposes no
limitations on review by courts in the venue of the arbitration.
However, popular arbitration jurisdictions have severely cur-
tailed their courts' authority to strike down international arbi-
tral awards. 38 In addition, several jurisdictions have adopted
statutes that recognize waiver of court review of the merits of
tion.org/new-york-convention-countries/contracting-states (last visited Jan.
26, 2012).
37. Most grounds relate to fairness of process or the legitimacy of the
arbitration and must be proven by the party challenging enforcement, in-
cluding invalidity of the arbitration agreement, a party's inability to present
his case, excess of the scope of the arbitration agreement, irregularity in the
composition of the tribunal, and a decision from a court at the seat of the
arbitration setting aside the award. New York Convention art. V, 1 (a)-(e).
The remaining two grounds, non-arbitrability of the dispute and violation of
public policy, may be invoked by a party or by the court acting on its own
initiative. New York Convention art. V, 2(a)-(b).
38. Cf Thomas E. Carbonneau, At the Crossroads of Legitimacy and Arbitral
Autonomy, 16 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 213, 213 (2005) ("The consensus among
like-minded national legal systems regarding standards for the court supervi-
sion of arbitral awards excludes the judicial review of the merits of awards.").
France, for example, limits the grounds for annulment to procedural irregu-
larities or situations in which execution or enforcement would be "contrary
to international public policy." Nouveau code de procedure civile
[N.C.P.C.] art. 1520 (Fr.). International arbitral awards rendered in Switzer-
land may be set aside only on procedural grounds or if the award is "incom-
patible with public policy." BUNDESGESETZ OBER DAS INTERNATIONALE PRIVA-
TRECHT, LOI FtD.RALE SUR LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE, LEGGE FEDERALE
SUL DIRITrO INTERNAZIONALE PRrVATO [LDIP] [Federal Statute on Private In-
ternational Law] Dec. 18, 1987, art. 190, 12 (Switz.), available in translation at
https://www.sccam.org/sa/download/IPRG-english.pdf; cf. Arbitration Act,
1996, c. 23, §§ 69, 81(1) (U.K.) (limiting challenges to arbitral awards based
on questions of law to a narrow category of cases and instructing courts to
apply a deferential standard of review). In the United States, the Federal
Arbitration Act provides an exhaustive list of grounds for vacatur, annul-
ment or modification of awards, and the Supreme Court has ruled that the
parties cannot contractually expand these grounds. Hall Street Assocs. v.
Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 582-91 (2008).
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arbitral awards.3 9 These provisions effectively preclude court
review of awards rendered in arbitrations conducted under the
auspices of institutions, as arbitration rules typically contain
waivers of court review.
40
The rules of institutions that handle most high-stakes in-
ternational commercial arbitrations, including the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris, the Interna-
tional Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR) of the American
Arbitration Association (AAA), and the London Court of In-
ternational Arbitration (LCIA), do not provide for appellate
procedures within the arbitration framework. 41 These institu-
tions probably do enforce agreements providing for appellate
arbitral review.
42
39. See, e.g., N.C.P.C., art. 1522 (parties may waive the right to seek annul-
ment, but such waivers do not affect the right to appeal from a court deci-
sion enforcing an award in France); LDIP, art. 192, 1 (parties may waive
annulment actions or remove some of the grounds for annulment, provided,
however, that none of the parties is Swiss); Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23,
§ 69(1) (U.K.) (issues of law may be appealed "[u]nless otherwise agreed by
the parties").
40. See, e.g., London Court of International Arbitration, Arbitration Rules,
art. 26.9, (Jan. 1, 1998) [hereinafter LCIA Rules] (precluding review by
courts); International Chamber of Commerce, Arbitration and ADR Rules, art.
34, 6 (Jan. 1, 2012) [hereinafter ICC Rules] (stating that parties who opt
for arbitration under ICC rules "shall be deemed to have waived their right
to any form of recourse insofar as such recourse can be validly made" [em-
phasis added]); see also PhilipJ. McConnaughay, The Risks and Virtues of Law-
lessness: A "Second Look" at International Commercial Arbitration, 93 Nw. U. L.
REv. 453, 467 (1999) ("it has become common for institutions that adminis-
ter international commercial arbitrations to include provisions in their pro-
cedural rules expressly excluding national judicial review of arbitrations they
administer").
41. The rules of these institutions do provide for decision-makers other
than the arbitration panel to decide on challenges of arbitrators. ICC Rules
art. 14, 13 (ICC Court decides on admissibility and merits of a challenge);
International Centre for Dispute Resolution, International Dispute Resolution
Procedures, art. 9 (June 1, 2009) [hereinafter ICDR Rules] (administrator de-
cides on challenge of arbitrator); LCIA Rules art. 10.1-.2 (LCIA Court has
authority, upon a party's challenge or a request from the other arbitrators,
to revoke appointment).
42. Cf Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration and Choice: Taking Charge of the
"New Litigation, "7 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 383, 430 (2009) ("Since properly
constituted agreements for 'second-tier' arbitration are as enforceable as any
other arbitration agreements, so are the resulting awards."). The issue is
whether the parties can set aside the finality provisions in institutional rules
by providing for a second level of arbitration. Arbitration rules typically pro-
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Appellate procedures are currently offered by three arbi-
tration institutions, namely the International Institute for Con-
flict Prevention and Resolution (CPR), JAMS (formerly an ac-
ronym for Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services, now
the official name), and the European Court of Arbitration.
These institutions follow the same basic structure, in which a
second panel is appointed to review the first panel's award.
The rules vary significantly, however, as to the level of defer-
ence given to the award of the first panel. The standards of
review reflect three philosophies of what appellate review
should be, ranging from a check for the most egregious mis-
takes to a full re-examination of both legal and factual deter-
minations.
CPR is based in New York, but it is involved in the devel-
opment and promotion of alternative dispute resolution over-
seas. 43 Since 1999, CPR offers a "Rules of Appeals Procedure"
which applies if parties have so agreed in writing.44 An appel-
late tribunal consists of three arbitrators, who are appointed
by the CPR in accordance with a list procedure.45 CPR ap-
pears to offer the appellate option reluctantly; its website ex-
plains that CPR "does not wish to encourage widespread ap-
peals from arbitration awards."' 46 CPR felt compelled, how-
ever, to respond to the concerns of parties to high-stakes
vide that as to the parties, awards are "binding" or "final and binding." ICC
Rules art. 34, 6; ICDR Rules art. 27, 1; LCIA Rules art. 26.9. The AAA, of
which the ICDR is a division, offers a model provision that parties who wish
to provide for arbitral appellate review can insert in their arbitration agree-
ments. American Arbitration Association, Drafting Dispute Resolution Clauses:
A Practical Guide 37 (2007), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=29159.
43. See http://www.cpradr.org/AcrossBorders.aspx (last visited May 2,
2012) (portal for information about CPR's activities outside of the United
States).
44. International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution, Rules
of Appeal Procedure, r. 1.1 (2007) [hereinafter CPR Rules of Appeal Proce-
dure]. The appeals procedure seems to target domestic arbitrations, as evi-
denced by the fact that CPR's roster of appellate arbitrators consists of for-
mer federaljudges. International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Reso-
lution, Introduction to CPR Rules of Appeal Procedure, available at www.cpradr.
org. Rule 1.1 provides that the appellate procedure may be invoked only for
arbitrations conducted in the United States, but does not expressly restrict it
to arbitrations between U.S. parties.
45. CPR Rules of Appeal Procedure, r. 4.
46. International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution, Intro-
duction to CPR Rules of Appeal Procedure, supra note 44; see also International
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arbitrations that a tribunal may render an "aberrant" or "irra-
tional" award, and to make some review available to a losing
party that "concludes that it is the victim of a gross injustice.
47
To fulfill these limited objectives, CPR's standard of review is
highly deferential: An appellate tribunal may modify or set
aside the original award under the limited grounds for vacatur
set forth in section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 48 or if the
award "(i) contains material and prejudicial errors of law of
such a nature that it does not rest upon any appropriate legal
basis, or (ii) is based upon factual findings clearly unsup-
ported by the record."
49
JAMS, which was founded in 1979, has long administered
arbitrations and mediations through its "Resolution Centers"
throughout the United States. JAMS recently established a
presence in Europe through the creation of an affiliate called
' JAMS International," which is headquartered in London and
also has offices in Amsterdam, Milan, New York, and Rome.
50
Its Optional Arbitration Appeal Procedure, as the name indi-
cates, applies only upon express agreement. Selection of the
appellate arbitrators is left to the parties, but if they fail to
reach agreement the assigned case manager is authorized to
make the appointments. 5' The appellate panel is mandated to
apply "the same standard of review that the first-level appellate
court in the jurisdiction would apply to an appeal from the
trial court decision."5
2
The European Court of Arbitration offers yet another ap-
proach. This institution, founded under the patronage of the
Council of Europe, disagrees with the "general tendency.., to
Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution, Commentary on Rules of Ap-
peal Procedure.
47. Id.
48. These grounds include corruption or fraud in the procurement of
the award, partiality in the arbitrators, prejudice of the rights of any party as
a result of, among other misconduct, a refusal by the arbitrators to hear
material evidence, and excess of the tribunal's powers. 9 U.S.C.
§ 10(a)(1)-(4) (2006).
49. CPR Rules of Appeal Procedure, r. 8.2.
50. See http://www.jamsinternational.com/about (last visited Apr. 23,
2012) (briefly describingJAMS' mission and history); http://www.jamsinter-
national.com/wp-content/uploads/201 1/09/JAMS-Internationa-Fact-
Sheet.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2012) (listing office locations).
51. JAMS, Optional Arbitration Appeal Procedure, art. A (2003).
52. Id. art. D.
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limit the review of arbitration awards to procedural errors. 53
Appellate tribunals consist of three arbitrators who are ap-
pointed by the Court.5 4 Parties are deemed to have agreed to
appellate review, unless it is expressly excluded. 55 The appeals
procedure comprises "a full review of the dispute by way of
rehearing including dealing in particular with admissibility,
the facts and the merits.
5 6
B. The Case for an Arbitral Appeals Process
A losing party to a commercial arbitration generally has
no avenues for recourse even when it has strong reasons to
believe the award is wrong as to an outcome-determinative le-
gal issue. The 2002 Second Circuit decision in Westerbeke Corp.
v. Daihatsu Motor Co., Ltd. provides an example of such a situa-
tion.57 The dispute in this case involved a Component Sales
Agreement under which Daihatsu, a Toyota subsidiary, was to
supply certain engines to Westerbeke, a Delaware corporation
that produced engines suitable for use in marine environ-
ments.5 8 The contract also granted Westerbeke a right of first
refusal as to engines developed by Daihatsu in the future.
Westerbeke claimed that Daihatsu had breached that right of
first refusal provision when it contracted with a third party for
exclusive distribution of a new engine, without offering it to
Westerbeke first. 59 The dispute was submitted to arbitration in
New York under the Japan-American Trade Arbitration Agree-
53. The European Court of Arbitration, Arbitration, http://cour-europe-
arbitrage.org/ content .php?lang=en&delegation=l&id=l (last visited Mar.
23, 2012).
54. Arbitration Rules of the European Court of Arbitration, art. 28, 5, available
at http://cour-europe-arbitrage.org/archivos/documentos/22.pdf (last vis-
tited Apr. 15, 2012).
55. Id. art. 28, 1.
56. Id. art. 28, 4. The President of the European Court of Arbitration
has opined that "the award must be reviewed not only for errors in law but
also as to the merits, and that a full review, by rehearing the case, is not just
to be tolerated but is to be seen as an important part of the arbitral process."
Mauro Rubino-Sammartano, Is Arbitration Losing Ground, 14 AM. REv. INT'L
ARI. 341, 343 (2003).
57. 304 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2000).
58. Id. at 204 & n.1.
59. Id. at 205.
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ment, and the proceedings were bifurcated into a liability and
a damages phase. 60
In the interlocutory award on liability, the arbitrator held
that Daihatsu had breached the right of first refusal provision
because it refused to enter into negotiations with Westerbeke
about the new engine.61 The arbitrator subsequently awarded
reliance and expectancy damages, rejecting Daihatsu's argu-
ment that New York case law proscribed the award of expec-
tancy damages for breach of a preliminary "agreement to
agree."62 The arbitrator explained that the right of first re-
fusal provision was more appropriately analyzed as "'a contract
with condition precedent to the addition of a new Engine."'
63
A judge in the Southern District of New York vacated the
award on the basis of manifest disregard of the law, 64 ruling
that the provision for right of first refusal was a preliminary
agreement that could not give rise to expectancy damages
under New York law.65 The Second Circuit reversed. It reiter-
ated that manifest disregard requires, first, that "the 'gov-
erning law alleged to have been ignored by the arbitrators
[was] well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable[,]"' and
second, that "the arbitrator must 'appreciate[ ] the existence
of a clearly governing legal principle but decide[ ] to ignore
or pay no attention to it.'"66 The Second Circuit stated that by
determining how to categorize the right of first refusal provi-
60. Id.
61. Id. at 206.
62. Id. at 206-07.
63. Id. at 207.
64. Manifest disregard is a judicially created ground for vacatur of arbi-
tration awards that evince the arbitrators' willful defiance of clearly applica-
ble law. Notably, the Supreme Court's opinion in Hall Street has cast doubt
on the continuing viability of the doctrine. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1768 n.3 (2010); see also Hiro N. Aragaki, The
Mess of Manifest Disregard, 119 YALE L.J. 1, 3-5 (2009) (providing overview of
different positions on the viability of manifest disregard after Hall Street).
Some have predicted that interest in appeals procedures within the arbitra-
tion system will increase as a result of the Hall Street decision. See, e.g.,
George K. Foster & David M. Bigge, Expanded Review of Awards: A Door Shuts,
Others Open?, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 23, 2008, at 5-6; International Institute for Con-
flict Prevention & Resolution, The Calm and the Storm: Arbitration Experts Speak
Out on Hall Street Associates, 26 ALTS. TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIG. 104, 107-08
(2008) (comments by James H. Carter and Robert B. Davidson).
65. 304 F.3d at 208.
66. Id. at 209 (citations omitted).
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sion, the district court had improperly encroached on the arbi-
trator's authority to interpret the contract at issue.6 7 The Sec-
ond Circuit further held that Daihatsu had not demonstrated
the existence of a "clearly governing legal principle" preclud-
ing categorization of the right of first refusal provision as a
contract with condition precedent. 68 Essentially, Daihatsu had
failed to identify a New York case specifically precluding such a
reading with regards to a contractual provision that was suffi-
ciently similar to the right of first refusal provision in the Com-
ponent Supply Agreement.69 Yet the Second Circuit strongly
suggested that the arbitrator's decision was incorrect. Re-
sponding to the argument that, "as a matter of law and sound
policy," an agreement to negotiate could never be a contract
with condition precedent, the court noted: "[W]ere we con-
fronted with the task of construing the [Components Supply
Agreement] in the first instance, we might well be inclined to
adopt the reading proposed by the district court, for we have
serious reservations about the soundness of the arbitrator's
reading of this contract." 70 The Second Circuit concluded,
however, that "our standard of review constrains us to affirm
an arbitrator's judgment even if 'a court is convinced he com-
mitted serious error. ,"71 Here, the arbitrator's interpretation
was "at least slightly colorable, which is all that is required[.]" '72
Academics and practitioners who advocate for appellate
review in commercial arbitration argue that the losing party in
a case like Westerbeke should have some opportunity for review,
at least when the financial stakes are sufficiently high. They
claim that the availability of appellate review within the frame-
work of commercial arbitration would add value for a sizeable
percentage of users of arbitration, as well as potential parties
who currently do not opt for arbitration because they perceive
it as too risky.73 The most articulate defense of this position is
67. Id. at 213, 216.
68. Id. at 216.
69. See id. at 214-15.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 218.
73. While the notion of arbitral appellate review is not universally em-
braced, many in the arbitration community view it as a more palatable alter-
native to expanded judicial review. Paul Bennett Marrow, A Practical Ap-
proach to Affording Review of Commercial Arbitration Awards: Using an Appellate
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presented in an article by attorneys William Knull and Noah
Rubins, aptly titled Betting the Farm on International Arbitration:
Is It Time to Offer an Appeal Option ?4 Stripped down to its es-
sence, their argument is that because of the characteristics of
international commercial disputes, parties have a strong inter-
est in an avenue for recourse when they believe an award con-
tains errors.7 5 In the words of a former general counsel:
Arbitrator, 60 Disp. RESOL. J. 10, 12 (2005) (positing that intra-arbitral appel-
late review is consistent with the underpinnings of arbitration, including
flexibility, confidentiality, speed, and efficiency, and eliminates uncertainties
relating to judicial review of arbitral awards); Pierre Mayer, Seeking the Middle
Ground of Court Control: A Reply to IN. Duncan Wallace, 7 ARB. INT'L 311, 316
(1991) ("It would be perfectly possible to organise a system of arbitral appeals
which would not present the disadvantages referred to, and which would
give the same additional assurance of quality of justice that is sought by cre-
ating appellate jurisdictions."); Richard C. Reuben, Personal Autonomy and
VacaturAfter Hall Street, 113 PENN ST. L. REv. 1103, 1140 (2009) (arguing that
"[a]rbitral review would not adversely affect the arbitration process to the
same degree as public judicial review" because it does not implicate public
resources, a second arbitral panel is not confined to the strict standards of
review a court would need to follow, and confidentiality can be maintained);
Stipanowich, supra note 42, at 429-30 ("Appellate arbitration procedures af-
ford parties the opportunity of a 'second look' at an arbitration award in a
controlled setting while avoiding the delays and legal uncertainties associ-
ated with expanded judicial review."); cf Chicago Typographical Union v.
Chicago Sun-Times, 935 F.2d 1501, 1504-05 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Federal courts
do not review the soundness of arbitration awards.... If the parties want,
they can contract for an appellate arbitration panel to review the arbitrator's
award."); but see Eric van Ginkel, Reframing the Dilemma of Contractually Ex-
panded Judicial Review: Arbitral Appeal vs. Vacatur, 3 PEPP. Disp. REs. L. J. 157,
201-02 (2003) (arguing that substantive review by courts should not be pre-
cluded due to the availability of arbitral appellate review because "[t] he im-
portance of the parties' autonomy simply outweighs the fact that certain
scholars (as well as certain contracting parties) may prefer appeal to another
arbitral tribunal"). In fact, CPR has expresslyjustified the introduction of an
appeals procedure by stating that it is preferable to substantive court review
of arbitration awards. CPR, Commentary on Rules of Appeal Procedure, supra
note 46 (stating that "a well structured private appeal to a highly qualified
tribunal is likely to be preferable to seeking judicial review with all the at-
tendant uncertainties.").
74. Knull & Rubins, supra note 2.
75. See, e.g., Erin E. Gleason, International Arbitral Appeals: What Are We So
Afraid Of?, 7 PEPP. Disp. RESOL. L.J. 269, 293 (2007) ("Even arbitrators may
be fallible ... [T] he adoption of appellate procedures for international com-
mercial disputes at an institutional level would enhance the efficiency of in-
ternational commercial arbitration."); Knull & Rubins, supra note 2, at
531-34; cf. Born, supra note 4, at 82 (noting as a disadvantage of finality that
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"Speed and finality are virtues, but only if you win. They are
not virtues if a fundamental mistake has been made."76
Knull and Rubins posit that finality would be an unmiti-
gated advantage only if the stakes were relatively minor, or if
arbitrators never made mistakes. 77 But the prototypical inter-
national commercial arbitration involves significant stakes, fi-
nancially and otherwise. 78 And of course, arbitrators some-
times make mistakes, just like judges and other humans. In
fact, the complexity of the factual and legal issues presented by
high-stakes disputes about cross-border transactions may make
mistakes more likely. 79 International disputes often present
choice of law issues, and may require application of the sub-
stantive laws of several jurisdictions.80 Also, arbitrators are fre-
quently called upon to apply the laws of a jurisdiction in which
they have not trained or practiced.8' Some features of the ar-
"a wildly eccentric, or simply wrong, arbitration decision cannot readily (if
ever) be corrected.").
76. ThomasJ. Klitgaard, Presentation given to the Seventh Annual Trans-
national Commercial Arbitration Workshop: Transnational Arbitration of
High-Tech Disputes (June 20, 1996) available at http://www.wirepaladin.
com/spch0696.htm, cited in Knull & Rubins, supra note 2, at 563.
77. Knull & Rubins, supra note 2, at 541.
78. Id. at 537; see also David D. Caron, Reputation and Reality in the ICSID
Annulment Process: Understanding the Distinction Between Annulment and Appeal,
7 ICSID REV. 21, 48-49 (1992) (relating the story of a general counsel who,
having been informed of an unfavorable arbitration award with no possibil-
ity of appeal, scolded his attorney: "'You advised resolving a million dollar
dispute with only one roll of the die?"'). One commentator noted, in the
context of the United States' refusal to honor party agreements for substan-
tive court review in Hall Street "The tipping point comes, however, when the
stakes are so high that parties become unwilling to take the risk that legal
principles and rules will not be rigorously applied to their dispute.... One
way to meet this need is the development of an arbitration appellate panel,
the specifics of which would be negotiated by the parties." International
Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution, supra note 64, at 106-07
(comment by S. Elaine McChesney).
79. Knull & Rubins, supra note 2, at 537-38; see also Drahozal, Private Or-
dering and International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 15, at 1048 (2009)
("In international commercial arbitration, disputes often arise out of non-
standardized transactions with very high stakes."); Van Ginkel, supra note 73,
at 160 ("[A]s arbitrators are asked to interpret more complex legal issues...
finality is increasingly felt as the absence of much needed quality control
over arbitrators.").
80. Knull & Rubins, supra note 2, at 537-38.
81. Id. at 541-42; cf Gleason, supra note 75, at 293 ("[A]rbitral awards
are sometimes based on misapplications of law ...."). One commentator
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bitration process, including the influence of the parties in the
selection process and the fact that most high-stakes disputes
are decided by three arbitrators, reduce the likelihood of an
aberrational outcome. Yet parties still take a significant risk by
leaving the resolution of a dispute in the hands of a single
panel.8 2
Knull and Rubins argue that one should consider the rea-
sons for choosing arbitration.83 While it may be an exaggera-
tion to say that for transnational disputes, "[a] rbitration is the
only game" in town,84 the choice for arbitration in this context
usually does not emanate from a preference for "alternative"
methods of dispute resolution. Rather, the decision tends to
be motivated primarily by a desire to avoid problems associ-
ated with cross-border litigation, including the perceived
"home court advantage," disputes about jurisdiction, parallel
procedures, and difficulties in obtaining enforcement of for-
eign court judgments.8 5 Thus, in the context of international
commercial disputes, traditional arbitration values such as
speed, efficiency, and confidentiality arguably take a backseat
to the parties' interest in diligent adjudication.86 As a result,
points out that arbitrators trained in different legal cultures may have radi-
cally different perspectives on how to interpret the law. James M. Gaitis,
International and Domestic Arbitration Procedure: The Need for a Rule Providing a
Limited Opportunity for Arbitral Reconsideration of Reasoned Awards, 15 Am. REV.
INT'L ARB. 9, 19 (2004).
82. Cf Mauro Rubino Sammartano, The Fall of a Taboo: Review of the Merits
of an Award by an Appellate Arbitration Panel and a Proposal for an International
Appellate Court, 20J. INT'L ARB. 387, 387 (2003) ("I ... submit that it may be
safer, except for those who prefer to gamble, to provide for a review of the
merits in the arbitral agreement."). One commentator observed that many
contracting parties "'have no confidence that the arbitrators' decision will
be as objective, predictable and correct as one would expect if the decision
were made by a highly respected judge sitting without a jury."' Stephen A.
Hochman, Judicial Review to Correct Arbitral Error An Option to Consider, 13
OHIO ST.J. ON Disp. RESOL. 103, 104 (1997), quoted in Knull & Rubins, supra
note 2, at 541.
83. Knull & Rubins, supra note 2, at 536-37.
84. Jan Paulsson, International Arbitration is not Arbitration, 2 STOCKHOLM
INT'L ARB. REV. 1, 2 (2008).
85. BORN, supra note 4, at 2-3.
86. Caron, supra note 78, at 49 ("Because the motivations for entering
into international and wholly domestic arbitration can differ, there also per-
haps should be important differences in these two forms of arbitration and
in how they are evolving.... Perhaps internationally, there should be several
forms of arbitration, some more courtlike than others, possibly even provid-
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international commercial arbitration proceedings often take
on features of court litigation. The decision-makers are almost
always lawyers rather than industry experts,8 7 the proceedings
tend to involve the submission of evidence and legal argu-
ments based on statutes, and awards are reasoned and in writ-
ing.88
Proponents of appellate review in commercial arbitration
usually propose the appointment of a second panel of arbitra-
tors. This is the model selected by the three arbitration institu-
tions that already provide for appellate procedures, although
they differ as to the methods for selection of the appellate
panel.8 9 Knull and Rubins stress flexibility. They propose that
institutions offer templates with different menu options so that
parties who wish to opt into appellate review can select the
scope and standard of review and procedural restrictions that,
for them, strike the right balance between finality and the ad-
vantages of a second level of review.90
ing for a process of review approaching appeal."); Nana Japaridze, Fair
Enough? Reconciling the Pursuit of Fairness and Justice with Preseruing the Nature of
International Commercial Arbitration, 36 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1415, 1416 (2008)
("[I]t is clear that the landscape of international commercial arbitration is
changing and the traditional key characteristics of the process, such as
speed, cost, informality, and confidentiality, are becoming both less practical
and less lucrative."); see also Knull & Rubins, supra note 2, at 538-41. One
commentator has gone so far as to conclude that "[t] he notion of efficiency
as a value underlying the arbitration of international disputes seems miscon-
ceived." Edward Brunet, The Core Values of Arbitration, in ARBITRATION LAW IN
AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 3, 21 (Brunet et al., eds. 2006). Knull and
Rubins add the observation that finality does not translate into speed, effi-
ciency and cost savings if the losing party puts up protracted fights in the
courts to which the victorious party turns for enforcement. Knull & Rubins,
supra note 2, at 542-43.
87. See, e.g., Stephen R. Bond, The International Arbitrator: From the Perspec-
tive of the ICC International Court of Arbitration, 12 Nw. J. Ir'L L. & Bus. 1, 5
(1991) (ninety-five percent of arbitrators in ICC arbitrations are legal profes-
sionals); Jacques Werner, The Trade Explosion and Some Likely Effects on Interna-
tional Arbitration, 14J. INT'L ARB. 5, 10 (1997) ("Arbitral justice in interna-
tional commercial cases is almost always rendered by business lawyers in pri-
vate practice, and sometimes by academics.").
88. BORN, supra note 4, at 2; see also Brunet, supra note 86, at 21
("[A]rbitration procedures... essentially constitute an event that resembles
a trial.").
89. See supra Part III.A.
90. Knull & Rubins, supra note 2, at 559-63.
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C. Conditions for Error Correction
Error correction is the most universal and least controver-
sial purpose of appellate review in court systems. Yet transpos-
ing this function into the private dispute resolution context is
not a straightforward matter. An examination of the condi-
tions for error correction shows that the implementation of
this function into commercial arbitration would require
changes to deeply ingrained practices.
1. The Nature of "Error"
Error correction, as the name indicates, is premised on
the assumption that mistakes can be ascertained. But of
course, "error" is a troubling concept. Legal Realists have con-
vincingly argued that, due to the indeterminacy of most legal
rules, a range of reasonably "correct" solutions exists for al-
most any legal question.91 As put by Karl Llewellyn:
The major defect in [our system of precedent] is a
mistaken idea which many lawyers have about it-to
wit, the idea that the cases themselves and in them-
selves, plus the correct rules on how to handle cases,
provide one single correct answer to a disputed issue
of law. In fact the available correct answers are two,
three, or ten. The question is: Which of the available
correct answers will the court select-and why? For
there is always more than one available correct an-
swer, the court always has to select.
92
91. See BRIAN Bix, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 178 (3d ed.
2003) (characterizing Legal Realism as "a critique of legal reasoning: that
beneath a veneer of scientific and deductive reasoning, legal rules and con-
cepts were in fact indeterminate and rarely as neutral as they were presented
as being.").
92. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 396
(1950); see also Michael Boudin, Judge Henry Friendly and the Craft of Judging,
159 U. PA. L. Rv. 1, 13 (2010) ("[Mlany a complicated case is like ajigsaw
puzzle with multiple solutions, often as to reasoning and sometimes as to
outcome, none being inevitable.");Jon 0. Newman, A Study of Appellate Rever-
sals, 58 BROO& L. REv. 629, 630 (1992) ("Reasonable judges will inevitably
come out differently on close questions of law. The hierarchical structure of
a judicial system requires that even a well-reasoned view of a trial judge will
be displaced by the well-reasoned view of a panel of appellate judges.").
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Some Legal Realists have argued that the indeterminacy
of law enables adjudicators to characterize rules and past deci-
sions so as to fit the result they want to reach.93 From the exis-
tence of a range of possible outcomes, it does not necessarily
follow that a judge's personal preferences will determine the
outcome. It does mean, however, that error is often a debata-
ble matter. Moreover, as a matter of logic, one might expect
that a relatively large number of appeals are taken from deci-
sions about which reasonable legal minds could disagree. 94 In-
evitably, at times the determination of error on appeal appears
arbitrary.9
5
The Realist notion of indeterminacy rings particularly
true for determinations that involve discretion and, as a result,
a certain level of subjectivity. Examples are factual determina-
tions that turn on credibility judgments, or interpretation of
ambiguous contractual language. These are, of course, pre-
cisely the types of determinations commercial arbitrators must
make. The international context may compound the difficul-
ties. Consider the assessment of the intent of two or more par-
ties at the time they entered into the contract. This is already
a challenging task in the case of parties who negotiated against
93. See generally JEROME FRANK, LAw AND THE MODERN MIND (1930) (dis-
cussing rationalization in judging and the potential influence of a judge's
personality and biases); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR
LAW AND ITS STUDY 67-70 (1930) (describing how courts use precedent to
de-emphasize unfavorable cases and bolster favorable ones).
94. The theory is that relatively few appeals are taken from decisions that
are clearly correct, leaving decisions that are clearly incorrect and decisions
whose accuracy is debatable. But see Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to
Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE L.J. 62, 85 (1985) (identifying several
factors that facilitate appeal, including access to counsel, a strong interest in
the outcome, strategic considerations, and a belief that the first instance de-
cision was erroneous, and noting that with the exception of the last one,
none of them relates to the merits of the dispute).
95. In a study of reversals by the Second Circuit, Judge Newman con-
cluded that "the overwhelming proportion of the reversals arose from dis-
agreements between the Second Circuit and a district court on a reasonably
debatable point of law. Arguably, the number of reversals of that sort indi-
cates that the law is less determinate than one would wish, but it does not
indicate to me that either the district courts or the Second Circuit are per-
forming deficiently." Newman, supra note 92, at 638. Cf Steven Shavell, The
Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 379, 413 (1995)
(noting that errors involving the application of law to facts "are conceptually
clear when the law is well-articulated, but often the law will not be specified
in a relevant aspect and must be amplified.").
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the backdrop of shared legal norms. When parties hail from
different legal cultures, however, there is a stronger likelihood
that they have incompatible notions of what was agreed, even
if they engaged in extensive negotiations and all parties be-
lieve they fully understood the documents they were signing.
96
Such parties may also have different ideas about how contrac-
tual gaps are to be filled in, which is critical in long-term con-
tracts that cannot provide for all contingencies. 97 In many
civil law traditions, for example, a good faith principle is used
in connection with the interpretation of contractual terms as
well as to supplement the agreement (playing a role similar to,
but not identical with, the "implication of terms" doctrine in
common law). In some legal systems, good faith may even op-
erate to set aside express contractual terms in exceptional cir-
cumstances-a result that could be baffling to many business
people and lawyers from common law jurisdictions. 98
Moreover, arbitration, even when it involves international
disputes, differs from litigation, and arbitrators are not judges.
Consequently, as pointed out by Laurence Craig, "the result in
many cases will be the application of an approximation of the
national law rather than the application of the national law
precisely the same way a court of that jurisdiction would apply
it."99 In part, this is because unlike judges who are steeped in
a particular legal culture, commercial arbitrators often apply
the laws of a jurisdiction with which they are not intimately
familiar. It is to be expected that the arbitrators' training in
and experience with other legal systems colors their interpre-
tation of the contracts and the applicable law. 100
The notion that arbitrators are law appliers, not
lawmakers, presents a challenge to the argument for appellate
96. Cf Lawrence Solan et al., False Consensus Bias in Contract Interpretation,
108 COLUM. L. REV. 1268, 1269 (2008) ("[T]he parties to a contract may
understand their rights and obligations differently and never notice the dif-
ferences until a disagreement occurs .... ").
97. Cf Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Incomplete Law, 35 N.Y.U.J.
INT'L L. & POL. 931, 957-59 (2003) (discussing incomplete contract theory).
98. See Arthur Hartkamp, The Concept of Good Faith in the UNIDROIT Prin-
ciples for International Commercial Contracts, 3 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 65,
65-66 (1995) (noting that application of the doctrine good faith may lead to
the setting aside of an entire contract or the non-application of otherwise
applicable, even perhaps mandatory, statutory rules).
99. Craig, supra note 15, at 256.
100. Cf id. at 255-56.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U Journal of International Law and Politics
2012]
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS
review in international commercial arbitration. This is espe-
cially true when the applicable law does not specifically ad-
dress an issue. When presented with a lacuna in the governing
law, an appellate court does not need to accord any deference
to the solution adopted by the trial court. It can simply iden-
tify a different principle or rule and declare that the lower
court's decision was erroneous. The justifications for such in-
trusive review, however, are less strong when the lawmaking
function of appellate review falls away. The Westerbeke decision,
discussed above, touches on this issue in the context of a dis-
cussion of the constraints imposed on court review of arbitral
awards. Daihatsu had asked the Second Circuit to hold that as
a matter of law and principle, a provision that was interpreted
to impose a duty to negotiate could not simultaneously be a
contract with condition precedent. 10 1 The Second Circuit ob-
served:
[O]ur announcement of such a principle, no matter
how well-founded, would not affect the outcome of
this case. Our sole task is to determine whether there
already exists a well-defined, clearly governing deci-
sional rule under New York law that would prohibit
the arbitrator from reading the [Components Supply
Agreement] as a contract with condition precedent.
Daihatsu has not met its burden of showing that such
a rule exists. 10
2
Of course, the existence of a lawmaking function bolsters
the case for plenary review, especially on questions of law.
Conversely, the absence of this function in arbitration argua-
bly would call for a more limited concept of error, according
greater deference to the first tribunal103 When no unequivo-
cal rule can be identified, why substitute the second tribunal's
speculation on which decision is most in keeping with the law
for that of the first tribunal? This discomfort is probably one
of the reasons why advocates for appellate review have pro-
posed deferential standards of review. Arguably, de novo review
101. 304 F.3d at 215-16.
102. Id. at 216.
103. Cf Oldfather, Universal De Novo Review, supra note 1, at 318-19
(pointing out that review under a more deferential standard is still review for
error, but "[t]he difference would lie in the manner in which error is de-
fined.").
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(especially in the United States, where it only pertains to legal
issues) is primarily necessary to ensure harmonized applica-
tion of the law within a jurisdiction. When appellate review
does not serve that function, it is not self-evident that an appel-
late tribunal should have the authority to "correct" a decision
from the lower tribunal with which it disagrees but that is not
blatantly wrong.
On the other hand, even when there is no rule that is
technically on point, courts and arbitrators still have an array
of tools to determine which solutions are most in line with the
applicable law. Among other things, they may draw on gen-
eral legal principles, rules governing analogous situations, im-
plicit assumptions in the existing case law, and rules adopted
in other jurisdictions. And although disputes that raise ques-
tions of first impression are in some ways distinct from those in
which there may be reasonable disagreement about how the
law applies to a given situation, both types of cases require ad-
judicators to try to determine which result is most accurate in
light of the surrounding legal context. If one accepts that ad-
judicators are capable of qualitatively assessing different defen-
sible answers, the error correction function standing alone
provides a strong justification for a more searching standard of
review on appeal.
2. Error Correction and Hierarchy
Proponents of the introduction of appeals processes into
international commercial arbitration, as noted, appear to
struggle with the question of why the decision of a second
panel would have more authority than the award rendered by
the first panel. One of the main issues in developing a mean-
ingful review mechanism within commercial arbitration, there-
fore, is whether error correction can be disentangled from hi-
erarchy.
In jurisdictions with a multi-level court structure (which
describes the legal system of virtually all nations),'10 4 appellate
review is embedded in, and identified with, institutional hier-
104. See Peter E. Herzog & Delmar Karlen, Attacks on Judicial Decisions, Ch.
8 in CIVIL PROCEDURE 69, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE
LAw (Mauro Cappelletti ed., 1982); Shavell, supra note 95, at 379; but see
MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYsIs 194-222
(1981) (describing limitations on the use of appeals under Islamic law).
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archy.10 5 Indeed, the hierarchical structure itself confers some
degree of authority on the decisions of appellate courts. But
court systems have also put structural features and procedural
practices in place that provide credibility to the notion that
decisions by intermediate appellate courts are "better" than
the ones they purport to correct. One such feature is the in-
crease in the number of adjudicators: in many systems, a dis-
pute will first be heard by a single adjudicator and can then be
appealed to a three-member panel. In commercial arbitra-
tion, on the other hand, it is common to submit high-stakes
disputes immediately to a panel of three arbitrators. 10 6
The hierarchy in court systems effectively creates a divi-
sion of labor between the different actors. In the federal court
system of the United States, in theory, the primary function of
intermediate appellate courts is to correct errors made by the
trial courts, while the Supreme Court has the ultimate respon-
sibility for harmonizing the interpretation and application of
federal law. 10 7 The reality, of course, is more complex. Be-
cause the Supreme Court takes on a fraction of the cases that
present unsettled questions of law, in practice intermediate ap-
pellate courts play an important role in the development of
legal standards.'08 As a result, there is variation among the
Circuits in the interpretation of federal law.
The rules governing appellate review reflect the need to
balance competing values, including accuracy and efficiency.
One of the most important choices to be made in designing an
105. Lea Brihmayer, Wobble, or the Death of Error, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 363, 381
(1986) ("Error amounts to an inconsistency between the decision made and
the applicable standards. One cannot have error without hierarchy... Char-
acterizing a legal decision as error is possible within an established hierarchy
because in such a hierarchy there is an accepted direction of fit; the lower
court's judgment is supposed to fit the appellate court's.").
106. See, e.g., MARGARET L. MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INTER-
NATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 117 (2008) (noting that "[iin interna-
tional arbitrations, there is frequently a preference for three arbitrators" for
high-stakes disputes).
107. See Frisch, supra note 1, at 74-75 (arguing that the trial court is as-
sumed to be primarily responsible for correcting errors in the trial court, so
that the supreme court can concentrate on developing a useful body of law).
108. See Benjamin Kaplan, Do Intermediate Appellate Courts Have a Lawmak-
ing Function?, 70 MASS. L. REv. 10 (2007) (arguing that, although the extent
varies depending on the extent to which the highest court exerts control,
intermediate courts contribute significantly to the development of law).
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appeals process is how to divide the responsibilities between
the first instance adjudicator and the appellate adjudicator.
Court systems have adopted different approaches. For exam-
ple, one significant difference between appellate review in the
United States and in continental European legal systems con-
cerns the treatment of facts. In the United States, appellate
courts review legal questions de novo (i.e., they engage in ple-
nary review of these questions), and factual determinations
made by a trial court judge under a highly deferential "clearly
erroneous" standard. 109 Historically, the justification for the
existence of two standards of review "rests upon the belief that
different tiers of courts possess different decision-making skills
and that this distinction recognizes the particular competence
of each." 10 The pre-trial and trial stages are characterized by
a strong emphasis on the development of a factual record.
The adversary system empowers parties to leave no stone un-
turned in the discovery process, and even before trial, parties
have the opportunity to present evidence in connection with
summary judgment motions, and sometimes at preliminary in-
junction hearings. Trials often involve extensive questioning
of fact and expert witnesses by counsel for all parties, and in
high-stakes commercial cases, they can easily take several days
or even weeks. The near-exclusive focus on legal issues at the
appellate level suggests that the legal system of the United
States primarily values appellate review for its role in lawmak-
ing. Because determinations of fact rarely have significance
for anyone other than the parties to a specific dispute, it
makes sense to devote fewer appellate resources to this review
for factual errors." ' I Civil law systems, in contrast, do not have
distinct standards of review for factual and legal issues, at least
not formally. In continental European court systems, appel-
late courts may request evidence and hear witnesses, and they
109. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6). Factual findings from juries are generally
insulated from review under the Seventh Amendment. U.S. Const. amend.
VII.
110. Frisch, supra note 1, at 77.
111. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 93, at 36 (noting that if imposing consis-
tency is the main function of appellate review, "then a review of the facts, of
the doubtful testimony, even a review of all the details of admitted facts, in
reference to the legal consequences, seem to lose their importance. What
looms large is the rule to be laid down-a general proposition."); cf. Frisch,
supra note 1, at 78-79.
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are not bound by the trial court's factual findings. 112 Thus, in
legal traditions that do not have a formal precedent system
and in which the legislature has primacy in developing new
law, appellate courts engage in a more comprehensive form of
error correction. 113 The absence of lawmaking in interna-
tional commercial arbitration would similarly remove some of
the justifications for treating factual findings and legal conclu-
sions differently.
A more mundane aspect of hierarchy is that judges oper-
ate in a system in which the higher levels come with increased
prestige. Of course, at an individual level, certain trial court
judges may be held in higher esteem than most or even all
appellate court judges in a given jurisdiction. Nonetheless, in
many legal systems the advancement of a trial court judge to
the appellate level is viewed as a promotion." 4 In arbitration,
in contrast, it is hard to conceive of a class of appellate arbitra-
tors. To be sure, the international arbitration community has
as many ranking lists of arbitrators, firms, and attorneys as any
other field."15 Yet unless and until appellate review becomes
112. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS
190 (2d ed. 1994) (noting that in civil law court systems, "the proceedings in
this intermediate court may involve a full review de novo of the facts as well as
the law of the case."); CIVIL APPELLATE PROCEDURES WORLDWIDE 161-62
(Charles Platto ed., 1992) (in France, an appeal transfers the entire matter
to the appellate court, with respect to both questions of fact and law, essen-
tially resulting in a "de novo trial" as to the aspects from which appeal is
taken); id. at 179-80, 206-07 (describing similar basic outlines in Germany
and Spain).
113. Mirjan Damaska has famously characterized civil law system as prima-
rily "hierarchical," versus the more "coordinate" nature of common law sys-
tems. See MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY
18-28 (1986). He notes that in a hierarchical structure, "[t]here are few
aspects of lower authority's decision making that are accorded immunity
from supervision: fact, law, and logical are all fair game for scrutiny and
possible correction." Id. at 48-49.
114. Indeed, one of the central presumptions in empirical research on
incentives ofjudges is that they are assumed to be motivated by a desire for
promotion, understood as advancement to the next level in the court hierar-
chy. See, e.g., Drahozal, supra note 1, at 476-77; Richard A. Posner, What Do
Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 Sup. CT.
ECON. REv. 1, 6 & n.9 (providing an overview of studies that analyze the
behavior of judges in utility-maximizing terms, including the desire for pro-
motion).
115. See, e.g., CHAMBERS & PARTNERS, http://www.chambersandpartners.
com (last visited Mar. 22, 2012) (providing rankings of international arbitra-
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commonplace in commercial arbitration, arbitrators have no
financial incentives to serve only on appellate panels. The
practice in which each side nominates an arbitrator and the
two party-appointed arbitrators select a chair adds further
complications. Why should a second tribunal have the power
to correct "mistakes" made by what the parties considered to
be the best available tribunal at the time of appointment?
16
To put it bluntly, within the current arbitration framework,
the best guarantee against a rogue tribunal is not to appoint
one.
The absence of a formal hierarchy thus poses challenges
to the implementation of appellate review in commercial arbi-
tration. For an appeals system to work in this context, parties
and institutions will have to be willing to create conditions that
will lend added legitimacy to rulings made at the second level.
3. Quality of Adjudication
One aspect of error correction is the notion that appellate
review improves the quality of adjudication. It does so in two
ways. First, appellate courts are generally better equipped
than trial courts to reach well-thought-out decisions on ques-
tions of law. Second, the awareness that another court may
review a decision creates incentives for more diligent decision-
making at the lower level. Appellate review thus facilitates er-
ror correction as well as error avoidance.
Court systems are structured so as to ensure that appellate
courts can engage in more careful deliberation on legal issues
than trial courts. Take, for example, the increase of the num-
"ber of judges on appeal discussed above. There is a persistent
tion practices at law firms); Global Arbitration Review's "GAR 100," http://
www.globalarbitrationreview.com/surveys/survey/156/GAR-100 (last visited
Mar. 22, 2012); Global Arbitration Review, The International Who's Who of
Commercial Arbitration, http://www.whoswholegal.com (last visited Mar. 22,
2012); Euromoney's Guide to the World's Leading Experts in Commercial Arbitration,
http://www.expertguides.com (last visited Mar. 22, 2012). This type of rec-
ognition is proudly relayed in practice group descriptions and bios of indi-
vidual practitioners.
116. See Mark D. Wasco, When Less Is More: The International Split Over Ex-
panded Judicial Review in Arbitration, 62 RUTGERS L. REv. 599, 620-21 (2010)
("There is no guarantee that the addition of an appeal process will give any
more protection against 'maverick' decisions."); cf Shavell, supra note 95, at
391 (suggesting that the existence of the appeals process may spur judges to
expend effort toward greater accuracy at trial).
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belief that three judges are more likely to reach a correct out-
come than one. Indeed, one empirical study, which compared
reversal rates by the federal courts of appeal of appellate bank-
ruptcy law decisions made by sole judges (district courts
judges) and by three-judge panels (three-member panels of
bankruptcy judges), supports the notion that a perception ex-
ists among judicial actors that multi-member appellate panels
are more likely to arrive at the right outcome.' 17 The theoreti-
cal literature puts forward two reasons for this intuition. First,
as a matter of statistical probability, a three-judge panel
reduces the risk of a truly erratic decision as it would require
two judges to sign onto it.' 18 The second reason is the idea
that collective deliberation improves the quality of decision-
making.)19 Paradoxically, the two arguments rest on conflict-
ing premises. The first reason for why three adjudicators are
better than one assumes that each decision-maker decides in-
dependently. The second reason, on the other hand, acknowl-
edges the reality that decision-making on a multi-member
117. Jonathan Remy Nash & Rafael I. Pardo, An Empirical Investigation into
Appellate Structure and the Perceived Quality of Appellate Review, 61 VAND. L. REv.
1745, 1803-06 (2008).
118. This argument is a variation of the CondorcetJury Theorem, which
explains that "where each voter has more than an even chance of being right
on some matter, then the more voters we have, the closer we get to a
probability of one getting the matter right by abiding by a simple majority
vote." Saul Levmore, Ruling Majorities and Reasoning Pluralities, 3 THEORETI-
CAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 87, 88-89 (2002); cf. Evan Caminker, Why Must Inferior
Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. RE\,. 817, 847 (1994) ("As-
suming (quite reasonably) that each individual judge has a greater than fifty
percent chance of arriving at the 'correct' answer in any given legal dispute,
then the larger the panel the greater the likelihood that a majority of them
will reach the correct result..."); Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the
Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82
HARv. L. REV. 542, 551 (1969) ("By employing a larger group of decision
makers than can be efficiently employed at the primary level, we bring a
broader base of values into operation so that the personal dimension of deci-
sions is diminished.").
119. See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the
Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82, 102 (1986) (describing some effects of the exchange
of ideas and concluding that "the general assumption favoring deliberation
as an aid to correct judgment seems reasonable in light of common experi-
ence."); Alex Kozinsky, What I Ate for Breakfast and Other Mysteries of Judicial
Decision Making, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 993, 994 (noting the constraining influ-
ence provided by the need for a federal appellate judge to "persuade at least
one colleague, preferably two, to join your opinion.").
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U Journal of International Law and Politics
[Vol. 44:11091144
APPEALS IN ARBITRATION
panel does not come down to a simple aggregation of the indi-
vidual adjudicators' votes. The collegial nature of the under-
taking inevitably affects-some would say distorts-the deci-
sion-making process of each individual adjudicator. 120 Even if
there were no true collective deliberation, an adjudicator's
perceptions regarding the other members' positions may influ-
ence her vote. The exchange of views between multiple deci-
sion-makers further increases the likelihood that the result
ends up being different from what the aggregation of three
independent decisions would have yielded. 121 So, the collegial
nature of multi-member courts presents the risk that a deci-
sion-maker who favors an aberrational result convinces at least
one other member of a panel to change his or her mind (per-
haps because the first person is more authoritative, or simply
happens to speak when others have not fully made up their
minds).122 In sum, although the exchange of insights about a
case may improve decision-making, it offsets to some extent
the notion that three minds are better than one.
The nature of appellate decision-making also facilitates a
strong focus on legal issues. 123 By design, appellate judges are
120. See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the
Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 51-56 (1993) (discuss-
ing reasons for strategic voting on multi-member courts); Evan H.
Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97 MICH.
L. REV. 2297, 2312-33 (detailing opportunities and incentives for strategic
conduct).
121. Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 119, at 100-02; Tracey E. George,
Developing a Positive Theory of Decision-making on U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1635, 1655-65 (1998) (discussing "strategic" theories ofjudicial be-
havior, which analyze the influence of several factors, such as interactions
with colleagues on the court, on decision-making).
122. Cf Levmore, supra note 118, at 90 (noting that "[a Condorcet] Jury
Theorem purist might say that the simple result is ruined if voters are given
the opportunity to influence one another ..., to exhibit herd mentality, or
to otherwise allow their own assessments and self-esteem to interfere with
the value of numerosity."); Menachem Mautner, Luck in the Courts, 9 THEO-
RETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAw 217, 228 (2008) ("Allowing the judges in the panel
to be influenced by their colleagues undermines the rationale for having
judicial decisions made by a large panel."); Maxwell L. Stearns, The Condorcet
Jury Theorem and Judicial Decision-making: A Reply to Saul Levmore, 3 THEORETI-
CAL INQUIRIES IN LAw 125, 147 (2002) (expressing skepticism about the sig-
nificance of the CondorcetJury Theorem for understanding appellate court
decision-making).
123. Caminker argues that even if higher courts have stronger proficiency
for many of the reasons I mention, the comparative disadvantage of lower
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free from many of the interruptions trial court judges face,
such as short-notice applications for emergency relief, case
management, and in the United States, discovery disputes. A
trial court judge lives with a case until it is finally disposed of
or the parties settle the matter. Appellate judges, in contrast,
have one-off encounters with cases. After reviewing the lower
court record and the parties' submissions on appeal and possi-
bly hearing oral argument, they write an opinion, and that typ-
ically concludes their involvement. In addition, the two stan-
dards of review, at least in theory, make it possible for appel-
late judges in the United States to concentrate on legal issues
without bearing responsibility for making independent factual
determinations. 124 Even in civil law systems, which have not
formalized the division of labor to the same extent, appellate
courts often engage in less extensive fact-finding than the trial
courts.125 And of course, appellate judges enjoy the benefit of
an opinion from a lower court judge who has grappled with
the pertinent legal issues. Relatedly, one would expect that
the party submissions on appeal are at once more focused, in
the sense that they address the most problematic parts of the
lower court's opinion, and better developed.
126
courts is less pronounced once a higher court has addressed a legal issue.
Caminker, supra note 118, at 848-49. But in many cases, even if a higher
court has decided a legal question, the precise scope of the decision as well
as its application to specific cases could still be unclear.
124. See Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1991) ("District
judges preside alone over fast-paced trials: of necessity they devote much of
their energy and resources to hearing witnesses and reviewing evidence ...
Courts of appeals, on the other hand, are structurally suited to the collabora-
tive judicial process that promotes decisional accuracy. With the record hav-
ing been constructed below and settled for purposes of the appeal, appellate
judges are able to devote their primary attention to legal issues."); see also
Frisch, supra note 1, at 77-78 (citing Salve Regina and noting the "widespread
and persistent belief that appellate judges are more likely to generate the
correct answers to questions of law than their brethren below who oversee
the trial and provide the initial answer to all legal questions, both simple and
difficult.").
125. See GLENDON ET AL., supra note 112, at 190 (intermediate appellate
court panels in civil law systems initially determine the facts based on the
trial court record, but they may question witnesses again or request the par-
ties to submit new evidence).
126. Cf Salve Regina, 499 U.S. at 232 ("As questions of law become the
focus of appellate review, it can be expected that the parties' briefs will be
refined to bring to bear on the legal issues more information and more com-
prehensive analysis than was provided for the district judge.").
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Appellate review also improves the quality of adjudication
in a more indirect way, through its restraining influence on
first instance judges. 127 The threat of reversal provides power-
ful incentives for trial court judges to follow settled precedent,
even if they disagree with it.12 8 Indeed, the burgeoning empir-
ical research on this topic suggests that lower courtjudges fear
reversal as it may harm their reputation and negatively affect
their salaries or the likelihood of promotion. In addition, re-
mand decisions create additional, and often duplicative, work
for trial courtjudges. 129 Even in legal traditions that have no
binding precedent, judges tend to deviate from prior appellate
court cases only if they have strong reasons to do so. 130 Lastly,
the awareness that a decision may be subject to scrutiny incen-
tivizes first instance judges to draft well-reasoned opinions, as
they will try to convince their superiors of the correctness of
the position taken. Presumably judges spend more time and
127. Oldfather, De Novo Review, supra note 1, at 317 ("[A]n appellate
court's correction of an error in any given case tends to foster an environ-
ment in which fewer errors are committed in the first instance.").
128. See Frisch, supra note 1, at 85; Shavell, supra note 95, at 390-91; but see
Caminker, supra note 118, at 839-43 (arguing that judicial economy argu-
ments, both from the perspective of lower courts and from the perspective
of a legal system, do not provide a full explanation of why lower courts follow
precedent). Although arbitrators are not subject to the pressures of poten-
tial reversal, outright refusal to apply settled precedent renders their awards
vulnerable to vacatur actions or enforcement challenges. See, e.g., New York
Tel. Co. v. Commc'n Workers of Am. Local 1100, 256 F.3d 89, 91-93 (2d Cir.
2001) (per curiam) (affirming vacatur on the basis of manifest disregard of
the law where an arbitrator deliberately refused to apply binding Second
Circuit law, stating that "[p]erhaps it is time for a new court decision.").
129. See Susan B. Haire et al., Appellate Court Supervision in the FederalJudici-
ary: A Hierarchical Perspective, 37 L. & Soc'v REV. 143 (2003) (empirically test-
ing the principal-agent model of adjudication under which, among other
things, trial court judges have relatively strong incentives to avoid reversal by
intermediate courts); see also Drahozal, supra note 1, at 491-97 (considering
the constraining function of the appeals process in holding judicial prefer-
ences constant).
130. See, e.g., Olav A. Haazen, Precedent in the Netherlands, in PRECEDENT AND
THE LAw 227, 235-36 (Ewoud Hondius, ed., 2007) (lower courts in the
Netherlands tend to decide in line with higher court decisions); Robert
Alexy & Ralf Dreier, Precedent in the Federal Republic of Germany, in INrERPRET-
ING PRECEDENTS (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers, eds., 1997), at
17, 36 (noting the same regarding Germany); Raj Bhala, The Myth About Stare
Decisis and International Trade Law (Part One of a Trilogy), 14 AM. U. INT'L L.
REv. 845, 910-15 (1999) (in practice, if not in theory, French courts over-
whelmingly follow decisions from higher courts).
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resources on opinions that will likely be reviewed on appeal,
for example because the stakes are high, or because the case
presents important issues of first impression. Moreover, first
instance judges will also try to dissuade losing parties from ap-
pealing by providing persuasive reasoning in their opinions.
131
The connection between reason-giving and the quality of deci-
sion-making, however, is a tenuous one, as judges may use rea-
soning to mask weaknesses and project conviction even- in
cases that presented close calls.
1 3 2
It is a fair question whether many characteristics that ac-
count for the quality of decision-making in the appellate
courts are already present in the standard single-tier process in
international commercial arbitration. After all, in high-stakes
international disputes, tribunals typically consist of three arbi-
trators. The common appointment practices in arbitration,
however, offset many of the advantages that come with three-
arbitrator adjudication. It has become standard for parties to
agree that each party select an arbitrator, and that the two
party-appointed arbitrators nominate a chair.1 - 3 Compared
with the random assignment systems that are used in most
courts, parties to arbitrations have tremendous influence over
the constitution of the tribunal that will decide their dis-
pute. 13 4 To be sure, this is viewed by many as a significant ad-
vantage of arbitration, and the institution of the party-ap-
pointed arbitrator serves several legitimate goals. A party may
want to select an arbitrator who has expertise in the relevant
131. See Mathilde Cohen, Reason Giving in Court Practice: Decision-Makers at
the Crossroads, 14 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 257, 265-70 (2008).
132. Id. at 269 ("Weaknesses of the written reasons enhance the chances
of an appeal in matters of law, while skillfully developed reasons may prevent
a materially doubtful judgment from being overturned by the court of ap-
peal").
133. BoRN, supra note 4, at 1355, 1356, 1403 ;James H. Carter, The Selection
of Arbitrators, 5 Am. REv. INT'L ARB. 84, 86 (1994); James Wangelin, Effective
Selection of Arbitrators in International Arbitration, 14 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP.
69, 70 (1999).
134. For a critical view of random assignment of judges in appellate
courts, see Michael Hasday, Ending the Reign of Slot Machine Justice, 57 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. Am. L. 291, 295-98 (2000) (arguing that the random assignment
system in appellate courts is unfair to the parties, renders appellate adjudica-
tion less predictable and contributes to inter-circuit splits); cf Mautner,
supra note 122, at 222 (identifying two sources of "luck" in adjudication:
law's indeterminacy, and the random assignment of judges).
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industry or in a specific type of dispute, or who is familiar with
that party's legal culture. 135 Perhaps most importantly, signifi-
cant party influence on the appointment of a tribunal helps
engender confidence in the legitimacy of the process, which in
turn may increase compliance with awards.136 Yet this appoint-
ment practice affects both the incentives of individual arbitra-
tions and the dynamic within the tribunal in ways that present
a tension with strict application of the law.
In practice, any attorney worth her fees will try to select an
arbitrator who is favorably inclined to the client's position and
persuasive to other arbitrators. As bluntly put by Martin
Hunter a quarter century ago: "[W] hen I am representing a
client in an arbitration, what I am really looking for in a party-
nominated arbitrator is someone with the maximum predispo-
sition towards my client, but with the minimum appearance of
bias." 137 Indeed, while party-appointed arbitrators must be im-
partial, there is some expectation that they will ensure the ar-
guments of "their" side receive sufficient consideration from
the tribunal, especially the chair.1 38 The predisposition to-
135. See DavidJ. Branson, American Party-Appointed Arbitrators-Not the Three
Monkeys, 30 U. DAYTON L. REv. 1, 61 (2004).
136. See William W. Park, Arbitrator Integrity: The Transient and the Perma-
nent, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 629, 644-45 ("To promote confidence in the
international arbitral process, party input into the selection of arbitrators
has long been common practice... Such party participation democratizes
the process, serving to foster trust that at least one person on the tribunal
(the party's nominee) will monitor the procedural integrity of the arbitra-
tion.").
137. Martin Hunter, Ethics of the International Arbitrator, 53 AIB. 219, 223
(1987); see also R. Doak Bishop & Lucy F. Reed, Practical Guidelines for Inter-
viewing, Selecting and Challenging Party-appointed Arbitrators in International
Commercial Arbitration, 14 ARB. INT'L 395, 396 (noting that most parties follow
the guideline that "'their' arbitrators can be generally predisposed to them
personally or to their positions, as long as they can ultimately decide the
case-without partiality-in favour of the party with the better case."); Chris-
topher R. Seppdld, Recommended Strategy for Getting the Right International Arbi-
tral Tribunal, 6 TRANSNAT'L Disp. MGMT. 10 (Mar. 2009) (characterizing as an
"essential attribute" for the "party-nominated arbitrator... [to] be prepared
to consider favorably the case or position of the party nominating him or
her."); Wangelin, supra note 133, at 70 (noting that the selection of an arbi-
trator is "guided ... by the hope of employing one with qualities which tend
to give him and his client the greatest assurance that their viewpoint will be
understood ....").
138. See Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in Private Judging, 38 S. TEx. L. REV. 485,
497-98 (1997) (describing the role of the party-appointed arbitrators as
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ward the appointing party, however slight, may distort the indi-
vidual deliberation of the party-appointed arbitrators. Indeed,
it reduces many of the benefits associated with decision-mak-
ing by multiple adjudicators. The role of the party-appointed
arbitrator, in other words, is at odds with the type of mindset
conducive to the prevention of errors: a combination of de-
tachment from the parties and receptiveness to the evidence
and arguments presented by both sides. 13 9 As a result, even
though tribunals in high-stakes commercial arbitration usually
consist of three arbitrators, the chair may well end up casting
the deciding vote. 140 Yet the presence of two party-appointed
making sure that the chair "fully understands the issues and background of
the case, the contentions of each party, and the possible implications of the
award before it is issued."); cf Andreas Lowenfeld, The Party-Appointed Arbi-
trator in International Controversies: Some Reflections, 30 TEX. INT'L L. J. 59,
65-68 (1995) (" [i] n an international case a party-appointed arbitrator serves
as a translator. I do not mean just of language ... I mean rather the transla-
tion of legal culture, and not infrequently of the law itself, when matters that
are self-evident to lawyers from one country are puzzling to lawyers from
another.").
139. Legal Realists have offered a powerful critique of this mindset as an
idea that is not matched by reality, something Part III.C.1, supra, touched
on. For purposes of this analysis, what matters is that, by design, only one of
the three adjudicators in a commercial arbitration panel is expected to even
strive to adopt a truly objective a mindset as possible. Cf Rau, supra note
138, at 506-09 (criticizing the notion that international arbitrators can at
once be predisposed and impartial, and noting that "[e]ven in the best of
circumstances an official rhetoric of 'independence' and a tolerated latent
'sympathy' must exist in an uneasy tension.").
140. SeeJennifer Kirby, With Arbitrators, Less Can Be More: Why the Conven-
tional Wisdom on the Benefits of Having Three Arbitrators May Be Overrated, 26 J.
INT'L ARB. 337, 338 ("Contrary to what some parties may believe, the votes of
co-arbitrators do not determine any issue to be decided by the arbitral tribu-
nal; rather, it is the vote of the chairman-and only the vote of the chair-
man-that is ultimately decisive."); cf Diane P. Wood, The Brave New World of
Arbitration, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 383, 396 (2003) ("Courts have found no fault
with the presence of the party-arbitrators on the panel; that system simply
focuses attention on the third arbitrator."). Recognizing the importance of
the chair, experienced arbitration practitioners recommend that parties
carefully consider the dynamics within the tribunal during the appointment
process. See, e.g., Sepptlft, supra note 137, at 3-4 ("A party's goal should be
the appointment of an arbitral tribunal, a majority (at least) of whose mem-
bers, while being independent and impartial as regards the parties ... will at
the same time be well disposed towards, or sympathetic to, or at the very
least receptive to, that party's position."); see also C. Mark Baker, Advocacy in
International Arbitration, in THE LEADING ARBITRATORS' GUIDE 381, 384 (Law-
rence W. Newman & Richard D. Hill eds., 2008) (noting, as to the selection
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arbitrators could influence a chair's ultimate position. As Alan
Rau has pointed out, if each of the three arbitrators takes a
different view of the outcome, the chair will often negotiate
and compromise to reach a majority.
141
In addition to the immediate impact of party nomination
on particular cases, the private nature of arbitration creates
systemic incentives that are at tension with error avoidance.
All arbitrators on a tribunal have a strong economic interest in
future appointments. Christopher Drahozal has speculated
that these market pressures have a constraining influence on
arbitrators that is similar to the effect of the possibility of rever-
sal on trial court judges. He suggests that this is a significant
reason for the absence of appeals processes from commercial
arbitration.142 Yet, as Drahozal himself has acknowledged,
market pressures differ from the constraints on tenured
judges, and they may yield different outcomes.1 43 The party-
of a party-appointed arbitrator, "an arbitrator that will remain impartial and
independent but understand the advocate's arguments, and who has the
right personality to convince the other arbitrators during deliberations, is
the ideal choice."); but see Kirby, supra, at 338 ("[W]hile co-arbitrators may
influence the chairman, their influence is often substantially limited by the
dynamics within the tribunal, including the chairman's inherent scepticism
with respect to anything a co-arbitrator may do that would tend to further
the interests of the party that nominated him ....").
141. Rau, supra note 138, at 501 (noting that "[t]he need to obtain a ma-
jority often leads to a process of negotiation and compromise, in which the
neutral feels obliged to trim or adjust his position in the search for a coali-
tion with one of his colleagues-and ultimately perhaps to concur, reluc-
tantly, in an award different from the one he might have preferred."). Cur-
rently, most arbitration rules provide that if no majority can be reached, the
chair alone will issue an award. See, e.g., ICC Rules art. 31, 1; LCIA Rules
art. 26.3; but see ICDR Rules art. 26, 1 (requiring that decisions and rulings
be made by a majority without making provision for the event a majority
cannot be reached). Although these provisions give the chair some lever-
age, there are still institutional pressures and other incentives for a chair to
try to reach consensus or at least a majority, as such a result increases the
appearance of legitimacy of the process and the decision.
142. Drahozal, supra note 1, at 501-02; see also Shavell, supra note 95, at
424 (noting that "because parties select their arbitrators, arbitrators have an
economic interest in not making errors and in maintaining their reputation.
Judges do not have a similar interest.").
143. Christopher R. Drahozal, Privatizing CivilJustice: Commercial Arbitration
and the CivilJustice System, 9 KAN.J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 578, 588 (2000) ("Arbitra-
tors compete with each other to be selected. You don't have similar market
competition in the judiciary.").
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appointed arbitrator's incentive is to achieve a resolution that
is satisfactory to the side that nominated him or her.144 In a
perfectly balanced situation, the chair-who wants to obtain
future appointments from either or both of the parties-is
motivated to resolve the dispute in a way that is acceptable to
both sides. In many instances, however, one of the parties will
be more likely than the other to nominate the chair in the
future. One party may likely go out of business, or maybe the
arbitrator has expertise in a niche area in which one of the
parties specializes. Perhaps one party is represented by a lead-
ing practitioner who frequently advises clients with regards to
appointments. The chair, in other words, is not always unaf-
fected by the practice of party-appointment. Furthermore,
even if the tribunal's incentives cancel each other out, the de-
sire to reach a resolution with which both sides can live should
not be equated with rigorous application of legal standards.
145
To understand why, one need only imagine a judge who is in-
centivized to reach a decision that gives something to each
party, rather than considering herself constrained to deter-
144. See Alan Scott Rau, The Culture of American Arbitration and the Lessons of
ADR, 40 TEX. INT'L L.J. 449, 459 (2005) (noting that "it [cannot] escape
even the most ingenuous of arbitrators that he is rather more likely to be
nominated again by someone who has already been willing to nominate him
once."). Recently, other well-respected arbitrators have advocated for aboli-
tion of party-appointment to put an end to these incentives and ensure true
impartiality. See generally Jan Paulsson, Moral Hazard in International Dispute
Resolution: Inaugural Lecture, University of Miami School of Law (Apr. 10, 2010),
8 TRANSNAT'L Disp. MGMT., no. 2, 2011; Hans Smit, The Pernicious Institution
of the Party-Appointed Arbitrator, Columbia FDI Perspectives (Dec. 14, 2010),
available at http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/content/pemicious-institution-
party-appointed-arbitrator. Unsurprisingly, these proposals have been met
with resistance. See, e.g., Herman Manuel Duarte, Fixing the Way Multi-Arbitra-
tor Tribunals Are Formed, ABA Section of Litigation (Oct. 27, 2011), available
at http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/international/arti-
cles/fal12011-multi-arbitrator-tribunals-unilateral-appointments.html; Alexis
Mourre, Are Unilateral Appointments Defensible? On Jan Paulsson's Moral Hazard




145. Cf Christopher R. Drahozal, Is Arbitration Lawless?, 40 LOYOLA L.A. L.
REv. 187, 192 (2006) ("If faced with a choice between a decision preferred
by the parties or one that follows the law, arbitrators have an incentive to
choose the former.").
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mine the outcome based on the merits of the parties' posi-
tions.
To be sure, arbitrators have a long-term interest in devel-
oping a reputation for fairness and accuracy. 146 Yet arbitrators
may be more prone than judges to creativity, especially when a
strict approach seems to result in an unjust or impractical out-
come.147 In part, this is because arbitrators are not burdened
by the constraints that come with responsibility for the devel-
opment of a body of substantive law. The private, contractual
nature of arbitration thus facilitates flexible application of the
selected laws. 148 One last check on judges that is mostly lack-
146. Cf Rau, supra note 144, at 514-15 ("Now I imagine it is fair to say that
arbitrators usually do try their best to model their awards on what courts
would do in similar cases-and that as often as not they succeed in doing so.
... Above all perhaps, arbitrators may be expected to act in such a way as to
maximize the likelihood that their awards will be enforceable in all jurisdic-
tions where review is likely ...").
147. Alan Rau provides some specific examples in which arbitrators reach
results that are sensible from a business perspective, but cannot easily be
squared with legal doctrines. Rau, supra note 138, at 533-34. For example,
in a strong claim for rescission of a joint venture agreement for fraud, if a
tribunal believes that the claimant is partly to blame in connection with reli-
ance, the tribunal could justify reduced recovery based on an analogy to
comparative negligence doctrines. Id. (citing John E. Coons, Approaches to
Court Imposed Compromise--The Uses of Doubt and Reason, 58 Nw. U. L. REV.
750, 768 n.12, 774-75 (1964)); see also CPR COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF ARB.,
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST: SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES FOR BUSINESS
USERS 270-71 (ThomasJ. Stipanowich & Peter H. Kaskell, eds., 2001) (citing
court decisions recognizing that arbitrators have more leeway than judges in
fashioning remedies and may, for example, order specific performance).
Some commentators suggest that arbitrators' leeway extends beyond reme-
dies. See, e.g., Hans Smit, Contractual Modifications of the Arbitral Process, 113
PENN ST. L. REv. 995, 1006 (2009) ("Arbitrators have desirable leeway in
developing and applying law to fit the circumstances of the individual case
..."); Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law
Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 725 (1999) ("[A]rbitrators often
do not apply the law"); cf. Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 15, at 364
("[A] rbitrators have an inclination to 'transnationalise' the rules they apply,
either because they are subject to no meaningful controls when it comes to
the merits, they act in a transnational environment, or they are themselves
very often from different legal cultures.").
148. Cf Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction,
1996 Sup. CT. REV. 331, 346 (noting that "[e]ven [ICC] arbitrators are de-
pendent for their careers, to a degree that no judges are, on the acceptabil-
ity of their awards to the parties, and perhaps especially on their acceptabil-
ity to parties who are 'repeat players'" and suggesting that for "[f]or this
reason ...reluctant parties have cause to believe that their legal entitle-
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U Journal of International Law and Politics
2012]
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS
ing in arbitration is the court of public opinion. In contrast
with judges, who must open their courtrooms to the public
and the press and whose opinions are published, commercial
arbitrators operate in relative obscurity.149 Of course, they are
scrutinized by their fellow arbitrators, as well as the parties and
their counsel. Yet the pressures created by interactions with
those who are immediately involved in the arbitration are dif-
ferent from those that result from the possibility of evaluation
by a broader public.
In sum, combined with other characteristics of arbitra-
tion, the direct appointment of arbitrators by the parties cre-
ates incentives that are at odds with error correction. Appel-
late review in commercial arbitration can therefore be effec-
tive only if parties and institutions are willing to use another
appointment model for the appellate panel. Of course, so
long as the party-appointed arbitrator remains a fixture in ar-
bitration, even arbitrators on tribunals that are selected in
their entirety by an institution have incentives that are differ-
ent from those of tenured judges. But at least the immediate
effect of party-appointment would be reduced.
D. Error Correction in Commercial Arbitration
Having analyzed the conditions for error correction, we
are now in a position to assess whether this value should be
implemented in international commercial arbitration. This
section addresses the question in three steps. It explains, first,
why the rules of arbitration institutions are the most appropri-
ate vehicles for the implementation of error correction. It
then identifies some features a two-tier process should have in
ments will be more squarely observed in court than in an arbitral tribunal
); see also Rau, supra note 144, at 515 n.271 (discussing Carrington and
Haagen's statements about incentives of arbitrators, and observing that these
incentives are consistent "with our recognition of the truism that the primary
felt obligation of the arbitrators is at all times to the contracting parties
rather than to the state.").
149. Knull & Rubins, supra note 2, at 541 n.31 ("J]udges, as public
figures, are more concerned about the effect each decision will have upon
their reputation than arbitrators, who enjoy some degree of anonymity.").
Eric Posner has argued that the possibility of substantive review of arbitral
awards by national courts creates an incentive for arbitrators to engage in
more diligent decision-making. Eric A. Posner, Arbitration and the Harmoniza-
tion of International Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 647, 651-52, 667
(1999).
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order to achieve meaningful error correction within the arbi-
tration framework. Lastly, it discusses the normative question
of whether institutions should make an appellate option availa-
ble, or at least experiment with it.
1. The Nature of Arbitration Rules
At the outset, let me emphasize that arbitration in a single
instance offers significant advantages and that it works for
many parties who avail themselves of arbitration. Any proposal
for appellate review in international commercial arbitration
should therefore not be mistaken for a call to revolutionize
the arbitration process or to spring a highly unconventional
process on unsuspecting parties. The common practices will
continue to be the default. This raises the question of whether
we shouldn't simply leave it to the parties themselves to come
up with tailor-made appeals processes. After all, they are free
to agree to appellate review, either by supplementing the se-
lected arbitration rules (which, consistent with the consensual
nature of arbitration, tend to be default rules), or by opting
for arbitration outside the arbitration institutions.
Yet few parties will make the effort. In part, this is be-
cause many parties do not give the nuts and bolts of arbitra-
tion extensive thought at the time they agree to it. The arbi-
tration provision is typically negotiated along with the substan-
tive terms of a complex transaction, at a time when no dispute
is on the horizon. Another complication is that appellate re-
view only makes sense for certain disputes. Although parties
could specify under which circumstances a right to appeal ex-
ists (e.g., when the amount in dispute or the damages awarded
reach a certain threshold), few arbitration clauses go into this
level of detail. More generally, the transaction costs of requir-
ing parties to negotiate and document the specific features of
an appeals process are significant, and the result probably will
not be optimal. After a dispute has materialized, it is even less
likely that the parties will hammer out an agreement specify-
ing a detailed two-tier arbitration process.
The parties' freedom to adjust the arbitration process to
their needs has prompted the suggestion that arbitration insti-
tutions should provide a menu of options regarding critical
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features of a two-tier process.150 But the value arbitration insti-
tutions can provide, aside from their roles in appointing arbi-
trators and facilitating logistical aspects of the proceedings,
lies in their ability to develop default procedures that are sensi-
ble to most parties. When an arbitration institution issues a
new set of rules, it should be able to offer a principled defense
of the choices it has made. Of course, some parties will wish to
deviate from the rules, and institutions should generally en-
force arrangements that do not present blatant challenges for
enforceability, for example, by violating fundamental notions
of impartiality and due process.1 5 ' Institutions would do their
customers a disservice, however, by simply presenting the par-
ties with a menu of choices that would require extensive analy-
sis, followed by negotiation about each item. 15 2 Instead, if in-
stitutions offer appeals processes, these should satisfy a sub-
stantial portion of those parties who would wish to opt into a
two-tier process.
2. Achieving Error Correction
What follows is the outline of a proposed two-level arbitra-
tion system that would create conditions conducive to error
correction, in the sense of meaningful review of an initial
award and improvement of the quality of adjudication in first
instance. 153 Some features of the proposed process will render
the arbitration process more similar to litigation. At the same
150. See supra note 90 and accompanying text for a description of such a
proposal.
151. Cf Craig, supra note 15, at 282 (noting that there is no absolute duty
on arbitrators to render an enforceable award, but they are under an obliga-
tion to use their best endeavors to do so).
152. In similar vein, Hans Smit has noted with regards to the appropriate
scope of review for an appellate arbitral panel: "The considered judgment of
the drafters of institutional and ad hoc rules as to the most desirable scope
of review is likely to be better than ad hoc determinations by drafters of
contracts who are unlikely or unable to give the question the consideration
it deserves." Smit, supra note 147, at 1005. Smit considers the possibility that
rules governing appellate arbitral review provide a preferred option as well
as possible alternatives, but notes that if there are strong institutional inter-
ests in providing a single option, the rules should specifically exclude provi-
sion for a different scope of review. Id. at 1005-06.
153. I will not discuss features that are important from an arbitration-tech-
nical perspective, but do not go directly to the error correction function,
such as provisions to address the lack of finality of the first award if an appeal
is taken, or disincentives that could be created by cost provisions (for exam-
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time, the process differs in some respects from the court
model so as to accommodate features of the arbitration pro-
cess.
Number of Arbitrators. The first feature of the proposed
two-level arbitration process may seem self-evident, but it re-
quires a drastic change from current practice: The first in-
stance arbitration should be conducted by a sole arbitrator,
and the appellate procedure by three arbitrators.15 4 This is
important, not only for reasons of efficiency, but because an
increase in the number of adjudicators is a critical condition
for the effectiveness of review for error. The absence of hier-
archy in commercial arbitration already renders the concept
of error correction problematic. If one accepts that three ad-
judicators will reach a better result than one, however, it is at
least plausible that the second tribunal will reach a better deci-
sion even if the sole arbitrator is no less qualified than any
member of the appellate panel. Moreover, because of their
experiences with court systems, parties would be more likely to
accept an appellate tribunal's reversal or modification of an
earlier award that is rendered by only one arbitrator.
155
ple, an asymmetrical provision under which the party that files an appeal is
liable for the costs of the other party if it loses).
154. Arbitration agreements usually specify the number of arbitrators,
with most opting for a three-member tribunal. See Wangelin, supra note 133,
at 72-73 ("Procedurally, it is typical that the party-appointed arbitrators se-
lect the chairman or presiding arbitrator. .. . The practitioner... will want
the process to allow him freely to suggest candidates known to be acceptable
to his client and to object to candidates proposed by the opposition."). Most
arbitration rules, including those of institutions that have adopted appellate
procedures, provide for a sole arbitrator as a default. They also note, how-
ever, that a dispute will be submitted to three arbitrators if the parties so
agree or if the appointing authority concludes that would be more appropri-
ate. See, e.g., ICC Rules art. 12, 2; ICDR Rules art. 5; LCIA Rules art. 5.4. In
practice, institutions tend to appoint three arbitrators if the amount in dis-
pute exceeds a certain threshold amount. See, e.g., MICHAEL W. BOHLER &
THOMAS H. WEBSTER, HANDBOOK OF ICC ARBITRATION 139 (2005) ("For arbi-
trations where the amount in dispute is over US$ 10 million, one would
generally expect the ICC Court to decide that there should be a tribunal of
three arbitrators.").
155. It would be less ideal to go from three arbitrators in the first instance
to five on appeal. Although the logic underlying the Condorcet jury theo-
rem compels the conclusion that five minds are even better than three, the
improvement is relatively marginal and comes at significantly increased ex-
pense and longer delays. Moreover, because the added value is less dra-
matic, parties are less likely to accept an award from a five-member panel
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Appointment of the Appellate Tribunal. As we have seen, the
incentives created by the institution of the party-appointed ar-
bitrator are incompatible with error correction. Therefore,
the appellate tribunal should either be selected by agreement
of both parties or, more realistically, by the arbitration institu-
tion. 15 6 The proposed practice would reduce one of the fea-
tures of arbitration that is most valued by parties, namely sig-
nificant control over the selection of the adjudicators. Yet in-
stitutions could still solicit input from the parties, so long as
there is no direct appointment link between a party and an
arbitrator. 157 For example, the parties may agree on some
qualifications (or, if they cannot agree, to submit a description
to the institution without sharing it with the other side). The
institution could also give the parties a preliminary list of po-
tential arbitrators, which they must return with a ranking and
a limited number of "strikes." Adoption of a list procedure,
which in some form or other has been followed by a number
of institutions including the AAA, would significantly reduce
distortions caused by the party-appointed arbitrator system. At
the same time, it would leave the parties with some influence
and, importantly, the ability to veto "rogue" arbitrators.
Lastly, even though the joint appointment of three arbi-
trators may be unrealistic in most cases, there is a greater like-
lihood that parties will be able to identify one arbitrator who is
acceptable to both sides. In fact, the possibility of substantive
review may take some of the pressure off the appointment of
the first instance arbitrator, making it easier for the parties to
reach agreement. In practice, therefore, the parties would
maintain a high level of control over the appointment of the
first instance arbitrator.
that overturns a decision from three-member panel, especially if the appel-
late panel is divided. In sum, going from one to three adjudicators seems
the best model for error correction.
156. Hans Smit has argued that, in light of the importance of the constitu-
tion of an appellate tribunal, its members should be appointed by the super-
vising arbitration institution or a third party (in practice, also a leading arbi-
tration institution). See Smit, supra note 147, at 1007.
157. Another solution would be one in which parties nominate arbitra-
tors, but the arbitrators do not learn which party appointed them. Realisti-
cally, however, in the relatively small, closely knit community of elite interna-
tional arbitration practitioners, arbitrators would often be able to make an
educated guess as to which side appointed them.
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Standard of Review. This factor is critical, as the level of
deference due to the first award determines the scope of the
appellate tribunal's error correction mandate. The existing
arbitral appeals procedures demonstrate three notions of what
appellate review could accomplish. On one end of the spec-
trum is CPR's standard, under which appellate panels may
overturn an award that "does not rest upon any appropriate
legal basis" or that "is based upon factual findings clearly un-
supported by the record[.]" 15 8 On the other end is the Euro-
pean Court of Arbitration, which provides for de novo review
on both factual and legal determinations. JAMS, by providing
that the appellate panel adopts the standard of review that
would be used by appellate courts in the jurisdiction in which
it sits, does not take a position. CPR's highly deferential stan-
dard appears to be primarily concerned with the promotion of
a fair arbitration process in the first instance. 15 9 This level of
review may be satisfactory for parties who wish to obtain a safe-
guard against arbitrary or capricious awards. Yet parties who
wish to optimize the error correction function will benefit
from a more searching review of the first instance award. 160 In
other words, a de novo standard of review is the most appropri-
ate one for errors of law.
The standard of review for facts is a more controversial
subject, as it is one area in which the practices of court systems
in different jurisdictions show significant variation. In light of
the nature of international contractual disputes and the char-
acteristics of the arbitration process, de novo review of facts
would appear to be appropriate. For one, it is often hard to
draw the line between law and facts in cases involving the in-
158. CPR Rules of Appeal Procedure, r. 8(2).
159. See Martin Shapiro, Appeal, 14 L. & Soc'y REV. 629, 629 (1980) (iden-
tifying as the "principal purpose" of appellate review, from the perspective of
the losing party, "to protect the loser against an arbitrary, capricious, or mis-
taken decision by the trial judge"); cf. CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 1, at 2
("[T]he review for correctness serves to reinforce the dignity, authority, and
acceptability of the trial, and to control the adverse effects of any personal
shortcomings of the basic decision-makers.").
160. Cf Lord Justice Dyson, The 2000 Eversheds Lecture: Finality in Arbitra-
tion and Adjudication, 66 ARB. 288, 288 (2000) (noting that "the more gener-
ous the scope for challenging decisions by appeal or review, the greater the
chance of eliminating error.").
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terpretation and application of complex agreements. 161 More
fundamentally, there is no reason to believe that the notion
that three adjudicators are likely to reach better decisions does
not apply to questions of fact.162 As noted above, the systemic
choice to focus appellate resources on lawmaking provides a
significant explanation for the existence of two distinct stan-
dards of review in the United States. Appellate courts in Eu-
rope, which do not play as prominent a role in lawmaking,
have authority to review all aspects of the case from which ap-
peal is taken. Since the implementation of appellate review in
international commercial arbitration would be justified exclu-
sively in terms of error correction, much of the justification for
a different treatment of questions of fact and law would ap-
pear to fall away.
The case for full factual review faces at least two objec-
tions. The first objection is that a certain distance from the
fact-finding process allows appellate decision-makers to reach
better decisions on legal issues. It may result in greater objec-
tivity.163 Relatedly, a renewed focus on facts arguably would
diminish the attention appellate adjudicators can devote to le-
gal issues. 164 These arguments have some force with regards
to novel legal issues. They are less apt, however, in the context
of appeals that center on the correct application of legal stan-
dards to complex or disputed facts, which would describe the
nature of adjudication in many international commercial dis-
putes. More importantly, while it may be sensible in a legal
161. See Randall H. Warner, All Mixed Up About Contract: When Is Contract
Interpretation a Legal Question and When Is It a Fact Question?, 5 VA. L. & Bus.
REV. 81 (2010) (describing different approaches in determining whether
contract interpretation involves questions of fact or law, and claiming that
the answer depends on the nature of the contract at issue).
162. Cf GORDON TULLOCK, TRILmS ON TRiAL 166-67 (1980) ("If we are
going to have an appellate procedure ... and we do think that it improves
the quality of 'justice,' then there does not seem to be very much argument
for not allowing appeals on every aspect of the case[,]" including findings of
fact).
163. Cf Carrington, supra note 118, at 551 (noting that "[r]emoteness of
the reviewer from the firing line of trial can assure greater objectivity for the
institutional process.").
164. Cf Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority
Between the Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the
Judge/Juy Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REv. 993, 1013 (1986)
("To provide free review of ultimate facts, appellate courts would have to
steal the necessary additional time from the law-declaring function . . ").
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system to sacrifice, within limits, accuracy in fact-finding in
favor of better decision-making on legal issues, the justifica-
tions for this tradeoff are significantly weaker when the law-
making function is absent.
The second objection is that de novo review of facts is inef-
ficient. 165 While the examination of witnesses on appeal inevi-
tably would add time and expenses, these costs are to some
extent mitigated by common arbitration practices. For in-
stance, in international commercial arbitration cases parties
often submit signed witness statements in lieu of live testi-
mony. Moreover, key witnesses who testify at a hearing are
often only subjected to targeted questions from opposing
counsel and the tribunal.1 66 This said, the tension between
error correction and efficiency is a real one. Even in court
systems, error correction gives way to other considerations, as
we have seen in the case of the legal system in the United
States in which appellate courts have limited authority to re-
view for factual errors. Similarly, arbitration institutions and
parties may balance these interests differently.
One way to increase efficiency could be to videotape the
hearings in the first instance arbitration and agree that on ap-
peal, the parties will only use transcript excerpts in their writ-
ten submissions and recorded segments at the hearing. The
appellate arbitrators could be given the authority to call wit-
nesses if they believe additional testimony is likely to clarify key
issues that were not sufficiently addressed in the first instance
proceeding. Alternatively, parties could limit the first instance
arbitration proceeding to paper submissions, with a brief hear-
ing, possibly conducted by telephone or videoconference, at
which counsel can be heard, and perhaps a limited number of
key fact and expert witnesses. If it comes to an appeal, the
parties would have the opportunity to make supplemental sub-
missions. The second level arbitration would also be the op-
portunity for the parties to present witnesses so that three arbi-
165. See, e.g., Marrow, supra note 73, at 12 (proposing that any arbitral
appeal be limited to issues of law to safeguard some of the expediency and
cost-effectiveness of arbitration).
166. See, e.g., Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Globalization of Arbitral Procedure,
36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1313, 1329-30 (2003) (describing this practice
and explaining how it represents a hybrid between the common law trials,
with its emphasis on live witness testimony, and civil law trials, in which docu-
ments play a larger role).
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trators, rather than one, can make determinations of credibil-
ity based on demeanor. Both proposed alternatives to two full-
blown trials would still provide many of the benefits associated
with error correction. In particular, several aspects relating to
the improvement of the quality of adjudication are preserved.
The second-level arbitrators and the parties would have the
benefit of a reasoned first instance determination to focus
their attention on the most critical issues. Both processes
would also maintain the constraining influence on the first in-
stance arbitrator that comes from the awareness that a panel
of three peers may soon be poring over the award.
Each of the two alternatives to a full hearing at each level
has distinct advantages and drawbacks. The first alternative
makes more factual information available to the first instance
arbitrator. This increases the likelihood that the award ren-
dered by the first arbitrator is compelling to the losing party,
and makes appeal less likely. The availability of the backstop
of appellate review, ironically, would convince parties to place
greater trust in a sole arbitrator. Another advantage is that
this solution would prioritize the process before an arbitrator
jointly selected by the parties (if they reached agreement on
the first instance arbitrator). It is especially effective when the
parties appoint an experienced arbitrator. This solution may
strike the best balance between the competing interests of ac-
curacy, diligence and efficiency. Yet the second alternative of-
fers some advantages over the first. It may seem strange to
place a stronger fact-finding task with the appellate tribunal
and to ask the first instance arbitrator to rule on more limited
information, increasing the likelihood of error at that stage. It
is noteworthy, however, that arbitrators are not required to
adopt the relatively "passive" attitude ofjudges in common law
systems. An arbitrator has the power to request more informa-
tion or clarification on legal or factual issues. 167 Moreover,
streamlined processes are not unheard of even in court sys-
tems. Instead of conceiving of first-level arbitration as a trial,
one could think of it as something akin to a preliminary in-
junction hearing in the United States. Another, perhaps bet-
167. See, e.g., Park, supra note 17, at 35 (describing the international arbi-
tration process as a combination of the common law and civil law ap-
proaches, and noting that arbitrators tend to adopt an inquisitorial style with
regards to witness testimony).
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ter example is the so-called "kort geding" in the Dutch courts. 168
This summary proceeding was designed as a means to obtain
interim relief in urgent matters, but in the vast majority of the
cases the parties do not proceed to a full process after ob-
taining a decision.169 Thus, appellate review may be more
likely in the second alternative, but it is by no means inevita-
ble. In fact, limitations on the collection and submission of
evidence may simply result in a stronger focus on the most
important aspects of a case. 170 The second solution would also
sidestep some of the problems posed by the concept of "error"
in complex contracts cases. Rather than assessing whether the
determination made by the sole arbitrator is within the range
of acceptable answers, the second panel would take full re-
sponsibility for review of the case and reach a decision that is
independent from, but also aided by, the first instance arbitra-
tor's findings.
168. The proceeding, which is conducted by the president of the trial
court, is informal and usually requires only one hearing. The president
often provides an initial assessment of the case during the hearing, and par-
ties often settle at that stage. Erhard Blankenburg, Patterns of Legal Culture:
The Netherlands Compared to Neighboring Germany, 46 AM. J. CoMP. L. 1, 24
(1998).
169. See Xandra E. Kramer, Dutch Private International Law-Overview
1998-2002, 22 Praxis des internationalen Privat-und Verfahrensrechts 537,
546 n.73 (2002) (only about five percent of kort geding cases are followed by a
full proceeding); see also Heleen Sprenger, Latest Developments in Cross-Border
Litigation: Discovery and Injunctive Relief-the Dutch Perspective, 11 Int'l L. Prac-
ticum 101, 102 (1998) (noting that "in practice kort geding proceedings re-
place the actual substantive proceedings"). The popularity of kort geding is
probably in large part due to its expediency: decisions are usually rendered
within a few weeks, sooner if needed, whereas a full proceeding takes, on
average, a year and a half. Kramer, supra, at 546 n.73.
170. Geoffrey Miller has proposed to introduce "preliminary judgments"
into U.S. civil procedure. Under his proposal, at any time during the litiga-
tion, a party could seek a preliminaryjudgment (which can be vacated by the
losing party) on the entire case or on discrete aspects of the case. Geoffrey
P. Miller, PreliminaryJudgments, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 165, 168-69. He argues
that even though the likelihood of error increases when a court rules on
limited information, this risk should not be overstated as in many cases a
judge will be able to make a reasonable assessment when some discovery has
been done. He also points out that underdeveloped records are often a
problem in contexts in which judges provide assessments of the merits
before trial, but that it is tolerated in those contexts, and that judges and
parties accept the provisional character of such judgments. Id. at 171-72.
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3. Should Arbitration Institutions Offer Appeal?
Now that we have seen what error correction in commer-
cial arbitration could look like, the time has come to address
the ultimate question: Should institutions adopt such a pro-
cess? In the context of contractual, privately funded adjudica-
tion, this question breaks out into two parts. First, would the
addition of an appeals procedure improve the arbitration pro-
cess? Second, is there sufficient interest among users and po-
tential users of the arbitration process?
As to the first question, the most obvious objection is that
a two-tier process would insert unnecessary inefficiency into ar-
bitration. Even if most parties would not opt in, one could
argue that by offering rules for such a process an institution
would lend legitimacy to a process that may well result in addi-
tional delay and costs for no good reason. This concern is in
line with the complaint that international arbitration already
suffers from 'judicialization," i.e., the loss of distinct arbitra-
tion characteristics as a result of the adoption of court-like fea-
tures.171 Yet it bears emphasizing that the process would be
entirely optional. Since the majority of current arbitration
users are relatively content with the status quo, it is unlikely
that the two-tier process would effectively come to replace cur-
rent practices. Moreover, for many parties the two-level arbi-
tration process outlined above may prove to be more efficient
than the current system. Some parties will accept the award
from the first arbitrator. I suspect that more commonly, par-
ties will use the receipt of the first award as a logical moment
to engage in serious settlement discussions. The award gives
parties more insight into the strength of their legal positions
and the potential value of their claims. At the same time, the
risk that a second tribunal may arrive at a different conclusion
will leave the winning party with incentives to reach a compro-
mise, especially when the award appears to be weak on certain
points. 172 From the perspective of parties to commercial dis-
171. See, e.g., Alan Redfern, Stemming the Tide of Judicialisation in Interna-
tional Arbitration, 2 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REV. 21, 21, 24 (2008).
172. A recent survey found that under the current system, at least forty
percent of the corporations involved in arbitration cases negotiated a settle-
ment after an award was rendered (the actual number is likely higher, be-
cause only thirty percent responded that they did not renegotiate arbitral
awards, and thirty percent indicated they did not know). The main reasons
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putes, after all, adjudication is not only or even primarily
about the vindication of justice. It is also about risk. By ex-
tending the timeframe in which each party has something to
lose, the possibility of appellate review would affect the dynam-
ics in negotiations that often take place in the shadow of the
arbitration process.
A related objection is that much of what my proposal
seeks to accomplish could be achieved by abolishing direct
party appointment. In other words, the more efficient and less
radical solution would be for institutions to change the default
rule regarding appointment of the tribunal so that arbitrators
are selected by the institutions. In fact, the LCIA already has
adopted this approach. 173 Yet this solution, while removing
the incentives created by direct party appointment, fails to of-
fer some of the benefits associated with appellate review. Most
obviously, a panel of three arbitrators can still make errors,
and there would be no avenue for recourse. The parties also
would not have the benefits that stem from an arbitrator's
awareness that her award may well be reviewed. In sum, insti-
tutional appointment of arbitrators has some advantages over
direct party-nomination of the majority of a tribunal, but the
solution would not provide many benefits associated with error
correction.
This leaves the question of whether a market exists for an
appeals process in international commercial arbitration. In an
article published about thirty years ago, William Landes and
Judge Richard Posner posited that the virtual absence of ap-
pellate review in commercial arbitration is simply a conse-
quence of the circumstance that commercial arbitrators don't
make law. They stated that the lack of appeals options in com-
mercial arbitration "suggests that the principal value of appel-
for entering into negotiations after an award is obtained are avoidance of
cost (thirty-three percent), saving time associated with enforcement (twenty-
three percent), preservation of a continuing relationship with the other side
(nineteen percent) and the desire to receive the funds promptly (sixteen
percent). Queen Mary University of London & PricewaterhouseCoopers, In-
ternational Arbitration: Corporate Attitudes and Practices, 9 (2008), available at
http://www.pwc.co.uk/eng/publications/international-arbitration_2008.
html.
173. See LCIA Rules art. 5.5 (arbitrators are appointed by the LCIA court,
which pays due regard to any written agreements about selection methods or
criteria).
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late proceedings is not to correct errors at the trial level but to
formulate rules of law." 174 The underlying premise is that pri-
vate parties are unwilling to pay for error correction, but that a
legal system as a whole will pay for rule creation. On the other
hand, the intermediate appellate courts in the federal court
system of the United States were created primarily to correct
errors made by trial courts. 175 And as we have seen, in many
jurisdictions, especially in the civil law tradition, appellate
courts still engage principally in error correction. In commer-
cial arbitration, the absence of external checks on tribunals-
either through appellate review or through the norms of
openness and transparency that apply to court proceedings
and decisions-increases the risk of a decision that exceeds
the parameters imposed by the parties' contracts, including
any choice of law provisions. Thus, although the absence of a
broader rule-setting responsibility takes away a significantjusti-
fication of the costs and inefficiencies that come with appellate
review, in bet-the-company cases it may be a price worth pay-
ing. For parties who place a premium on diligent decision-
making over the benefits of obtaining a speedy and final reso-
lution, it may be sensible to provide for the possibility of ob-
taining a check on the first instance tribunal.
The available data is inconclusive regarding the potential
demand for an appeals process. According to a survey of 606
in-house attorneys from Fortune 1,000 corporations con-
174. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private
Good, 8J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 252 (1979). Kenneth Scott has also argued that
the dispute resolution model offers no justification for appeal: "The position
that appeals are never essential draws intellectual support from the Conflict
Resolution Model. In terms of a mechanism for settling disputes, one hear-
ing is enough to do the job, and it is all that arbitration and grievance proce-
dures customarily afford. No doubt the loser would like another chance, but
that it endlessly true. Rather than the outcome it is the existence of a form
of impartial arbitrament that is essential."). Kenneth E. Scott, Two Models of
the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 937, 946 (1975).
175. See. e.g., Paul D. Carrington, The Function of the Civil Appeal: A Late-
Century View, 38 S.C. L. REv. 411, 416 (1987) (noting that the vision underly-
ing the passage of the Evarts Act was that the law "was presumed clear and,
thus, amenable to application."); Martha Dragich, Uniformity, Inferiority, and
the Law of the Circuit Doctrine, 56 Loy. L. REv. 535, 560 (2010) (noting that in
passing the Evarts Act "Congress was focused primarily on the need for in-
creased capacity for error correction... [although] the Act's sponsors were
concerned with uniformity of decisions under federal law."); see also
Oldfather, Error Correction, supra note 1, at 65 (citing Carrington's article).
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ducted in 1998, 54.3 percent of respondents who did not opt
for arbitration indicated that the difficulty of appealing arbi-
tration awards was a major factor in their decision. 176 This
group does not consist solely of businesses that categorically
reject arbitration: Of the respondents who use arbitration very
frequently or frequently, forty-nine percent and sixty-four per-
cent, respectively, indicated that in instances in which they de-
cide against it, the lack of substantive review is a factor. 177
Based on this data, Knull and Rubins conclude that "[b]y not
offering appeal options, arbitral institutions ignore an oppor-
tunity to respond to needs felt by some potential users."'178 A
survey conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) and the
Queen Mary University of London in 2006, however, found
that out of 103 in-house counsel of "leading corporations
around the world," ninety-one percent of respondents rejected
the idea of an appeals system in international arbitration.
179
176. David B. Lipsky & Ronald L. Seeber, The Appropriate Resolution of Cor-
porate Disputes: A Report of the Growing Use of ADR by U.S. Corporations 8, 26
(1998), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article-1003&context=icrpubs; Knull & Rubins, supra note 2, at 532
(quoting Lipsky and Seeber).
177. Lipsky & Seeber, supra note 176, at 27-28.
178. Knull & Rubins, supra note 2, at 534. A study conducted by Theo-
dore Eisenberg andJeffrey Miller, which examined over 2,800 contracts filed
with the Securities Exchange Commission in 2002 by public firms, found
that although arbitration agreements were twice as common in international
contracts as in domestic ones, only twenty percent of international contracts
had an arbitration clause. Theodore Eisenberg &Jeffrey P. Miller, The Flight
from Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts
of Publicly Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 351-52 (2007). Although
the study is not focused on commercial contracts, its findings challenge the
conventional wisdom that arbitration is the dispute resolution mechanism of
choice for parties to international transactions. Arbitration experts have
proffered significantly higher estimates for commercial transactions, with
some placing the estimate as high as ninety percent. Gary Born thinks this
number is inflated, but notes: "It is probably true that, in negotiated com-
mercial (not financial) transactions, where parties devote attention to the
issue of dispute resolution, and where the parties possess comparable bar-
gaining power, arbitration clauses are more likely than not to be encoun-
tered." BORN, supra note 4, at 71.
179. QUEEN MARY UNIVERSITY OF LONDON & PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS,
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CORPORATE ATrITUDES AND PRACTICES 2, 15
(2006), available at http://www.pwc.co.uk/eng/publications/International_
arbitration.html. The PwC survey does not specify which companies were
surveyed or what the response rate was. The inconsistency with the Lipsky &
Seeber study, supra note 176, possibly reflects a selection bias, i.e., attorneys
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Attorneys who participated in interviews explained that they
would view the ability to appeal as a disadvantage, and they
considered finality and the attendant efficiency to be an ad-
vantage of the arbitration process.' s0 An important lesson
from the PwC survey is that even in the international context,
users of the arbitration process value efficiency. There is a rea-
sonable possibility that more in-house counsel would opt for
an arbitration process that includes an option to appeal if it is
designed so as to minimize inefficiency.
It is therefore hard to predict the level of interest for the
two-level procedure outlined above. At least initially, most ar-
bitration users will probably prefer arbitration as they know it:
in a single proceeding before a three-member tribunal that in-
cludes two party-appointed arbitrators. Even if sufficient inter-
est develops, some amount of time will pass before parties con-
sider adopting the "new" procedure in arbitration agreements.
Of course, parties are free to opt for the new procedure after a
dispute has arisen. To test whether an appellate option adds
value, an arbitration institution could pilot the proposal for a
few years. At the outset of the arbitration proceeding, it could
offer parties a set of rules providing for a two-level procedure
as an alternative to its regular arbitration procedure. The in-
stitution should closely monitor arbitrations conducted in ac-
cordance with the alternative procedure and keep detailed
records of the percentage of cases in which parties, respec-
tively, comply with the first award, settle the dispute after the
first award, settle the dispute during the appeals procedure, or
proceed all the way through the second stage. It should also
keep track of how many appellate awards lead to enforcement
proceedings, compared to awards in regular arbitration pro-
ceedings.
Ultimately, the question of whether international com-
mercial arbitration should make error correction available
goes to the heart of what adjudication is about. For many par-
ties, the ability to nominate one of the arbitrators and exert
who had good experiences with arbitration may have been more likely to
respond to the PwC survey.
180. QUEEN MARY UNIERSITY OF LONDON & PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS,
supra note 179, at 15; see also BORN, supra note 4, at 82 & n.472 (citing the
2006 PwC survey, supra note 179, and noting that, on balance, most busi-
nesses regard the efficiency provided by finality favorably).
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influence over the identity of the chair is a significant advan-
tage of arbitration.18' At the end of the day, many parties may
prefer the efficiency that comes with a one-shot process and a
certain level of control over the appointment of the tribunal.
Some parties may view the freedom of arbitrators to fashion
resolutions that do not neatly fit within the doctrinal rigidities
of the selected legal system as an advantage.18 2 On the other
hand, a non-negligible percentage of users and potential users
of the arbitration system may prefer the stricter adherence to
legal norms that would be encouraged by a system built on a
notion of error correction. For these parties, the process out-
lined in this Part may provide the conditions for a more rigor-
ous application of the laws they have selected without compro-
mising efficiency of the arbitration procedure too much.
IV. INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AND LAWMAKING
This Part explores whether the introduction of an appel-
late mechanism in investment arbitration is likely to achieve
greater consistency in investment law, as imagined by advo-
cates for the creation of an appeals facility. Based on an exam-
ination of pertinent aspects of the operation of the lawmaking
function in the United States and in other court systems, it
181. See Carter, supra note 133, at 84 (noting that "in international matters
in particular, there often is a fear of the unknown and a corresponding ten-
dency for each party to seek as much predictability as possible in the consti-
tuting of the tribunal. If each party has the right to select one of the three
arbitrators, and some role in the selection of the third, this builds party con-
fidence in the integrity of the process.").
182. This notion is reflected in the instruction given to courts in England
when evaluating arbitral awards for error of law: "The approach is to read an
arbitration award in a reasonable and commercial way, expecting, as is usu-
ally the case, that there will be no substantial fault that can be found with it."
AB Attorney General v. Hochtief Airport GmbH, [2006] 1 A.C. 221 (H.L.). Simi-
larly, Hans Smit has argued that in intra-arbitral review, a deferential "clearly
erroneous findings of fact or law" standard is most appropriate, as "itihe
essential nature of arbitration as an efficient and flexible substitute for litiga-
tion would be put in jeopardy if provisions were made for plenary review on
the facts and the law." Smit, supra note 147, at 1005-06. The error correc-
tion process proposed in this Article, in contrast, will not suit parties who
wish to grant an arbitrator wide leeway but still want to have the option of
appeal in case of an egregious award.
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appears doubtful that appellate review would be the best way
to achieve the envisioned lawmaking goals.183
A. The Investment Arbitration Framework
Investment treaties set out to promote foreign investment
by granting substantive rights that create a more stable invest-
ment climate for citizens of the investor country who invest in
the host country.18 4 Usually, the sovereign parties commit to
provide adequate compensation in case of expropriation, to
accord "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection and
security" to investments, and to honor obligations entered into
with regard to investments (this last protection is generally re-
183. Not surprisingly, several commentators have spoken out against the
introduction of appellate review in investment arbitration. Some have prin-
cipled objections based on the nature of investment treaties or the arbitra-
tion process. See, e.g., Barton Legum, Visualizing an Appellate System, in CUR-
RENT ISSUES, supra note 3, at 121 (noting that so long as investment treaties
retain a bilateral character, an appeals mechanism will do little to resolve
inconsistency and is potentially harmful); Jan Paulsson, Avoiding Unintended
Consequences, in APPEALS MECHANISM, supra note 22, at 241, 258-62 (2008)
(warning that the appointment of members of an appeals facility would
likely re-politicize and de-legitimize a process grounded in party consent);
Asif H. Qureshi & Shandana Gulzar Khan, Implications of an Appellate Body for
Investment Disputes from a Developing Country Point of View, in APPEALS MECHA-
NISM, supra note 22, at 267, 277-78 (2008) (noting that the consistency goal
may clash with the development interests of developing nations and that,
under the current bilateral system, a comprehensive appeals facility is not
desirable); cf. Ian Laird & Rebecca Askew, Finality Versus Consistency: Does In-
vestor-State Arbitration Need an Appellate System?, 7J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS 285,
290 (2005) (presenting the issue as one of balancing "consistency and cor-
rectness" with "finality"). Others believe that the practical and logistical hur-
dles form too great an impediment. See, e.g., Andreas Bucher, Is There a Need
to Establish a Permanent Reviewing Body?, in THE REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION AWARDS 285, 290-92 (Emmanuel Gaillard, ed., 2008) (conclud-
ing, because of problems associated with an amendment of the ICSID Con-
vention or with the creation of an optional appeals process, that it is more
fruitful to explore other avenues for increasing consistency). A third group
maintains that it is too early to assess whether there is a need for an appeals
procedure. See, e.g., Laird & Askew, supra, at 302.
184. Empirical studies have cast doubt on the assumption that investment
treaties result in larger flows of foreign investment. M. Sornarajah, A Coming
Crisis: Expansionary Trends in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in APPEALs MECHA-
NISM, supra note 22, at 39, 39 n.1.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U Journal of International Law and Politics
[Vol. 44:1109
APPEALS IN ARBITRATION
ferred to as an "umbrella clause").185 Although the vast major-
ity of investment treaties are bilateral, a few multilateral ar-
rangements exist, for example, the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
18 6
In investment treaties, the sovereigns also consent to arbi-
trate or litigate disputes regarding substantive treaty provi-
sions. The treaties usually give investor claimants a choice be-
tween litigation in the host country and arbitration before
tribunals organized under ICSID, the ICC, the Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce, or the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) .187 The majority of
known investment arbitrations are administered by ICSID.
18 8
This institution, which specializes in investor-state arbitrations,
was established by the Convention on the Settlement of Invest-
185. See, e.g., DUGAN ET AL, supra note 5, at 2 (describing the protections to
which investors are typically entitled under bilateral and multilateral invest-
ment treaties).
186. There is no comprehensive substantive multilateral investment con-
vention to which sovereigns can accede. Attempts by the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development to negotiate a Multilateral Agree-
ment on Investment have failed, as have attempts by the WTO to start multi-
lateral negotiations on investment rules. Rainer Geiger, The Multifaceted Na-
ture of International Investment Law, in APPEALS MECHANISM, supra note 22, at
17, 18.
187. Franck, supra note 3, at 1541. As of the end of 2006, ICSID adminis-
tered almost two-thirds of all known disputes. Approximately twenty-five
percent of all known investor-state arbitrations were conducted under the
UNCITRAL Rules. Sauvant, supra note 22, at 13; see also Andrew P. Tuck,
Investor-State Arbitration Revised: A Critical Analysis of the Revisions and Proposed
Reforms to the ICSID and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 13 LAw & Bus. REV. AM.
885, 886 (2007) (noting that more than half of the BITs provide for ICSID
arbitration, and that the UNCITRAL Rules were used in approximately
thirty percent of all known investor-state arbitrations).
188. Investment disputes arbitrated outside of ICSID often do not result
in publicly available awards. Cf Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Judging Judges:
From "Principal-Agent Theory" to "Constitutional Justice" in Multilevel "Judicial
Governance" of Economic Cooperation Among Citizens, 11 J. INT'L ECON. L. 827,
874 (2008) ("Even though foreign investments often affect public interests,
investor-state arbitrations are often submitted to commercial and confiden-
tial arbitration procedures . . ."). These disputes only become "known" if
enforcement actions in courts ensue or if the parties otherwise make the
existence of the arbitration public. Cf Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Interna-
tional Rule of Law and Constitutional Justice in International Investment Law and
Arbitration, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 513, 527 (2009) (observing that
"commercial arbitration awards remain confidential absent express consent
or challenges in national courts .... ).
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ment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States
(the ICSID Convention) of 1965.189 Proposals for appellate
review in investment arbitration have focused on the creation
of an appeals facility within the ICSID framework.
Unlike arbitral awards that are governed by the New York
Convention, ICSID awards cannot be challenged outside the
ICSID framework, effectively precluding review of awards in
the national courts in host states. 190 Instead, ICSID has an an-
nulment mechanism under which parties can seek review of
awards by an ad hoc annulment committee. 191 Annulment
committees are appointed by the Secretary General and con-
sist of three members who have not served on the first instance
tribunal. 192 Annulment is a limited remedy that differs in sig-
nificant respects from appeal. An annulment committee has
only two options: to annul an award in whole or in part, or to
let it stand.193 It cannot substitute its own opinion for the
award, nor can it remand the case to the tribunal that issued
the award. Rather, if an award is annulled, either party can
request submission of the dispute to a newly appointed tribu-
nal. 1 94 In addition, the grounds for annulment are limited to
(1) improper constitution of the tribunal; (2) manifest excess
of the tribunal's powers; (3) corruption on the part of a mem-
ber of the tribunal; (4) serious departure from a fundamental
procedural rule; and (5) failure to state the reasons in the
award.195 As David Caron has explained, the annulment pro-
cess is limited to a review of the legitimacy of the process, but
189. ICSID Secretariat, Possible Improvement of the Framework for ICSID Arbi-
tration 1 (Discussion Paper, Oct. 22, 2004), available at http://icsid.world
bank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?reques-Type=ICSIDPublicationsRH&action
Val=ViewAnnouncePDF&AnnouncementType=archive&AnnounceNo=14_1.
pdf. The ICSID Convention came into force one year later and currently has
157 signatory states, of which 146 have ratified or accepted the Convention.
A list of signatories, ratifications and acceptances is available at http://icsid.
worldbank.org.
190. ICSID Convention, supra note 25, art. 53, 1 ("The award shall be
binding on the parties and shall not be subject to any appeal or to any other
remedy except those provided for in this Convention.").
191. Non-ICSID investment arbitration awards are subject to challenges
under the New York Convention framework. See Tams, supra note 35, at 11.
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it does not extend to the substantive correctness of the award
under review.
1 9 6
B. The Search for a Solution to Incoherence
The question of whether international investment law will
develop into a coherent legal system is acute, in part, because
of the field's astonishing growth in recent years. The number
of bilateral investment treaties (usually referred to as BITs) has
grown from less than four hundred in the late 1980s to ap-
proximately three thousand today.197 Investor-state arbitra-
tions are on the rise as well. For about thirty years after the
ICSID Convention entered into force, ICSID registered less
than a handful of cases per year. In fact, it was not unusual for
a year to go by without the registration of any new ICSID cases.
Starting in 1997, however, the number of new cases has con-
sistently been in the double digits, and in 2011 alone, thirty-
eight new cases were registered with ICSID.19 8 The prolifera-
tion of bilateral treaties and the tremendous increase in case
load have contributed to fragmentation, a trend that will likely
continue. In light of these characteristics of investment law,
the question is whether the creation of an appeals facility
within the ICSID framework is likely to achieve the increased
coherence its proponents seek to achieve. 199
196. Caron, supra note 78, at 24 ("[Alppeal generally focuses upon both the
legitimacy of the process of decision and the substantive correctness of the
decision. Annulment, on the other hand, and particularly in the case of arbi-
tration, focuses not on the correctness of the decision, but rather more nar-
rowly considers whether, regardless of errors in application of law or deter-
mination of fact, the decision resulted from a legitimate process.").
197. As of the end of 2010, 2,807 BITs had been concluded. UNITED NA_
TIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD), WORLD INVEST-
MENT REPORT 2011 100, available at http://www.unctad-docs.org/files/
UNCTAD-WIR201 1-Full-en.pdf.
198. ICSID, THE ICSID CASELOAD-STATISTICS 7, 20 (2012), available at
http://icsid.worldbank.org.
199. Asif Qureshi and Shandana Khan point out that investment arbitra-
tion "is largely set against a normative framework that is bilateral, disorga-
nized and non-multi-lateral" and ask, rhetorically, "Is it really possible to
meaningfully evaluate the arguments for and the obstacles in setting up an
appellate facility in the investment sphere, with the objective of providing
normative coherence, in circumstances in which the multilateral consensus
on substantive matters is not very evident?" Qureshi & Khan, supra note 183,
at 272.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U Journal of International Law and Politics
2012]
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS
1. The Argentina Cases
Considering the decentralized nature of arbitration,
awards from investment arbitrators show remarkable consis-
tency. For example, based on an examination of investment
awards, Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler has concluded that case
law addressing the distinction between treaty and contract
claims and the fair and equitable treatment standard is consis-
tent.20 0 Yet inconsistency exists in certain controversial areas,
such as the application of the necessity defense. 20 1 The awards
and annulment decisions that have so far been issued in the
more than forty cases filed against Argentina with ICSID in the
past ten years leave no doubt that the risk of inconsistent out-
comes and reasoning is a real one. A brief discussion of five of
these cases, all of which were brought under the United States-
Argentina BIT, illustrates the form disagreement among in-
vestment tribunals can take.
The claimants in these cases had invested in Argentine
companies as part of Argentina's privatization program in the
early 1990s. In four cases, brought by CMS Gas Transmission
Co., LG&E Energy Corp., Enron Creditors Recovery Corp.,
and Sempra Energy International, the investments were in the
gas sector.20 2 In the fifth one, brought by Continental Casu-
alty Co., the investment was in the insurance industry.20 3 In
these investment transactions, Argentina had made commit-
ments aimed at stabilizing the tariff structure notwithstanding
the strong fluctuation of the peso. Specifically, Argentina un-
200. Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Is Consistency a Myth?, in PRECEDENT IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (Yas Banifatemi ed., 2007), at 137, 138-41.
201. Cf id. at 142-43.
202. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/8, Award (May 12, 2005) [hereinafter CMS Award]; CMS Gas
Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Annul-
ment Decision (Sept. 25, 2007) [hereinafter CMS Annulment Decision]; En-
ron Award, supra note 32; Enron Annulment Decision, supra note 32; LG&E
Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision
on Liability (Oct. 3, 2006) [hereinafter LG&E Decision on Liability]; Sem-
pra Energy Int'l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award
(Sept. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Sempra Award]; Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argen-
tine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Annulment Decision (June 29,
2010) [hereinafter Sempra Annulment Decision].
203. Cont'! Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9
(Sept. 5, 2008) [hereinafter Continental Award], Annulment Decision
(Sept. 16, 2011) [hereinafter Continental Annulment Decision].
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dertook to calculate tariffs collected by Argentine subsidiaries
in U.S. dollars converted into pesos. Argentina also consented
to adjust the tariffs twice a year. 20 4 Approximately ten years
later, Argentina suffered an unprecedented economic
meltdown. The Argentine government took a series of mea-
sures to address the crisis, including the enactment of an
Emergency Law in January 2002, which abrogated the tariff
conversions and semi-annual tariff adjustments. 20 5 The inves-
tors who filed claims with ICSID claimed that Argentina's ac-
tions violated several obligations under the BIT, including the
obligations to accord fair and equitable treatment to invest-
ments and to honor commitments made to investors.20 6 Ar-
gentina argued, among other things, that it was not liable as a
result of the necessity defense under customary international
law and the BIT's emergency clauses, chiefly Article XI.20
7
The inconsistency is immediately apparent from the out-
comes in the five cases. In CMS, Enron and Sempra, the tribu-
nals held that Argentina did not meet the standards for the
defenses. 208 In LG&E and Continental, the tribunals held that
Argentina had established the defense, but they applied it dif-
ferently, resulting in inconsistent rulings regarding the extent
of Argentina's liability.209 The conflicting outcomes reflect
differences in factual assessments, as well as disagreement
about the relationship between the defenses under, respec-
tively, the treaty and customary international law.21° Article XI
204. See, e.g., CMS Award, supra note 202, 11 53-57 (describing CMS's
understanding of such a commitment by Argentina).
205. E.g., id. T 65.
206. E.g., id. 88.
207. See, e.g., id. It 91-99.
208. Id. 1 331; Enron Award 11 313, 321, 339; Sempra Award 1 388.
209. LG&E Decision on Liability 11 257-63; Continental Award 11
219-22, 266.
210. Notably, there is substantial overlap in arbitrators in the Argentina
cases. Francisco Orrego-Vicufia was the chair in the CMS, Enron and Sempra
tribunals. CMS Award, supra note 202, 1 11; Enron Award, supra note 32, 1
12; Sempra Award, supra note 202, 1 10. Marc Lalonde sat on the CMS and
Sempra tribunals, and was appointed by the claimants in both cases. CMS
Award, supra, 1 10; Sempra Award, supra, 1 10. Two arbitrators served in
tribunals that issued inconsistent awards. Francisco Rezek was a member of
the CMS and LG&E tribunals, and was in both cases appointed by Argentina.
CMS Award, supra, 10; LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 202, 1 6.
AlbertJan van den Berg was a member of the LG&E and Enron tribunals. In
the LG&E case, he was appointed by the claimant. LG&E Decision on Lia-
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of the BIT reserves the right of the sovereigns to take "mea-
sures necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfill-
ment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or res-
toration of international peace or security, or the Protection of
its own essential security interests."2 1' The treaty text thus pro-
vides little guidance as to the content of necessity. In contrast,
Article 25 of the International Law Commission's Articles on
State Responsibility, which codifies the emergency defense,
lists specific elements.
The approaches taken by the tribunals and annulment
committees could be grouped in three categories. 21 2 The first
approach, taken by the tribunals in CMS, Enron, and Sempra, is
that the necessity defense under customary international law
supplies the standards for assessing whether the BIT defense
has been met. The CMS, Enron, and Sempra awards essentially
follow the same script. The tribunals first analyze Argentina's
defense under customary international law as codified by the
International Law Committee in the Articles on State Respon-
sibility.213 Turning to Article XI, the tribunals then state that
the defense must be interpreted by reference to the elements
of a state of emergency under customary international law.
2 1
4
bility, supra, 6. In the Enron case, he was appointed by the chair, when the
arbitrator initially appointed by Argentina resigned almost five years into the
arbitration proceedings. Enron Award, supra, 7 11, 39. Cf David Schneid-
erman, Judicial Politics and International Investment Arbitration: Seeking an Expla-
nation for Conflicting Outcomes, 30 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 383 (2010) (explor-
ing potential explanations for the outcome in LG&E even though two of the
three arbitrators sat on tribunals that rendered conflicting awards). As for
annulment committee appointments, Gavan Griffith sat on the Enron and
Continental committees, and Christer S6derlund sat on the Sempra and Conti-
nental committees. Enron Annulment Decision, supra note 202, 1 7; Conti-
nental Annulment Decision, supra note 203, 7 4; Sempra Annulment Deci-
sion, supra note 202, 7 5, 7.
211. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of
Investment, U.S.-Arg., art. XI, Nov. 14, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-2.
212. This part of the discussion draws on an illuminating presentation by
Michael Nolan, titled The Dynamic Relationship Between the Customary Interna-
tional Law of Investment Protection and Bilateral Investment Treaties (Columbia
Law School International Investment Law and Policy Speaker Series, March
19, 2012).
213. CMS Award, supra note 202, 315-31; Enron Award, supra note 32,
77 303-13; Sempra Award, supra note 202, 11 344-55.
214. CMS Award, supra note 202, 374; Enron Award, supra note 32, 1
334; Sempra Award, supra note 202, 7 378.
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The Enron and Sempra tribunals explicitly justified this ap-
proach against the argument, submitted in an expert opinion,
that a treaty is distinct from, and takes priority over, customary
international law. The Enron tribunal, while acknowledging
that "a treaty regime specifically dealing with a given matter
will prevail over more general rules of customary international
law[,]" observed that this was not the situation presented by
the U.S.-Argentina BIT.2 15 The tribunal noted that because
the BIT does not specify the elements of necessity, the BIT
defense "becomes inseparable from the customary law stan-
dard insofar as the conditions for the operation of state of ne-
cessity are concerned."2
1 6
The second approach, taken by the LG&E tribunal and
the CMS annulment committee, is that the two defenses are
distinct and stand in a hierarchical relationship to one an-
other. The CMS annulment committee provides the most
elaborate explanation of this position. Its decision explains
that Article XI concerns wrongfulness, meaning that acts cov-
ered by it cannot be held to be in breach of the BIT obliga-
tions. With regards to Article 25, it is unclear whether it ad-
dresses wrongfulness or liability.2 1 7 If Article 25 also addresses
wrongfulness, Article XI would be the lex specialis as to that
issue and apply at the exclusion of customary law.2 18 If Article
25 goes to liability, it would still be a secondary rule that the
tribunal should consider only after determining that Article XI
did not preclude a finding of breach.2 19 The LG&E tribunal
had already applied some aspects of this approach before the
CMS committee issued its annulment decision. Specifically,
the LG&E tribunal concluded that the measures taken by the
Argentine government fell within the Article XI defense 220
215. Enron Award, supra note 32, 334.
216. Id.; see also Sempra Award, supra note 202, 378. The CMS tribunal,
which was the first to issue an award, had followed this approach without
expressly justifying it. See CMS Award, supra note 202, 374 (noting that the
tribunal's review of Argentina's defense under the BIT involved "a substan-
tive review that must examine whether the state of necessity or emergency
meets the conditions laid down by customary international law and the
treaty provisions and whether it thus is or is not able to preclude wrongful-
ness.").
217. CMS Annulment Decision, supra note 202, 11 129, 132.
218. Id. 133.
219. Id. 134.
220. LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 202, 7 226-42.
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and noted that this effectively ended the inquiry.22 1 Although
the tribunal proceeded to address the necessity defense under
customary international law, it characterized this analysis as
one that provided further "support" for its conclusions regard-
ing Argentina's defense under the BIT.
222
The third approach was introduced by the Continental tri-
bunal. Like the LG&E tribunal and the CMS annulment com-
mittee, the Continental tribunal rejected the position, taken by
the other three tribunals, that the treaty and customary law
defenses are "inseparable. '" 223 Yet where the LG&E tribunal
engaged purely in textual analysis to determine whether the
evidence established the defense, the Continental tribunal
looked for guidance on the concept of necessity outside the
investment treaty context. The tribunal noted that Article XI
could be traced back to the Friendship, Commerce, and Navi-
gation treaties entered into by the United States and, eventu-
ally, to a specific provision in the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947.224 The tribunal therefore de-
cided that it is "appropriate to refer to the GATT and WTO
case law which has extensively dealt with the concept and re-
quirements of necessity in the context of economic measures
derogating to the obligations contained in GATT[.]
''225
Although the LG&E and the Continental tribunals both
honored Argentina's necessity defense under the BIT, the
awards differ in their analysis of the consequences of the appli-
cability of Article XI. The analysis of the LG&E tribunal on
this point, moreover, also appears to be inconsistent with the
reasoning of the CMS annulment committee. Specifically, in
analyzing the treaty defense the LG&E tribunal does not ap-
pear to distinguish between wrongfulness and liability. In fact,
it uses both terms in connection with the treaty defense, stat-
ing in a single sentence that "Article XI establishes the state of
necessity as a ground for exclusion from wrongfulness of an act
of the State, and therefore, the State is exempted from liabil-
ity." 2 2 6 The LG&E tribunal, which had earlier held that Argen-
221. Id. 1 245.
222. Id.
223. Continental Award, supra note 203, 192.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. LG&E Award, supra note 202, 261 (emphasis added).
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tina had breached its fair and equitable treatment obligations
under the umbrella clause, 227 further interpreted Article XI as
providing protection only during the state of necessity.
228
Consequently, it held that Argentina's obligations under the
BIT reemerged once the state of necessity had passed, and
that Argentina started incurring liability on that date.229 The
Continental tribunal, on the other hand, held that due to the
protections accorded by Article XI, the measures taken by Ar-
gentina during the economic collapse were not in breach of
the BIT obligations. 230 As a result, the claimants were entitled
only to damages that resulted from measures taken after the
crisis was over.23
1
The annulment decisions in CMS, Enron, and Sempra all
offer harsh criticisms of the awards they were reviewing. Yet
this is where the unity ends. Not only do the decisions con-
tinue to reflect different substantive approaches, they also re-
veal disagreement about the proper application of the "mani-
fest excess of powers" ground for annulment. The CMS com-
mittee, as noted, identified two errors in the CMS award: the
conflation of the two defenses, and the failure to give priority
to the treaty defense. The committee noted that the award
constituted "a manifest error of law" that may well have deter-
mined the outcome.232 Yet it let the award stand, aside from a
technical partial annulment of a different section of the award
that did not affect the validity of the award as a whole.23 3 In so
227. Id. 7 132, 175.
228. Id. 261.
229. Id.
230. Continental Award, supra note 202, 164.
231. Id. 7 220-22.
232. CMS Annulment Decision, supra note 202, 7 129-30, 135.
233. Id. 163. Although this rendered the CMS award final, Argentina
has to date refused to make any payments toward the $133.2 million it was
ordered to pay. Argentina reportedly took the position that CMS had to
seek enforcement in the Argentine courts, which CMS refused. Luke E. Pe-
terson, Argentine Crisis Arbitration Awards Pile Up, but Investors Still Wait for a
Payout, Law.corn (June 25, 2009), available at http://justinvestment.org/
2009/07/argentine-crisis-arbitration-awards-pile-up-but-investors-still-wait-
for-a-payout. CMS eventually transferred the award to Blue Ridge Invest-
ments, a subsidiary of Bank of America. Argentina's failure to pay the CMS
award and a second final ICSID award in favor of another American investor,
Azurix Corp., has now resulted in political sanctions: On March 26, 2012,
President Barack Obama announced a suspension of Argentina's trade ben-
efits under the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences program due to its
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U Journal of International Law and Politics
2012]
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLYTICS
doing, the CMS committee noted that wrong application of
the law does not constitute manifest excess of powers and that
it "cannot simply substitute its own view of the law and its own
appreciation of the facts for those of the Tribunal.
234
In contrast, the Enron and Sempra committees annulled
the awards based on excess of powers due to the failure of the
tribunal to apply the applicable law. The analysis followed by
each tribunal, however, was different. The Sempra committee
ruled that the tribunal had failed to apply the pertinent BIT
provisions because it had used customary international law as
the primary source of law.23 5 The Enron annulment commit-
tee, on the other hand, based the annulment on its conclusion
that the tribunal had failed to apply customary international
law.
23 6
The annulment committees' divergent views regarding
the excess of powers ground may well turn out to be a greater
challenge to international investment law than the substantive
disagreements among tribunals. After all, the interpretation
of the annulment grounds directly implicates a control mecha-
nism that is intended to guard the legitimacy of the arbitration
framework itself. 2 37 The Argentina annulment decisions have
rekindled the flames of a long-standing debate about the
failure to pay the awards. Doug Palmer, Obama Says to Suspend Trade Benefits




235. Sempra Annulment Decision, supra note 202, 196-219.
236. Enron Annulment Decision, supra note 32, 386-95. The Continen-
tal and LG&E cases also proceeded to annulment. The Continental annul-
ment committee let the award stand. Continental Annulment Decision,
supra note 202. In LG&E, the parties have suspended the proceedings, pre-
sumably because they are trying to work out a settlement. See the case infor-
mation, available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet (last
visited Apr. 29, 2012). In Enron and Sempra, new tribunals have been ap-
pointed. Id.
237. In an article that offers insights on the institution of annulment and
the challenges it faces that are still astute, Michael Reisman describes the
distinction between control and appeal as follows: "Appeal is concerned
with what is right for the parties and is initiated by the parties. Control is
concerned with maintenance of the minimum conditions necessary for the
continuation of the process of decision itself." W. Michael Reisman, The
Breakdown of the Control Mechanism in ICSID Arbitration, 1989 DUKE LJ. 739,
748.
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scope of permissible review by annulment committees. 238 In-
deed, the ICSID Secretariat announced recently that it will
prepare a paper on the annulment process. This step was
taken after the Philippines raised concerns about the process
at an Administrative Council meeting and proposed the crea-
tion of a task force to examine potential improvements. 239
2. The Envisioned Role of an Appeals Facility
The principal argument for the creation of an ICSID ap-
peals facility is the expectation that it would promote coher-
ence in investment law and, as a consequence, increase pre-
dictability. 2
40
Proponents of appellate review argue that the unpredict-
ability resulting from inconsistent awards, like those rendered
in the cases against Argentina, undermines the legitimacy of
238. See, e.g., Dohyun Kim, The Annulment Committee's Role in Multiplying
Inconsistency in ICSID Arbitration: The Need to Move Away from an Annulment-
Based System, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 242, 250-52 (2011) (arguing that in a recent
series of decisions, annulment committees seem to be engaging in greater
substantive review of tribunals' awards, suggesting confusion among annul-
ment committees of their role in the ICSID arbitration system); Bart M.J.
Szewczyk, Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic, 105 Am. J. INT'L L.
547, 551 (2011) (criticizing the Sempra annulment decision for blurring the
line between misapplication of the law and failure to apply the law).
239. Luke Eric Peterson, ICSID to Prepare "Background Paper" on Annulment
Process, Following Request by Philippines; German Investor Criticizes Effort by Philip-
pines, iareporter.com (Oct. 5, 2011), available at http://www.iareporter.
com/articles/201110051.
240. See Franck, supra note 3, at 1617-18 ("A single, unified, permanent
body ... will enhance the probability of centralization and standardization
.... "); Kim, supra note 238, at 276 (arguing that there is a "need for an
appeals mechanism to instill a norm of coherence in ICSID decisions.");
Howard Mann, Transparency and Consistency in International Investment Law:
Can the Problems be Fixed by Tinkering?, in APPEALS MECHANISM, supra note 22,
at 213, 220 ("Introducing an appellate level would . . . have the impact of
imposing consistency, and thus greater clarity, for both host countries and
investors."); VAN HARTEN, supra note 25, at 164 (noting the concern that
investment arbitration lacks coherence and stating that "[t]he difficulty in
investment treaty arbitration arises from the system's fragmented and indi-
vidualized structure . . . and, specifically, from the absence of an appellate
institution . . ."); cf. Katia Yannaca-Small, Improving the System of Investor-State
Dispute Settlement: The OECD Governments' Perspective, in APPEALS MECHANISM,
supra note 22, at 223, 224, 226 (the OECD considered avoidance of inconsis-
tent awards a main advantage of an appeals procedure, but the majority of
OECD governments believed a "radical system change" was not warranted).
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investment law. Susan Franck, a vocal advocate for the promo-
tion of coherence in investment arbitration, has put it as fol-
lows:
Legitimacy depends in large part upon factors such
as determinacy and coherence, which can in turn be-
get predictability and reliability. Related concepts
such as justice, fairness, accountability, representa-
tion, correct use of procedure, and opportunities for
review also impact conceptions of legitimacy. When
these factors are absent individuals, companies and
governments cannot anticipate how to comply with
the law and plan their conduct accordingly, thereby
undermining legitimacy.
241
In addition to enhancing predictability, consistency also
ensures that like cases are treated the same. Some have ar-
gued that a dispute settlement system that violates this funda-
mental principle of fairness is ultimately unsustainable. 242 A
few commentators go so far as to claim that the lack of coher-
ence has resulted in a legitimacy crisis in investment arbitra-
tion, which in turn will have negative consequences for inter-
national investments. 243 Several authors identify the absence
241. Franck, supra note 3, at 1584 (footnotes omitted); see also Charles H.
Brower, II, Structure, Legitimacy, and NAFTA's Investment Chapter, 36 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 37, 51 (2003) ("[I]nternational legal regimes depend for
their survival on perceptions of legitimacy .... To generate perceptions of
legitimacy, legal regimes must operate predictably, conform to historical
practice, and incorporate fundamental values shared by the governed com-
munity.") (footnotes omitted); Bucher, supra note 183, at 285 (noting that
the lack of consistency in investment arbitration awards creates "uncertainty"
and "has a negative impact on the authority that the ICSID system should
command."); THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NA-
TIONS 52 (1990) (identifying "determinacy" and "coherence" as two of four
indicators of rule legitimacy); Johanna Kalb, Creating an ICSID Appellate Body,
10 UCLAJ. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 179, 196-200 (2005) (arguing that in-
consistent arbitration awards undermine international investment).
242. Michael D. Goldhaber, Wanted: A World Investment Court, The Ameri-
can Lawyer, Summer 2004, reprinted in 1 TRANSNAT'L DISPUTE MGMT., JUL.
2004, at 1, 1 (quoting Nigel Blackaby, a prominent investment arbitration
practitioner, as saying that a system in which inconsistent awards are ren-
dered "cannot last long. It shocks the sense of rule of law or fairness."); see
also Franck, supra note 3, at 1583; Franck, supra note 25, at 65-66.
243. Sornarajah, supra note 184, at 41-42 (arguing that a legitimacy crisis
has arisen as a result of the exploding number of arbitrations, coupled with
the absence of a control mechanism and the fact that most arbitrators come
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of appellate review as a factor contributing to the lack of con-
sistency. 244 The existing framework, however, is not equipped
to engender greater coherence. The goal cannot be achieved
through the annulment process. This is not only a function of
the limited nature of annulment review due to the constraints
imposed by the grounds for annulment, but also a natural re-
sult of the ad hoc character of annulment review. There is no
reason why a committee whose mandate is limited to the re-
view of a single case will have a greater claim to authority than
the tribunal whose award it reviews. Those who seek to in-
crease coherence have therefore proposed several reforms, in-
cluding the establishment of a permanent appeals facility.
245
The idea of implementing appellate review in investment
arbitration gained momentum in 2004, when the ICSID Secre-
tariat published a discussion paper in which it raised the ques-
from commercial arbitration backgrounds and may not be as sensitive to the
public nature of the interests involved); see also Brower, supra note 241, at 93
(concluding that the investment chapter of NAFTA "finds itself in the midst
of a legitimacy crisis," in part as a result of incoherent decisions from ad hoc
tribunals); Franck, supra note 3, at 1586. But see Devashish Krishan, Thinking
About BITs and BIT Arbitration: The Legitimacy Crisis That Never Was, in NEW
DIRECrIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: IN MEMORIAM THOMAS WALDE
(Todd Weiler & Freya Baetens eds., 2011) at 107, 110-16 (arguing that the
term "legitimacy crisis" distorts the discussion as there is no legitimacy crisis
in investment arbitration and none is looming); Paulsson, supra note 183, at
241 ("What issues of coherence? ... From a practitioner's viewpoint, there
is no crisis of unpredictability.").
244. Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 27, at 299 ("These contradic-
tory awards and the lack of a coherent or consistent standard of review are
especially problematic given that the ICSID Convention lacks meaningful
appellate review ...."); see also Blackaby, supra note 27, at 364 ("An appeal
on specific points of law would avoid the risk of an aberrant decision and be
more likely to result in coherent jurisprudence.").
245. Franck, supra note 3, at 1617-25; Gantz, supra note 3, at 73; Gleason,
supra note 75, at 285-86; cf. Brower, supra note 241, at 91-94 (arguing for
the creation of a standing appellate body in the NAFTA framework). Gus
Van Harten has described a detailed proposal for a free-standing "interna-
tional investment court" modeled after the International Court of Justice.
VAN HARTEN, supra note 25, at 180-84. A permanent appeals facility makes
more sense than ad hoc appellate solutions, in light of the stated purpose of
promoting the development of a coherent body of law. Cf. Geiger, supra
note 186, at 26 (noting that "it is difficult to conceive how the coherence of
awards would be increased by an ad hoc appeals procedure, in the absence
of a permanent international tribunal that has no institutional basis in the
current system.").
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tion of whether it should seek to create an appeals facility. 246
While taking the position that ICSID awards did not present
significant inconsistencies (the publication of this paper pre-
dated the conflicting Argentina awards), the Secretariat ac-
knowledged the potential for the development of inconsistent
standards and suggested that an appeals facility might foster
coherence. 247 The Secretariat took note of initiatives to de-
velop appeal mechanisms for investor-state arbitrations outside
the ICSID framework248 and observed that a single, perma-
nent appeals facility within ICSID would be preferable. 249 Yet
the paper identified drawbacks as well, including the reduced
finality of awards and the potential for delays in enforce-
ment.2 50 An annex to the discussion paper outlined some pos-
sible features of a proposed appeals facility. ICSID suggested
that an appeals facility consist of fifteen arbitrators, which
would sit in panels of three. 251 Appellate panels would review
awards for clear error of law or any of the five grounds for
annulment under the ICSID Convention and possibly for "seri-
ous errors of fact."2
52
246. ICSID Secretariat, supra note 189, at 14-16.
247. Id. at 14-15.
248. Prior to the ICSID discussion paper, the United States had endorsed
the creation of an appeals process in investment arbitrations in the Trade
Act of 2002, which provided: "(T]he principal negotiating objectives of the
United States regarding foreign investment are ... to secure for investors
important rights comparable to those that would be available under United
States legal principles and practice, by... providing for an appellate body or
similar mechanism to provide coherence to the interpretations of invest-
ment provisions in trade agreements ...." Bipartisan Trade Promotion Au-
thority Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(3)(G)(iv) (2006). BITs concluded after the
Trade Protection Act was enacted (including with Chile, Uruguay, and Sin-
gapore), and the U.S. Model BIT as revised in 2004, include provisions
under which the parties agree to consider the establishment of an appeals
mechanism in the future. See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, Annex
10-H, June 6, 2003, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-
trade-agreements/chile-fta; U.S. Model Investment Bilateral Treaty, Annex
D, Nov. 2004, available at http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/ifd/bit; see also Tams,
supra note 35, at 5 ("Recent US [sic] investment treaties... as well as the
2004 U.S. Model B.I.T. envisage the establishment of an investment appeals
tribunal ....").
249. ICSID Secretariat, supra note 189, at 15-16.
250. Id. at 15. Of course, finality is already somewhat compromised as a
result of the availability of an annulment procedure.
251. Id., Annex at 3.
252. Id., Annex at 4.
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A year later, the ICSID Secretariat announced that it
would not pursue an appeals facility at that time, noting that
most commentators had indicated that the creation of an ap-
peals mechanism was "premature" in light of technical and
policy issues identified in the earlier paper.25 3 The Secretariat
stated that it would "continue to study" these issues.
254
C. Appellate Review and Lawmaking
1. Lawmaking by Adjudicators
Lawmaking refers, broadly, to the creation and refine-
ment of substantive law by adjudicators. Because of law's inde-
terminate nature, judges and other decision-makers play a crit-
ical role in shaping legal rules and standards through interpre-
tation and application. 255 The scope and extent of lawmaking
by adjudicators is not constant; there is considerable variation
among legal systems and between different fields within a legal
system. Even within a single field in a particular jurisdiction,
the amount of discretion exercised by adjudicators will differ
from time to time, depending on such things as the amount of
space applicable statutes leave for interpretation and the pre-
vailing attitudes regarding adjudicative lawmaking. In the
United States, courts have traditionally played a prominent
role as lawmakers in the areas that were the subject of com-
mon law. They also play a significant role in the development
and harmonization of the application of statutory norms and
the interpretation of the United States Constitution and the
state constitutions. Many civil law systems, on the other hand,
have strongly resisted the notion that adjudicators engage in
lawmaking, rather than pure law application. The aversion
against adjudicatory lawmaking is based on the theory that the
separation of powers requires that lawmaking be exclusively re-
served for the legislature. 256 But courts in civil law jurisdic-
tions interpret legal texts and apply legal rules to specific facts,
which are activities that contribute to the refinement of the
253. ICSID Secretariat, Suggested Changes to the ICSID Rules and Regulations
4 (Working Paper May 12, 2005), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org.
254. Id.
255. ALEC STONE SWEET, THEJUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 9 (2004).
256. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PtREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW
TRADITION 23-24 (3d ed. 2007).
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law. 257 Moreover, many civil law jurisdictions have moved to-
ward increased judicial power, especially in the constitutional
context. 258 Investment arbitrators undoubtedly engage in law-
making in the broadest sense. As adjudicators who have the
last word on the interpretation of investment treaties, the rele-
vance of investment awards extends far beyond the disputes
they resolve.
Lawmaking in court systems often involves a coordinated
endeavor to develop law in a coherent way. Appellate review
serves two specific goals in this process: the promotion of uni-
formity of decisions, and the adaptation of an existing body of
substantive law to meet new situations and changing circum-
stances. 259 These goals exist in tension with each other: True
uniformity requires strict adherence to earlier decisions, while
the second aspect mandates that, when the situation calls for
it, earlier decisions be bent or even overruled. 26 Adding to
these internal pressures are systems of checks and balances
that create a certain degree of friction between tenured judges
and a democratically-elected legislature. To maintain legiti-
macy in this environment, appellate courts must walk a tight-
rope between continuity and change. As a result, lawmaking
by domestic courts tends to be incremental. 261 Incremental-
257. Cf HANS KELSEN, PuRE THEORY OF LAw 234 (1934) (arguing no cate-
gorical distinction can be made between law-creation and law-application);
cf Armin von Bogdandy, Ingo Venzke, Beyond Dispute: International Judicial
Institutions as Lawmakers, 12 GERMAN L. REv. 979, 984-89 (2011).
258. MERRYMAN & PtREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 256, at 38; ALEC STONE
SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE
116-24 (2000) (discussing development toward increased constitutional re-
view byjudges in Germany, Italy, Spain and France); id. at 127-29 (describ-
ing examples of lawmaking through statutory interpretation by judges in
these jurisdictions in areas other than constitutional law).
259. Frisch, supra note 1, at 75-76; cf. CARRINGTON, supra note 1, at 2-3.
260. See Carrington, supra note 118, at 554 ("The lawmaking role requires
a delicate balance between the importance of flexibility in the national law
and the importance of stability of doctrine."); Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability
and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 422, 423 (1988)
("Th[e] possibility of improvement makes precedent unstable .... There is
an equilibrium degree of disequilibrium."); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39
STAN. L. RE-,. 571, (1987) ("We attain predictability.., only by diminishing
our ability to adapt to a changing future.").
261. Cf MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS, AND
JUDICIALIZATION 93 (2002) (noting that "the rules or practices of stare decisis
[are] simply those of incrementalism stated in other terms.").
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ism has also been observed in the case law of the WTO Appel-
late Body. 262 Here again, part of the explanation for the incre-
mental mode of law development may be found in legitimacy
concerns, albeit of a different nature from those in national
legal systems. Specifically, because the counterbalance of a
legislature is lacking, the WTO Appellate Body has more flexi-
bility than many domestic courts but it is also vulnerable to the
accusation of unchecked "activism." 263 Notwithstanding these
legitimacy concerns, the WTO Appellate Body has been partic-
ularly effective in shaping trade law, a process some observers
have referred to as "constitutionalization.
264
Incremental change guided by an ultimate decision-
maker is the most orderly way in which lawmaking can pro-
ceed. It is not, however, the only way to create law, and the
model is not feasible or even desirable in every context. In
national legal systems, courts develop law through a dialogue
with an identifiable, if shifting, legislature. In trade law, the
262. See Robert Howse, Moving the WIFO Forward-One Case at a Time, 42
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 223, 223-24 (2009) (arguing that "[t]he WTO dispute
settlement system has demonstrated its efficacy by evolving incrementally
through practice without a formal change in the treaty mandate that estab-
lished and defined the parameters of that system").
263. See, e.g., Michael loannidis, A Procedural Approach to the Legitimacy of
International Adjudication: Developing Standards of Participation in WTO Law, 12
GERMAN L.J. 1175, 1190-91 (2011) ("Taking into consideration the lack of
an effective legislating mechanism, the interpretation of international trade
rules by the adjudicating bodies may thus be addressed as a fairly 'cemented'
set of norms, which is little adaptive to the developing interests of those it
affects or the differing choices of subsequent domestic parliamentary majori-
ties."); cf Bogdandy & Venzke, supra note 257, at 994 ("International courts
do not operate as parts of polities that include functioning political legisla-
tures. Once an international agreement is in place, it is largely withdrawn
from the grasp of its individual makers."). Jos6 Alverez has observed that
investment law presents similar issues. Jos6 E. Alvarez, The Emerging Foreign
Direct Investment Regime, 99 AM. Soc. INT'L L. & PRoc. 94, 96 (2005) ("The
emerging FDI regime draws some of the same 'democratic' critiques as more
institutionalized international regimes: namely, that the law that it relies on
is not accountable or respectful of traditional notions of separation of pow-
ers.").
264. See, e.g., Sungjoon Cho, Global Constitutional Lawmaking, 31 U. PA. J.
INT'L L. 621 (2010); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Constitutional Conceits: The WTO's
"Constitution" and the Discipline of International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 647,
651-56 (2006); Deborah Z. Cass, The "Constitutionalization" of International
Trade Law: Judicial Norm-Generation as the Engine of Constitutional Development
in International Trade, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 39 (2001).
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Appellate Body evaluates the application and interpretation of
a specified group of international instruments-the "covered
agreements" as defined in the Dispute Settlement Understand-
ing. Investment arbitration, in contrast, is a field without a dis-
cernible legislature or a discrete body of law. An ICSID ap-
peals facility would be tasked with imposing coherence in the
face of an ever-growing number of bilateral treaties negotiated
at different times, with differing terms that were drafted in re-
sponse to evolving standards.265 Moreover, due to the nature
of the interests involved, in investment law coherence will al-
ways compete with other values, including development, envi-
ronmental, and human rights interests. The balance between
a host state's interest in retaining flexibility to respond to eco-
nomic crises and an investor's interest in stability will be struck
differently depending on the text of the treaty and the circum-
stances under which it was negotiated. 266 Some observers have
265. By way of example, investment treaties have become more protective
of the states' interests; as industrialized economies found themselves regu-
larly on the receiving end of investments, investment treaties have become
more balanced. Geiger, supra note 186, at 19-20; see also Sornarajah, supra
note 184, at 40 ("The United States and Canada have begun to see that de-
vices of investment protection that they had created for their nationals in-
vesting abroad are now being used against them."). One of the shifts in-
volves the treaty provisions regarding the state of emergency. The 2004 revi-
sions to the U.S. Model BIT, for example, added language to the emergency
defense that essentially renders it self-judging, i.e., it places the sovereign in
the position of determining whether a state of emergency exists. The provi-
sion now reads: "Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed... to preclude a
Party from applying measures that it considers necessary for the fulfillment of
its obligations with respect to ... the protection of its own essential security
interests." U.S. Model BIT, supra note 248, art. 18, 2 (emphasis added). In
the 2006 U.S.-Peru Free Trade Promotion Agreement, this provision was ac-
companied by a note that left little doubt about its self-judging nature: "For
greater certainty, if a Party invokes [the "essential security" defense] in an
arbitral proceeding . . . the tribunal or panel hearing the matter shall find
that the exception applies." United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agree-
ment, U.S.-Peru, art. 22.2(b) n.2, Apr. 12, 2006, available at http://www.ustr.
gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/PerujTPA/FinalTexts/SectionIndex.
html.
266. Cf Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 27, at 287-96 (arguing that
a more deferential standard of review should apply in arbitrations involving
public law questions, especially in a subset of public law disputes that they
term "quasi-constitutional" disputes and in which "a state's essential interests
are at stake and . . . the result of the litigation will impact the social and
economic life of the state").
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convincingly argued that a certain amount of unsettledness is
not only inevitable in light of the binary and dynamic charac-
ter of investment treaties, but that it is in fact one of the
strengths of the field. 267 Decentralized adjudication is chaotic,
but it is also dynamic. In investment arbitration, it creates the
conditions for lawmaking through clashes of opposing opin-
ions, and, in the best case, through honest assessments of ear-
lier awards based purely on the merits of the positions ad-
vanced by other tribunals.
268
If investment arbitration continues to grow at the current
rate, the field may reach a point where centralized lawmaking
is preferable over the current framework. Yet regardless of
how the field evolves in the long term, at its current stage of
development, as others have observed, a certain level of inco-
herence is natural.2 69 Even aside from the variations in invest-
ment treaties, the inconsistent interpretations of identical or
similar provisions appear to reflect a deep divide within the
investment community on how to balance the interests of in-
vestors and host countries. 2 70 A young appeals facility created
to increase coherence will be under enormous pressure to
stick to its earlier decisions no matter what the costs. At this
time, the investment community may be better served by an
emphasis on the development aspect of lawmaking, even if this
267. Krishan, supra note 243, at 132 ("The essential insight here is that the
norms that have governance effects are being generated through a binary,
dialectical process-that of arbitration-which pits one state against one
particular investor before one particular tribunal. This is a very peculiar-
and perhaps unrepresentative-way of making law."); cf. Qureshi & Khan,
supra note 183, at 278 ("[I]f investment involves and is about ultimately en-
suring development... [s]hould the goal not be constantly to facilitate the
'development objective' and better decisions all round, rather than pursuing
a fetish for identity of interpretation?").
268. Cf Krishan, supra note 243, at 135 ("If the global law develops
through the interactions of arbitral tribunals, that project is an indefinite
one in time-time that states can utilize to internalize norms of an ulti-
mately liberal order. It provides the gap, the time, that permits dissent and
assent to play out, to fine tune the system, to leave it an unfinished and ever-
evolving project.").
269. See, e.g., Paulsson, supra note 183, at 258 (" [T] his is a new area where
the jurisprudence must and will feel its way toward consensus .... ).
270. To some extent, these concerns are representative of more general
concerns that the arbitration process is developed by, and therefore biased
in favor of, Western commercial interests. See BORN, supra note 4, at 8.
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emphasis comes at the expense of consistency.271 Ad hoc adju-
dication combined with maximum transparency offers the
flexibility to change course and the conditions for robust de-
bate on the merits of specific awards.
272
2. Hierarchy and Precedent
In the United States, the promotion of consistency is
closely associated with the doctrine of stare decisis. Decisions
from higher courts are binding on lower courts within their
jurisdiction, creating what some have termed "vertical" prece-
dent. By curtailing the discretion of lower court judges, bind-
ing precedent ensures that changes to existing rules are only
made at the highest level, exercising a stabilizing effect.
273 Al-
though the highest courts are not technically bound by their
own earlier rulings, they generally follow them or at least pur-
port to do so. This norm of "horizontal precedent" aims to
protect the stability of the law and the authority of the court's
judgments. 274 The rigidity of this precedent system is softened
271. See, e.g., Donald McRae, The WITO Appellate Body: A Modelfor an ICSID
Appeals Facility?. I J. INT'L Disp. SETTLEMENT 371, 385 (2010) (noting that
from the bilateral nature of investment treaties, "[a] theory of the changing
nature of investors' rights has emerged . . .").
272. Cf Krishan, supra note 243, at 123 ("Is the indeterminacy of the sys-
tem (which is intrinsic to a future-oriented normative vision of BITs and BIT
arbitration) verifiably so terrifying? . .. On the contrary, a view from a posi-
tion of indeterminacy can be stimulating.").
273. See, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING
APPEALs 20-21 (Little, Brown 1960) (discussing "legal doctrine," including
earlier case law, as one of the "steadying factors" in appellate adjudication);
see also Kaplan, supra note 108, at 10 (arguing that binding precedent is not
illusory, and has a stabilizing effect). As mentioned earlier, because the
highest courts hear appeals selectively, whenever clear guidance from the
highest courts is unavailable the intermediate appellate courts perform error
correction as well as lawmaking functions. See supra note 108 and accompa-
nying text.
274. See, e.g., State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) ("Stare decisis reflects
a policyjudgment that in most matters it is more important that the applica-
ble rule of law be settled than that it be settled right. . . . It is the preferred
course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent de-
velopment of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and con-
tributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.") (cita-
tions omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003) ("The doctrine of stare decisis is essential to the
respect accorded to the judgments of the Court and to the stability of the
law. It is not, however, an inexorable command.") (citation omitted);
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considerably by the skills of common lawjurists in "distinguish-
ing" earlier cases.
275
Not all well-functioning legal systems rely on binding pre-
cedent. Although Western civil law jurisdictions differ consid-
erably in how courts treat earlier rulings, they generally reject
notions of binding precedent and stare decisis. Instead, the sta-
tus of earlier decisions (from higher courts or from the court
itself) is akin to persuasive authority. In Germany, for exam-
ple, with the exception of rulings by the Federal Constitutional
Court, decisions by higher courts are not binding on lower
courts. 276 When deciding how much weight to give to an ear-
lier decision, the place in the hierarchy of the court that made
the earlier decision is only one of many factors to be taken
into account. The most important factor is "the soundness of
the supporting arguments" of the earlier decision. 277 The
Netherlands similarly has no rule of horizontal or vertical pre-
cedent.278 Other jurisdictions, including France, impose a
strong presumption that rules that have been consistently ar-
ticulated in a line of cases be followed as jurisprudence con-
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
864 (1992) ("[A] decision to overrule should rest on some special reason
over and above the belief that a prior case was wrongly decided.") (citations
omitted).
275. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 118, at 819 ("[W]hen judges care
deeply about a particular legal issue but disagree with existing precedent,
they often attempt to subvert the doctrine and free themselves from its fet-
ters by stretching to distinguish the holdings of the higher courts."); Felix
Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COL. L. REv.
833 (1935) (noting "the stretching or shrinking of precedents in every wash-
ing."); Comment, The Attitude of Lower Courts to Changing Precedents, 50 YALE
L.J. 1448, 1449 (1941) ("[Many] precedents have been rejected through the
stratagem of distinguishment; others have been the subject of consciousjudi-
cial oversight. As a consequence, judicial discretion among 'inferior' judges
is not so confined and limited as legal theorists would have it."); see also
LLEWELLYN, supra note 273, at 62 ("[O]nly in times of stagnation or decay
does [the judicial] system even faintly resemble . . .a picture of detailed
dictation by the precedents.. ."); cf Timothy Schwarz, Cases Time Forgot: Why
Judges Can Sometimes Ignore Controlling Precedent, 56 EM. LJ. 1475, 1475 (2007)
(noting that precedent can be followed, distinguished, overruled, treated as
mistaken, or ignored).
276. Alexy & Dreier, supra note 130, at 36.
277. Id. at 34-35.
278. Haazen, supra note 130, at 234-39.
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stante.2 79 One could say that the civil law approach places a
higher value on independence of judgment at all levels of ad-
judication. 280 In practice, however, lower court judges in all of
these jurisdictions have incentives to avoid reversal, and tend
to follow the reasoning of higher courts. Thus, while binding
precedent explicitly confers lawmaking authority on the
higher courts, in other legal systems the incentives created by
the operation of error correction often result in de facto verti-
cal precedent.
28 1
In any legal system that values coherence and predictabil-
ity, the hierarchical structure of court systems thus plays a criti-
cal role in the harmonious development of law. As was the
case with error correction, the higher court court's ability to
reverse a decision that is out of line not only provides an ave-
nue for remedying such a situation, but it also induces compli-
ance by lower court judges. Centralized appellate review
serves precisely those fundamental values that are said to be
under siege in investment arbitration: It promotes fairness by
ensuring that like cases are treated alike, increases predictabil-
ity for stakeholders, and strengthens the external credibility of
the decision-making institution.282 It therefore makes sense
279. Philippe Malaurie, Les Prgcedents et le Droit: Rapport Franfais, in PRECE-
DENT AND THE LAW, supra note 130, at 139, 144-47; see also Kaufmann-Kohler,
supra note 15, at 359 n.1 1. Several arbitration scholars have argued for adop-
tion of this principle in investment arbitration. See, e.g., Andrea K. Bjork-
lund, Investment Treaty Arbitral Decisions as Jurisprudence Constante, in INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC LAw: THE STATE AND FUTURE OF THE DISCIPLINE 265,
270-80 (Colin B. Picker et al., eds., 2008) (discussing potential application
of jurisprudence constante in investment arbitration); Kaufmann-Kohler, supra
note 200, at 146-47 (suggesting that a practice of applying stare decisis to
lines of cases could, over time, "develop . . .into customary international
law"); Thomas W5lde, Confidential Awards as Precedent in Arbitration: Dynamics
and Implication of Award Publication, in PRECEDENT IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRA-
TION, supra note 200, at 113, 115 ("cumulative arbitral jurisprudence in the
field of investment arbitration could be said to crystallize into 'settled juris-
prudence' .... ).
280. There are also jurisdictions, such as China and the former commu-
nist states in Central and Eastern Europe, in which precedent has not been
part of the legal tradition at all. Ewoud Hondius, General Report, in PRECE-
DENT AND THE LAW, supra note 130, at 1, 7.
281. See supra notes 127-132 and accompanying text.
282. Schauer, supra note 260, at 595-602; Caminker, supra note 118, at
850-54; cf. Franck, supra note 25, at 63 ("Inconsistency tends to signal errors,
lends itself to suggestions of unfairness, creates inefficiencies, and generates
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that academics and practitioners who are concerned about the
effects of inconsistent awards in investment arbitration have
set their sights on a permanent appeals facility as the best solu-
tion.
Yet it is conceivable that horizontal coordination could
develop in investment arbitration without the looming threat
of reversal by a higher-ranked adjudicator. 283 While "soft" pre-
cedent does not necessarily result in consistent awards, a grow-
ing consensus may arise on many issues. 28 4 Investment arbitra-
tors operate in a relatively transparent environment, and the
awareness that their awards will likely be published creates in-
centives to avoid the appearance of arbitrariness. For invest-
ment arbitrators, past awards are a logical place to seek gui-
dance or, at the very least, find a useful point of reference in
the absence of sufficiently specific language in investment trea-
ties. Indeed, investment arbitration tribunals increasingly cite
to earlier awards. 28 5 Some commentators have suggested that
a more fluid precedent system is emerging, in the sense that
arbitrators justify their decisions in light of relevant awards.
28 6
difficulties related to coherence, most notably a lack [of] predictability, relia-
bility, and clarity.").
283. Martin Shapiro has argued that "horizontal coordination" in the
sense of communication between state courts may explain the largely paral-
lel development of "common law" areas, such as tort law, in different states.
See Martin Shapiro, Towards a Theory of Stare Decisis, 1 J. LEG. STUD. 125,
130-34 (1972), reprinted in SHAPIRO & STONE SWEET, supra note 261, at 102,
107-11.
284. James Fry, who calls for a shift of focus from a pure precedent ap-
proach to decision-making based on an examination of the reason or reason-
ableness of prior decisions, argues that a reason-based approach "would add
a large measure of consistency to the regime, regardless of whether different
lines of precedent develop over time." James D. Fry, Regularity Through Rea-
son: A Foundation of Virtue for International Arbitration, 4 CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J.
57, 82 (2011).
285. Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 15, at 368-73; Laird & Askew, supra
note 183, at 298-99; Barton Legum, Visualizing an Appellate System, in CUR-
RENT ISSUES, supra note 3, at 121, 128; but see Fry, supra note 284, at 63-75
(describing diverging approaches of investment arbitration tribunals to pre-
cedent).
286. See, e.g., Judith Gill, Inconsistent Decisions: An Issue to Be Addressed or a
Fact of Life?, in CURRENT ISSUES, supra note 3, at 23, 27 (concluding that some
degree of inconsistency is "a fact of life" but expressing the expectation that
debated issues will become more settled over time); Paulsson, supra note
183, at 253 (predicting a "process of natural correction" in investment arbi-
tration awards through "the consolidation of dominant trends; the contin-
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And although nobody maintains that earlier awards should
have the status of binding precedent in the common law sense,
some tribunals have suggested that some deference may be
warranted. One tribunal, in an award rendered in 2007, noted
the role of investment arbitrators in developing coherent law
and seemed to endorse at least a weak form of precedent:
The Tribunal considers that it is not bound by previ-
ous decisions. At the same time, it is of the opinion
that it must pay due consideration to earlier decisions
of international tribunals. It believes that, subject to
compelling contrary grounds, it has a duty to adopt
solutions established in a series of consistent cases. It
also believes that, subject to the specifics of a given
treaty and of the circumstances of the actual case, it
has a duty to seek to contribute to the harmonious
development of investment law and thereby to meet
the legitimate expectations of the community of
States and investors towards certainty of the rule of
law. 287
The annulment committee in the Enron case similarly
stated that tribunals should aim to achieve coherence. It con-
trasted this responsibility with the constraints that limit the
role of annulment committees:
[Tihe role of an ad hoc committee is a limited one,
restricted to assessing the legitimacy of the award and
not its correctness .... The annulment mechanism
is not designed to bring about consistency in the in-
terpretation and application of international invest-
ment law. The responsibility for ensuring consistency
in the jurisprudence and for building a coherent
body of law rests primarily with the investment tribu-
nals. They are assisted in their task by the develop-
ued isolation of perplexing outliers among awards; and thus, quite simply,
more consistent awards."); see also Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 15, at 358
(describing different possible definitions of "precedent"); but see Bucher,
supra note 183, at 287-88 (noting that the absence of hierarchy among ad
hoc decisions and lack of binding force results in uncertainty).
287. Saipem S.p.A. v. The People's Republic of Bangl., ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/7, Jurisdiction and Recommendation on Provisional Measures,
67 (Mar. 21, 2007).
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ment of a common legal opinion and the progressive
emergence of 'une jurisprudence constante.'
288
On the other hand, the notion of precedent in the arbi-
tration context is not unproblematic. In arbitration, parties
entrust a particular tribunal with the resolution of an identi-
fied dispute. This principle is at odds with the notion that a
tribunal is bound by awards in other disputes, simply because
they were issued earlier. Indeed, the ICSID Convention pro-
vides that awards are binding only as to the parties to a dispute
and have no third-party effect. 289 And some tribunals have ex-
pressed discomfort with the notion of precedent. One tribu-
nal, in an award rendered in 2004, stressed the importance of
doing justice in the case before it, noting that "in the end it
must be for each tribunal to exercise its competence in accor-
dance with the applicable law. . . . Moreover there is no doc-
trine of precedent in international law, if by precedent is
meant a rule of the binding effect of a single decision." 290 At
the same time, however, tribunals are not authorized to do jus-
tice in a vacuum. Arguably, in applying open-ended provisions
in investment treaties, arbitrators have to take into account
what meaning the relevant actors attach to these terms. The
interpretation of earlier tribunals plays a role in shaping the
contours of substantive rights.
A fuller exploration of the desirability of precedent in in-
vestment arbitration must wait until another day. For now, suf-
fice it to say that the lack of consensus among investment
tribunals regarding precedent not only reflects the different
legal backgrounds of the arbitrators. 2 1 It also points to some
respects in which a private dispute resolution mechanism is an
uneasy fit for the harmonious development of public law.
288. Enron Annulment Decision, supra note 32, 65.
289. ICSID Convention, supra note 25, art. 53, 1. Some investment trea-
ties also state that there is no binding effect between arbitration awards. See
Laird & Askew, supra note 183, at 298-99 & n.39 (citing NAFTA Article 1136
and comparing it with Article 59 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice).
290. Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID
Case No. ARB/02/6, Objections to Jurisdiction, 97 (Jan. 29, 2004).
291. Barton Legum, The Definitions of "Precedent" in International Arbitration,
in PRECEDENT IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra note 200, at 5, 6.
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3. Legitimacy in Private Adjudication
Whether appellate review could achieve greater consis-
tency in investment arbitration depends, in large part, on the
degree of comprehensiveness of the solution. In investment
arbitration, there are at least two issues that could undermine
the legitimacy of rulings from an appeals facility.
The first legitimacy problem is a systemic one. It is virtu-
ally impossible to establish a comprehensive appeals facility
under the current framework. As a technical matter, it is im-
practical to create an appeals facility within ICSID because
amendment of the ICSID Convention requires ratification by
all contracting states. 29 2 Recognizing this problem, the solu-
tion suggested by the ICSID Secretariat was to create an addi-
tional ICSID appeals mechanism to which sovereigns could
subscribe.2 93 A problem with this solution, and with any "opt-
in" regime, is that ad hoc tribunals that do not face the threat
of being overturned have no reason to accord deference to
awards from the appeals facility. An ICSID appeals system
would also be incomprehensive in another way. Because most
BITs give investors a choice between different arbitration op-
tions, investors could circumvent rulings from an appeals facil-
ity simply by bringing a claim in a different forum. As a result,
arbitrators who are not regularly appointed in ICSID cases
would have an incentive to deviate from rulings from an ap-
peals facility that are viewed as pro-host state. This would hurt
the development of investment arbitration law, because these
institutions privilege confidentiality over transparency. A
flight to other arbitration institutions, therefore, could result
in more and more investment arbitration disputes and awards
being hidden from view. 294 State defendants in ICSID pro-
292. ICSID Convention, supra note 25, art. 66; ICSID Secretariat, supra
note 189, at 2, see also Bucher, supra note 183, at 290-91; Tams, supra note
35, at 12-13 (suggesting that getting all states to ratify an amendment estab-
lishing an ICSID appeals mechanism would be prohibitively difficult).
293. ICSID Secretariat, supra note 189, Annex at 1-3; see also Franck, supra
note 3, at 1625 (suggesting that an appeals facility could be created by ad-
ding a separate optional protocol to the ICSID Convention); Tams, supra
note 35, at 13.
294. American legal scholars have pointed out that the growth of arbitra-
tion and other types of alternative dispute resolution poses a problem for
the development of law in some areas. Specifically, this development has
brought certain types of cases from the reach of public adjudicators, result-
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ceedings similarly could avoid some of the precedential effects
of decisions from an appeals facility by not agreeing to the ap-
peals process and forcefully arguing that rulings from a facility
they have not agreed to lack binding force.
The second legitimacy problem arises from the perspec-
tive of the parties to a particular dispute. In ICSID arbitra-
tions, the default rule is that each party appoints an arbitrator,
and the parties try to reach agreement on the chair.295 As
noted by Jan Paulsson, a permanent appeals facility appointed
by ICSID or contracting states "is in fact unlikely to have
greater moral authority than the first-level tribunal. Every an-
nulment decision is a repudiation of the award made by the
arbitrators chosen by the parties (or in accordance with their
agreement) ."296 Decisions that overturn the awards of a panel
appointed in accordance with the parties' wishes will render
the system more vulnerable, and increase the risk that inves-
tors and sovereigns opt out of the system. If investors perceive
an ICSID appeals facility to be sovereign-friendly, they will
make use of other fora made available in investment treaties,
and pursue arbitration with other institutions.
Governments that do not perceive investment arbitration
to be legitimate may also respond in ways that are detrimental
to the development of international investment law as a "sys-
tem." They could simply refuse to comply with an award, as
Argentina has done. They may also take more drastic steps:
Bolivia and Ecuador have taken steps to withdraw from ICSID,
ing both in decreased lawmaking in these fields and in reduced trans-
parency. See, e.g., Peter L. Murray, The Privatization of Civil Justice, 91 JUDICA-
TURE 6, 272, 274 (2008) ("The negative consequences of resolving civil litiga-
tion by party negotiation and agreement [including arbitration] are loss of
potential judicial precedent as well as losses sustained by parties who are
compelled to settle because of factors other than the objective merit of their
cases ... "); Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84
B.U. L. REX,. 1, 28-32 (2004) ("As a private proceeding conducted out of
public view, and with no precedential value, arbitration resolves disputes
without contributing to the body of law and without providing information
to the public."); see also Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet
Revolution in Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 784-89 (2002). It would
be ironical if similar concerns would plague investment arbitration.
295. ICSID Convention, supra note 25, art. 37, 2(b); ICSID Arbitration
Rules, supra note 25, r.4 (outlining default procedure for appointment of
arbitrators when parties fail to select them in a timely fashion).
296. Paulsson, supra note 183, at 258.
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and Nicaragua and Venezuela have threatened to follow
SUit.
2 9 7 In addition, several nations have terminated invest-
ment agreements, and Ecuador's Constitutional Court has de-
clared the arbitration provisions of six BITs unconstitu-
tional.298 An appeals process, in which the ultimate decision-
makers are not selected by the parties, could exacerbate these
developments.
In sum, there is a real danger that, far from fostering co-
herence, an appeals facility may encourage forum-shopping
and the development of different lines of authority.2 99 A
297. UNCTAD, Denunciation of the ICSID Convention and BITs: Impact on In-
vestor-State Claims at 1, 1 n.4, IIA ISSUES NOTE No. 2 (Dec. 2010), available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20l06en.pdf; see also Tuck,
supra note 187, at 905-10 (describing developments in Latin American juris-
dictions threatening enforcement of ICSID awards); but see Timothy G. Nel-
son, "History Ain't Changed Why Investor-State Arbitration Will Survive the "New
Revolution", in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 555-75
(Michael Waibel et al., eds., 2010) (arguing, based on a historical survey of
controversial arbitrations involving sovereigns, that it is unlikely that confi-
dence in investment treaty arbitration will be fundamentally undermined).
298. UNCTAD reports in a recent publication: "In 2008, Ecuador termi-
nated nine BITs-with Cuba, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guate-
mala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Romania and Uruguay. Other de-
nounced BITs include those between El Salvador and Nicaragua, and the
Netherlands and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. In 2010, Ecuador's
Constitutional Court declared arbitration provisions of six more BITs
(China, Finland, Germany, the UK, Venezuela and United States) to be in-
consistent with the country's Constitution. It is possible that Ecuador will
take action to terminate these (and possibly other) BITs." Id. at 1 n.3. Do-
mestic courts may further interfere with the smooth enforcement of invest-
ment arbitration awards. Argentina's Supreme Court has held that local
courts may review arbitral awards for, among other things, compliance with
Argentinean public policy, even when the parties have agreed to waive the
right to appeal. See Gleason, supra note 75, at 283-84.
299. The forum-shopping risks are not present in multi-lateral investment
arrangements that do not provide a range of options. Thus, one could imag-
ine a re-negotiation of NAFTA's dispute resolution provisions to provide for
an appeals mechanism. Brower, supra note 241, at 91-94; Legum, supra note
24, at 239 (noting the possibility of "a more modest appellate mechanism"
for investment chapters in free trade agreements and investment treaties ne-
gotiated by the United States that are highly consistent and have at least one
common party). Of course, while regional appeals mechanisms may in-
crease consistency among awards governed by a particular investment agree-
ment, they are unlikely to contribute to coherence in the larger world of
investment law. See, e.g., Katia Yannaca-Small, Improving the System of Investor-
State Dispute Settlement: An Overview 11 (OECD, Working Paper on Interna-
tional Investment Number 2006/1) ("The experts consulted were over-
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harmful side effect may be a decrease in transparency, which is
a critical condition for lawmaking. Quite possibly, investment
law may ultimately develop as a legal order with some form of
precedent, and an appeals facility could play a significant role
in that process. However, the selection of arbitration as the
method for resolving investment disputes presents serious ob-
stacles to such a development.
D. Complications for the Structural Design of an Appeals Facility
The tensions between lawmaking ideals and the realities
of investment arbitration come to the fore when one tries to
identify features of an appeals facility that would be conducive
to lawmaking. It is tempting to use the WTO appeals process
as a model, as many proponents of the creation of an appeals
facility have done.3 0 0 After all, the Appellate Body of the WTO
presents an example of successful appellate review in the adju-
dication of international disputes.30 1 Yet WTO dispute resolu-
tion differs in significant respects from investment arbitration,
not least because both the substantive law governing trade in
goods and the rules concerning WTO dispute settlement con-
stitute a single multilateral arrangement. 30 2 Due to the bilat-
eral nature of investment agreements, as well as several other
issues, the success of the WTO dispute settlement system may
whelmingly of the view that, even though they were not all convinced of the
objective necessity of an appeals mechanism for investor-state awards, if
some countries were ready to establish one, it would be better by far to have
a single mechanism."); Tams, supra note 35, at 24-25 (noting that an appeals
facility can only be effective if there is one single appeals facility that is com-
petent to hear appeals in all investment disputes).
300. See, e.g., Gleason, supra note 75, at 273-86 (discussing the WTO ap-
pellate system and other trade-related arbitral appellate systems and arguing
that they provide a model for successful appellate review that could be trans-
posed to ICSID); Kalb, supra note 241, at 209-19 (drawing lessons applicable
to ICSID from the WTO and NAYrA appellate structures). Indeed, one au-
thor has suggested that the WTO Appellate Body itself could take appeals
from investment awards. David Collins, A New Role for the WTO in Interna-
tional Investment Law: Public Interest in the Post-Neoliberal Period, 25 CONN. J.
INT'L L. 1 (2009).
301. Gantz, supra note 3, at 56-57 (noting that the WTO Appellate Body's
success is a continuing influence on the consideration of appeals mecha-
nisms in investment arbitration, despite differences between the two fields).
302. SeeJos6 E. Alvarez, Implications for the Future of International Investment
Law, in APPEALs MECHANISM, supra note 22, at 29, 29-30 (contrasting the
WTO dispute resolution regime with foreign direct investment rules).
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not be indicative of how well an appeals facility would function
in investment arbitration.
30 3
As an initial matter, for lawmaking in investment arbitra-
tion to be effective, a significant number of sovereigns must
elect to participate in an appeals facility. Investment treaties
should also not provide the option of bringing a claim in a
different arbitration forum. In addition, parties to investment
arbitrations should not be able to waive the right to appeal. In
commercial arbitration, where lawmaking was not at issue, a
situation in which a small percentage of the parties opt for an
appeals process is not problematic. After all, the appeals pro-
cess would be available solely as a service to parties who wish to
have the option to obtain review of the merits of an award.
When lawmaking enters the picture, however, a situation in
which a large percentage of parties opt out of the appeals pro-
cess has consequences for the potential effectiveness of the de-
velopment of consistent standards. Tribunals that adjudicate
disputes between parties who opt out of the system would not
be subject to the same constraints as tribunals whose awards
may be appealed.3 0 4 They might also be less inclined to view
awards from an appeals facility as having binding force, al-
though decisions from an appeals facility would possibly be
viewed as more persuasive than awards from individual tribu-
nals. Essentially, for an appellate system to be able to succeed,
a fundamental revision of how arbitration is conducted would
need to be imposed on all parties. Again, this concern does
not exist in commercial arbitration, where only parties who
303. See McRae, supra note 271, at 382-87 (arguing that the WTO Appel-
late Body is of limited relevance for evaluating appeals options in investment
arbitration as it deals with a system of interrelated agreements and is
grounded in a highly developed institutional structure); see also Legum,
supra note 24, at 235 (pointing out that "the great majority of standing inter-
national tribunals-including the rare international appellate bodies-have
issued from a single underlying multilateral agreement with very broad par-
ticipation negotiated at a single point in time.").
304. This consideration suggests that the constraining influence of appeal
is the result of both the lawmaking and the error correction functions. Cf
Mann, supra note 240, at 220 (noting, in the context of a discussion of the
possibility of increasing coherence through introduction of appellate review,
that "much as the WTO Appellate Body has instilled consistency in the WTO
law, it has also instilled a layer of accountability for WTO Panels that did not
exist before the Appellate Body was formed. This has also achieved a much
higher degree of public acceptability of the final results.").
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want to opt in to an appeals procedure are asked to re-think
the method by which arbitrators are appointed.
For the same reasons, the standard of review is compli-
cated. Presumably because of legitimacy concerns, the Secre-
tariat proposed that an appeals facility would apply a highly
deferential standard of review, namely "clear error of law.
'305
This level of deference, however, is not conducive to lawmak-
ing. In fact, the justification for granting appellate courts in
the United States plenary review over legal determinations is
precisely that a more searching standard is essential to fulfill-
ment of the lawmaking function.3 0 6 Moreover, how can an ap-
peals facility determine the existence of "clear error" in those
situations in which unequivocal precedent does not yet exist?
The implementation of an appeals facility would also pre-
sent structural challenges that could exacerbate its legitimacy
problems. To start, there would be a clear tension between
the need to appoint experienced arbitrators to the appeals fa-
cility and the interest of representation. 30 7 Recent statistics
from ICSID show that the overwhelming majority of invest-
ment arbitrators are nationals of Western European countries,
the United States, Canada, or New Zealand.308 Moreover, the
membership of a representative appeals facility would likely be
split on controversial issues.309 This has direct consequences
for the force of their decisions. Precedent emanating from an
internally-divided appeals facility would not necessarily possess
305. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
306. Oldfather, Universal De Novo Review, supra note 1, at 309 ("Universal
de novo review provides appellate courts with a broad warrant to engage in
lawmaking.").
307. Cf Paulsson, supra note 183, at 258 (noting that the recruitment of
members of a permanent body would re-politicize investment arbitration).
The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding requires that the members of
the Appellate Body be "broadly representative of membership in the WTO."
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes art. 17.3, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401; 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994); see
also Qureshi & Khan, supra note 183, at 275 (favorably comparing the repre-
sentative nature of the WTO Appellate Body with the unrepresentative
panels that often judge BIT disputes.).
308. ICSID, supra note 198, at 27.
309. Cf Kalb, supra note 241, at 203 ("If... unresolved political conflicts
between states are at the source of the incoherence, the appellate body
would likely continue to reflect them.").
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the same claim to authority that a majority ruling from the
highest court in a well-developed court system may have.
310
Without the structural backing by a larger political system and
law enforcement, a deeply divided appeals facility in invest-
ment arbitration would be quite vulnerable. Of course, one
could require that the appeals facility decides unanimously.
Although this would force the members of the appeals facility
to reach agreement, such an approach might give rise to com-
promise decisions, which would not necessarily foster coher-
ence. Moreover, the community would give up the benefits of
transparency and frank debate,
311
Lastly, in light of the nature of the appeals facility and of
the professional and financial interests of reputable invest-
ment arbitrators, granting life tenure to members of the ap-
peals facility (and requiring that they give up on arbitrator as-
signments and counsel work) is neither realistic nor desira-
ble. 31 2 Instead, arbitrators would probably serve in staggered
terms of, at most, three years. The kind of institutional stabil-
ity that is present in the highest courts of most countries would
therefore be lacking. This would place further strains on the
development of consistent interpretations.
It is probably misconceived, at least at this time, to think
of investment law as a "system" comparable to national and
supranational legal orders. Although an appeals facility could
achieve greater unity, the establishment of an ultimate deci-
sion-maker would raise the stakes and bring with it significant
risks that pull in different directions. On the one hand, there
is a real chance that an appeals facility may not gain the au-
thority necessary to guide a lawmaking endeavor. This is espe-
310. Cf Carrington, supra note 118, at 583 (noting that en banc hearings
in which the court was evenly split "not only failed to resolve a conflict, but
probably exacerbated it by finding it unresolvable.").
311. Donald McRae contrasts the usual practice of the WTO Appellate
Body, in which opinions tend to be unanimous, with the International Court
ofJustice, in which concurring and dissenting opinions are often expressed
and used in scholarly analysis. McRae, supra note 271, at 382. In civil law
jurisdictions, judicial decisions are typically presented as coming from the
court. They do not identify how the judges voted or which judge authored
the opinion, nor do they provide concurring and dissenting opinions. MER-
RYMAN & PEREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 256, at 37.
312. Cf Gantz, supra note 3, at 68 (asserting that arbitrators, when not
engaged in work for the appellate mechanism, would likely serve as counsel
or arbitrators in investor-state disputes).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U Journal of International Law and Politics
1202 [Vol. 44:1109
APPEALS IN ARBITRATION
cially true so long as investors can arbitrate their disputes
outside of the ICSID framework. But a successful appeals facil-
ity would also come with significant downsides. A single-
minded focus on consistency and coherence comes at a high
price. It is easy to paint the Argentina awards and annulment
decisions as a poster child for the mess that results from inco-
herence. Yet it is also possible to view them as an energized
interaction between some of the brightest minds in investment
arbitration, trying to find the best answers to complex ques-
tions in public international law. At least at its current stage of
development, the international investment community is bet-
ter served by the preservation of horizontal dialogue and the
flexibility to adjust.
V. CONCLUSION
The conclusions reached in this Article are counterintui-
tive. In national and supra-national court systems, the princi-
pal justifications for appellate structures rest on the interests
of an entire legal community. The case for appellate review in
investment arbitration strongly resonates with those who be-
lieve adjudicators have a role to play in the articulation of pub-
lic values. The argument for providing parties to commercial
arbitrations with the option to get a "second bite at the apple"
is, on its face, significantly less compelling. This is not just be-
cause of the absence of lawmaking. Rather, the reason is that
the error correction justification for offering appellate review
in commercial arbitration is limited to a subset of users and
potential users of arbitration who are concerned about the risk
that comes with a one-tier process. The reason why legal sys-
tems pay for error correction is, perhaps, that it increases sub-
stantive justice and fairness of process for all litigants, includ-
ing many who are compelled to litigate because they were
named a defendant in a case over which a court assumed juris-
diction. Yet the private nature of commercial arbitration
should not stop us from considering ways in which value could
be added for a substantial number of parties. Conversely, the
public nature of investment arbitration provides a strong rea-
son to carefully weigh the drawbacks and risks presented by
centralized lawmaking.
The analysis conducted in this Article also shows that the
content of the error correction and lawmaking values is
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shaped by the substantive and procedural contexts in which
they operate. In turn, how the two values are balanced has
implications for the form an appeals process should take. To
be sustainable, any appeals system must strike a sensible bal-
ance between accuracy, diligence, and efficiency. In arbitra-
tion, appellate review will be successful only if it is carefully
tailored to meet the particular combination of goals the rele-
vant community seeks to achieve. In commercial arbitration,
an appeals procedure that is not carefully designed to give
meaning to error correction adds little value and will rightly
be ignored by almost all parties. On the other hand, a well-
thought-out appeals process could provide a ready-made alter-
native for those who wish to add substantive safeguards, in-
cluding potential parties who currently deem arbitration too
risky. In investment arbitration, an examination of how an ap-
peals facility would function suggests that it may well under-
mine the very goal its proponents seek to achieve.
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